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3Introduction
The following work is premised on a view of philosophy that is not quite widespread. 
According to this the majority of philosophical questions has to be considered against the 
backdrop of empirical knowledge. Concretely, if philosophy consists in the explication of 
conceptual relations, then I think that those concepts have to be specified in terms of the 
respective empirical theories and on the basis of this one can explicate the relevant 
conceptual relations. The philosophical problems that are supposed to be solved are those 
that came up in the course of the history of philosophy. To give an example concerning the 
topic of the following work, the question whether nonconceptual content exists or not is 
determined subject to neuroimaging studies. Thus I proceed not only on the assumption that 
philosophy has to be compatible with empirical theories, but I also think that philosophy is 
said to make use of empirical information in order to elaborate theoretical positions.
1
The following considerations oppose the view that language is constitutive of all kinds of 
mental
2  content. I will argue for a non-linguistic understanding of concepts and for the 
ontogenetic grounding of higher-level cognition in phenomenal structures. Moreover, I will 
go on at a realistic and intersubjectively objective view of the mental. 
The overall goal is to develop an exhaustive conceptualization of mental content in terms of 
embodied mental systems. One of the main principles of cognition I argue for is concept 
empiricism: All concepts are embodied in sensorimotor content. The vehicles of thought 
processing this content are perception and action mechanisms of the brain. (e.g., Varela et al. 
1991) 
The first Chapter aims at introducing crucial elements of embodied cognition. At first I will 
present Lakoff/Johnson's analyse of meaning and understanding in terms of image-schemata 
and basic-level concepts. In this context I will show how concrete and abstract concepts 
make use of the sensorimotor systems (what is called 'neural exploitation'). Three different 
notions of embodied simulation respectively residing in a certain functional cluster of the 
1 I think that the objection which is frequently made to neurobiologically grounded philosophical theories ( that 
is, neurophilosophy), namely that the interpretation of neural processes presupposes a phenomenological and 
social   prior  understanding,   is   not   conclusive.   Why?   Because   even   if  those  theories   rely   on   a   prior 
understanding, this does not imply that the prior understanding being used cannot be constituted by 
neurobiological processes. To this extent neurophilosophy may be considered as contributing to our self-
awareness. 
2 In order to avoid misunderstandings resulting from terminological ambiguities, I define ‘mental’, ‘mind’, 
‘cognitive’ and ‘internal as follows: I use ‘mental’ and ‘mind’ so that they are interchangeable. They name 
those episodes that can become globally available. We shall see later what this means. ‘Cognitive’ is only used 
if we name mental components whose activation is fully decoupleable from ongoing online cognition. That is, 
they have to be storable in long-term memory. ‘Internal’ processes stand for cognitive, mental and those 
processes that cannot become globally available. 
4brain are given. Subsequently, Milner/Goodale's two visual pathways hypothesis and the 
pervasive structure of sensorimotor coupling are brought in line. Then, the body schema and 
the body image are introduced as two functionally distinct components of the human brain. 
Finally the inverse and forward model are presented with the aim of giving a more or less 
non-neural functional determination of constituents of online processing. 
In Chapter two a functional characterization of phenomenal mental processes is given: 
Consciousness is analysed in terms of availability for guided attention, behavioural control, 
and cognitive processing (global availability). The three concepts introduced – presentation, 
representation, and simulation – are inter alia characterized by the degree to which they are 
globally available. Beyond that, I will delineate each concept in non-phenomenal terms. The 
majority of mental processes takes place non-phenomenally.
The   topic   of   Chapter   three   is   a   model   of   neuroscientific   explanation   (‘mechanistic 
explanations’) that reconsiders reduction, causation, emergence, identity, realisation, and 
multiple realisation. I think its highest merit is to emphasize the importance of making 
relations   between   different   levels   (e.g.,   functionally   individuated   brain   regions   and 
phenomenal experiences or observable behaviour) intelligible. 
Chapter four deals with Barsalou's theory of perceptual symbol systems (PSS). The pivotal 
idea is to ground higher-level cognition in re-enactments of sensorimotor areas of the brain. 
After   a   detailed   reconstruction   of   PSS,   I   will   outline   some   behavioural   and 
neurophenomenological evidence for embodied cognition in general and PSS in particular. A 
neurally embodied theory of language is also presented in this chapter. Finally, I will discuss 
objections to the entire project of concept empiricism.
The goal of Chapter five is to reveal the weaknesses of symbolism and connectionism as two 
versions of computationalism. These negative contributions are contrasted with a positive 
account of dynamical systems theory. It defines the mind in terms of an ongoing, real-time 
sensation-cognition-action process. 
The aim of Chapter six is to spell out the implications of embodied cognition in general and 
PSS in particular for classical philosophical questions concerning mental content. At first I 
will conceptualize an embodied theory of intentionality. Linked to that I will criticize some 
classical models of intentionality, pre-eminently the one of Putnam/Kripke and the model of 
informational semantics. Subsequently, I will provide four positive contributions: justifying 
why PSS or embodied simulation fixes mental content narrowly; giving a version of 
nonconceptual content; explicating that perception is cognitively penetrable; and showing 
how PSS as a version of concept empiricism can account for the indeterminateness of 
5conceptual processing. Then I will criticize the explanations a possible world semantics 
provides for non-synonymous co-extensional expressions and intensional contexts of beliefs. 
The second last section aims to eliminate, or reconsider, truth, reference, compositionality, 
and normativity as classical semantic notions, as already done with amodal symbols and the 
computational   version   of   propositions.   Finally,   I   will   elucidate   the   methodological 
consequences of embodied cognition – that is, argue for the unreliability of philosophical 
intuitions and formulate an epistemically relevant concept of possibility. 
1 Crucial thoughts of the embodied mind paradigm
The current mind-body problem […] is not whether minds are part of the natural world, but how 
they are. (Polger 2004, p. 1) 
My intention is to outline pivotal assumptions made by the embodied cognition framework. It 
is important to note that this chapter is not mainly argumentatively-oriented, but rather aims 
at making the approach of embodied cognition intelligible. As a matter of course, I introduce 
distinctions which are used later in more argumentative contexts.
1.1 Cognitivist objectivist semantics versus embodied cognition 
To make one's own profile clear it often seems appropriate to outline how it differs from the 
opposite position. Hence, I am going to briefly depict the crucial tenets of cognitivist 
objectivist semantics in order to subsequently present the basic philosophical ideas of 
embodied cognition.
(i) The meaning of mental states is based on a relation between symbolic, language-like 
mental   representations   and   objective,   mind-independent   reality.   These   symbolic 
representations   receive   their   content   exclusively   via   their   correspondence   to   external 
individuals, properties, and relations that are constituents of an objective world. (ii) Concepts 
are symbols that bear relations to other concepts within conceptual systems and correspond 
with individuals and categories of real and possible worlds. Concepts have to be quite 
general, since they represent what is common to various particular objects. The meaning of a 
concept is a function of the individuals to which it is applicable in all possible worlds. The 
meaning of a sentence-like proposition is a function of its truth-value in all possible worlds. 
(iii) Concepts are not bound to concrete embodied experiences of subjective minds. Their 
general, communicable, objective character requires that they are independent of any 
6concrete embodiment. Conceptual relations as objective relations are independent of the way 
they are intelligible within cognitive systems. What has been said so far implies that there is 
an objectivist view from which the correspondence between quasi-linguistic concepts and 
external states of affairs can be assessed. (iv) A theory of mental content must be able in 
principle to determine the truth conditions or satisfaction conditions of quasi-linguistic 
mental representations. The recursive character of a theory of mental content allows it to 
build larger true representations from smaller ones by means of logical connection. (cf. 
Lakoff 1987, pp. 157-84)
What is the opposite of this? On the basis of an experientialist account of cognition, 
meaningfulness is analysed in terms of preconceptual sensorimotor structures. Understanding 
is analysed in terms of meaningfulness. Truth in a psychological sense is analysed in terms of 
understanding the correspondence between cognitive mental representations and phenomenal 
experiences. Objectivity is analysed in terms of elucidating how we understand.
The external   referents   or  objective  states   of  affairs  are  only  intelligible   against  the 
background of our conceptual system. To act as if the description of the truth or satisfaction 
conditions of language-like mental representations were objective and independent of our 
conceptual system – whose very content is in need of explanation – is highly questionable. 
As we will see later, one could even go as far as to say that such an objectivist 
conceptualization of mental content is due to a naïve realism that is suggested by our 
transparent   phenomenal   mental   world   model,   which   can   be   characterized   at   best  in 
teleofunctionalist terms. I am drawn to the conclusion that cognitivist objectivist semantics 
considers nonconceptual visual experiences as being in contact with the external world. How 
could it otherwise be considered possible to provide quasi-linguistic tokens with meaning by 
relating them with objective descriptions – that rely on our conceptual system – of truth-
conditions? Would one say that one can articulate truth or satisfaction conditions of 
language-like representations, if one appreciated the non-epistemic phenomenal character of 
visual perception? Would one speak of describing truth or satisfaction conditions, if one 
thought that the described referents or states of affairs were not phenomenally accessible? I 
don’t think so. 
What does it mean to say that meaningfulness is analysed in terms of preconceptual 
sensorimotor structures?
71.2 Lakoff/Johnson's notions of image schemata and basic-level concepts
The project undertaken by Lakoff (1980, 1987) and Johnson (1987) (1999) is presented here. 
In order to outline the sense of embodied understanding and meaning that Johnson and 
Lakoff have in mind, it is essential to elucidate the roles played by  kinesthetic  image 
schemata  (or  embodied schemata) and  basic-level concepts. The experientialist strategy 
characterizes meaning in terms of experiences undergone by biological organisms. More 
concretely, the conceptual structures arise from bodily experiences themselves that are pre-
conceptually structured. Our pre-conceptual experiences are structured at least two-fold: 
Through   basic-level   structures   and   kinesthetic   image-schematic   structures.   Basic-level 
concepts directly correspond to preconceptual structures that are based on the part-whole 
structure in gestalt perception (e.g., the shape of a tiger quite rich in structure), our capacity 
for motor movement and mental imagery. These basic-level concepts should not be regarded 
as primitive, non-analysable, and unstructured building blocks of conceptual systems. 
Importantly, being structured and being non-basal do not coincide with one another. They are 
actually intermediate in conceptual systems – for example, chairs are subordinate to furniture 
and superordinate to office chairs. Yet what is critical is that they are human artifacts which 
are constructed so that our bodies can optimally interact with them. Human beings possess 
basic-level concepts for objects (e.g., tables, tigers, water (they correspond to the aspect of 
'natural kinds' that is phenomenally visible with the naked eye) etc.), actions (e.g., eating, 
running, walking, etc.), and properties (e.g., small, cold, soft, red, etc.). Image schemata are 
structures that are constitutive of our common bodily experience. Compared with basic-level 
concepts, they are a lot less structured, they exhibit structure only along general lines. 
Typical examples are the CONTAINER schema (structural elements: an interior, a boundary, 
an exterior), the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema (structural elements: a starting point, an 
end point, a path from starting to end point, direction toward the end point) the LINK schema 
(structural elements: two entities, A and B, and a connecting link), the PART-WHOLE 
schema (structural elements: a whole, parts, and a configuration), and the UP-DOWN 
schema. These pre-conceptual structures of experience are directly meaningful, not least 
because they are immediately and constantly experienced arising from the way our body 
functions in an environment. 
Because we also apply abstract concepts, the question arises as to how abstract concepts can 
develop from basic-level and image-schematic structure. For one thing, by metaphorical 
projection from the direct experienced phenomenal physical domain to abstract domains; for 
8another thing, by projection from basic-level to super- and subordinate categories. We will 
restrict ourselves to an explication of the former. The following examples of metaphorical 
projection are typical: We understand the target domain QUANTITY in terms of structures 
of   the   source   domain   VERTICALITY   (more   corresponds   to   up,   less   to   down:   the 
VERTICALITY metaphor makes QUANTITY intelligible); arguments as a target domain are 
made intelligible in terms of structures of the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema (the first 
premise as starting point, the conclusion as end point, etc.); we understand slavery as 
bondage or freedom as not being tied down (the LINK schema as the source domain of the 
metaphorical projection); logical structures like transitivity (A→B, B→C, hence A→C) are 
understood within the frame of the CONTAINER schema (B contains A and C contains B; 
hence, C contains A). 
What the last example (more importantly) should make clear is that the logical structure (in 
the example, transitivity) is already meaningful to human beings due to their bodily 
experiences. It is just not the case that disembodied, meaningless logical structures form the 
scaffold of thought. In fact, the structure is already meaningful and tailor-made for the human 
body. Hence, understanding and thought are not sensitive only to meaningless structures. 
According to the spatialization of form hypothesis, the spatial structure (to which several 
image   schemata   correspond)   is   mapped   onto   the   conceptual   structure:   For   example, 
categories are understood in terms of CONTAINER schemas, relational structures are 
intelligible in terms of LINK schemas, or radial structures are taken in terms of CENTER-
PERIPHERY schemas. If one applies the theory to itself, that is, if one asks about the way 
metaphorical   projections   are   understood   within   cognitive   systems,   then   it   seems 
unproblematic to say that they are also understood in terms of projected image schemata: 
Within the frame of the CONTAINER schema, source and target domains are understood as 
being set off from one another, the metaphorical mapping from source to target domain (the 
conceptual domain) is understood in terms of the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema, although 
the path as a structural element is unspecified. 
If the cognitivist objectivist semantics takes the following principles for granted, it neglects 
how the human conceptual system (in contrast to artificially construed systems) works: (1) 
Every concept is either primitive or composed of primitives by completely productive 
principles of semantic composition. (2) The internal structure of conceptual systems arises 
entirely from the application of completely productive principles of semantic composition. 
(3) Only those concepts without internal structure are directly meaningful. Both basic-level 
and image-schematic concepts have internal structure and are directly meaningful – hence at 
9odds   with   (3).   Additionally,   basic-level   and   image-schematic   concepts   have   internal 
structures that cannot result from applying completely productive principles of composition – 
hence at odds with (2). (Lakoff 1987, pp. 269-303)
In connection with the phenomenally catchy notion of image schemata the question arises 
whether this grounding of conceptual processing in preconceptual sensorimotor structures is 
also neurally plausible. The following section is supposed to show that it is really like that.
1.3 Neural exploitation – how concrete and abstract concepts make use of the 
sensorimotor system (Gallese & Lakoff 2005)
The following deliberations on neural exploitation anticipate the basic thought of PSS (see 
Chapter four), namely, that higher-level cognition bases on the re-enactment of sensorimotor 
areas. The continuity involved between the representational formats of online sensorimotor 
and cognitive processing is a keynote of this work. 
Understanding concrete concepts (phenomenally re-presented physical actions and objects) 
requires sensorimotor simulation. Sensorimotor simulation is carried out by the sensorimotor 
system of the brain. What one understands of a sentence in a certain context via sensorimotor 
simulation is the content of that sentence in this context. This is incompatible with the claim 
that concrete concepts are modality-neutral and disembodied. 
Since any theory of concrete concepts must capture all of the existing sensorimotor structure 
(agent-object-location, manner, purposes, and phases), a modality-neutral theory of concepts 
needs to assume that this structure is represented neurally outside the sensorimotor system. 
Because this sensorimotor structure exists in the sensorimotor system, it would have to be 
duplicated outside the sensorimotor system in order that such a modality-neutral theory could 
be true. Proponents of an embodied neural theory of concepts simply appeal to an Occam's 
Razor argument – the duplication is just superfluous. 
Basic-level concepts are constituted by the convergence of the gestalt perception of objects 
(both observed or imagined) and the motor programs which account for interaction with 
objects (again, both performed or imagined). Functional neural clusters bring the perceptual 
and motor properties together (sensorimotor coupling). 
Taking the example of the action concept grasp, I will now elucidate three central points: that 
single neurons fire 'multimodally', that 'functional clusters' realize multimodal firing, and that 
understanding is 'mental simulation'. 
10To say that an action such as grasping is multimodal here means that its neural enactment 
consists in the activation of neural substrates which are used for both perception and action. 
It has been demonstrated, for example, that the premotor area F4 comprises neurons that 
integrate motor, visual, and somatosensory modalities in order to control actions in space and 
to perceive the space reachable by body parts ('peri-personal space') (e.g., Rizzolatti & 
Gallese 2004). Moreover, it has been shown that F4 neurons also integrate auditory 
information about the location of objects within peri-personal space (Graziano et al. 1999). 
What is critical is that the same neurons that control target-oriented actions also respond to 
visual, somatosensory, and auditory information about objects to which they are directed. 
They respond that way because they are part of a certain cortical network – in other words, 
they are part of a certain functional cluster.
What is a network in this context? In addition to the two other parietal-premotor networks 
that realise multimodal functions, the F4-VIP functional cluster transforms the spatial 
position of objects in the peri-personal space into the most apt motor programs for interacting 
with these objects. If this functional cluster is damaged, conscious awareness of, and 
interaction with objects localised therein are not possible (Rizzolatti et al. 2000). Here the 
spatial position of the objects is much more important than their properties. The F5ab-AIP 
functional cluster comprises 'canonical neurons' that transform physical features of objects 
(such as shape, or size) into the most apt hand-motor programs for acting on them. Whereby 
the properties of the objects are much more important than their spatial positions. Damage to 
this cluster would result in visuomotor grasping deficits, whereby motor capacities for 
grasping would remain intact (e.g., Fogassi et al. 2001). The F5c-PF functional cluster 
comprises 'mirror neurons' that respond when subjects perform goal-related hand actions and 
when they observe other individuals performing similar actions (Rizzolatti 2001 et al.). 
Where does mental simulation come into play?
Note that the same neurons that fire when a monkey turns its head toward a certain location 
in its peri-personal space also discharge when an object is in place, or it sounds, at the same 
location toward the monkey would turn its head, if he would actually do. Thus, action 
simulation is responsible for automatically triggering an action plan in response to the sight 
or sound of an object at the respective location. If the neurons fire in the presence of the sight 
or sound of the object without turning the head, it makes sense to say that these neurons 
simulate the action toward the respective location. This takes place within the F4-VIP cluster. 
Within the F5ab-AIP cluster are 'canonical neurons' that fire both when the monkey actually 
is grasping an object and when it sees an object that it could grasp but does not. It is indeed 
11the case that the same neurons that respond for the execution of a certain manner of grasping 
a particular object also fire if that same object is merely observed. Observing a graspable 
object only triggers those neurons that provide a suitable manner for interacting with it 
(Gallese 2003). Obviously, if the motor programs are triggered without being executed, one 
speaks of action simulation. 
The 'mirror neurons' within the F5c-PF cluster do not discharge if the object one could act on 
is simply seen. They also do not respond if the observed action is performed with a tool. 
Indeed, some mirror neurons are (about 30%) 'strictly congruent' and fire when the action 
seen is exactly the same as the action performed. Others (about 70%) fire when the monkey 
either grasps with a pincer grip or perceives any type of grasping. The point is that when a 
monkey sees or hears another subject performing an action it simply simulates the same 
action. 
What is the corresponding evidence for embodied simulations in the case of humans? Firstly, 
homologous to the F4-VIP cluster in monkeys, a functional cluster that fires when stimuli in 
the peri-personal space are seen or heard was found in humans. What is critical is that a 
premotor area is activated during such perception, an area that controls movements in the 
peri-personal space (Bremmer et al. 2001). Secondly, it was shown that while observing, 
silently naming, and imagining using man-made objects, the subjects’ ventral premotor 
cortex was active – an area that discharges if subjects are using the respective tools to 
perform actions (e.g., Chao & Martin 2000). These neurons stand for the 'canonical neurons' 
found in monkeys. Thirdly, several brain-imaging studies show that while humans are 
observing actions of conspecifics, premotor and parietal areas are active which most likely 
are the homologue to the mirror system found in monkeys (e.g., Buccino et al. 2001). The 
mirror system matches action observation and execution. 
Because these types of simulations are triggered by external input, they can be regarded as 
more or less online processes. That is not to say that the simulated contents are only 
determined in terms of bottom-up information, it quite plausible to assume that memorized 
information is relevant to those simulations. Moreover, are there simulated contents that can 
be internally triggered, in addition to that they bear on memorized contents?
3 
Mental imagery as embodied simulation embraces both embodied visual imagery and 
embodied motor imagery. Visual imagery makes use of some of the same neural areas that 
3  This internal triggering is understood as being internal to the effect that the simulated contents bear no 
perceptual resemblance to the triggering inputs. Concretely, if you read a sentence that triggers a perceptual 
simulation whose contents have nothing to do with the phenomenal environment in which your are located, then 
I take this triggering as being internal. I think of lack of perceptual resemblance as a necessary condition for 
internal triggering.
12are activated during seeing (Kosslyn 2006, Farah 2000). It was shown, for instance, that the 
time needed to scan a visual scene is quasi identical to the time it takes to scan the scene in 
imagination (Kosslyn et al. 1978). It was further probed that imaging and actually perceiving 
the same scene share certain neural correlates (Farah 1989, Kosslyn 1994), such as the 
primary visual cortex. 
During motor imagery, some of the same brain areas are used which are responsible for 
action. Brain-imaging studies have demonstrated that executed actions and motor imagery 
both   activate   a   common   neural   network   –   consisting   of   the   premotor   cortex,   the 
supplementary motor area (SMA), the basal ganglia, and the cerebellum (cf. Jeannerod 
1994). Evidence for the embodied nature of motor imagery is that heartbeat and breathing 
frequency increases when one simulates bodily performance (Decety 1991). 
Complex premotor structures are called 'executing schemas' (or X-schemas). Actions differ 
from each other in the kind of premotor structure they make use of and how they are linked 
to the motor cortex and other sensory areas that subserve perceptual and somatosensory 
feedback. What is most important for our purposes is that the X-schemas of the premotor 
system can function independently of the execution of motor behaviour – in understanding 
language or planning action, for example.
4 In respect thereof, this comes close to Clark and 
Grush’s concept of ‘full-blooded representation’ (1999, p. 10), because the independent 
functioning of the premotor cortex is a mechanism that can be fully decoupled from ongoing 
environmental input. The same applies to visual imagery. 
1.4  Sensorimotor coupling and a weakened version of the dual visual systems 
hypothesis 
As sensorimotor coupling was an essential part of the last section, the question arises whether 
it is compatible with a meanwhile known thesis, namely, the dual visual system hypothesis. 
Prima facie its basic idea, that is, a functional distinction between vision-for-action and 
vision-for-phenomenal-perception, discounts sensorimotor coupling.
4  This question is obvious: How are these neural mechanisms related to basic-level concepts and image-
schemata? The sentence The cat is on the mat is true only relative to our embodied understanding of the world – 
basic-level categories and words for them like cat and mat are recognizable by means of our gestalt perception, 
and we can interact with them in virtue of our motor programs (that is, the different X-schemas). ON can be 
analysed in terms of three kinesthetic schemas: ABOVE, CONTACT, and SUPPORT. The category animal 
neither directly corresponds to our gestalt perception, nor do we have motor programs for interacting with 
animals in general. The homologue of canonical neurons in humans could make up the neural correlate of basic-
level categories. 
13The dual visual systems hypothesis of Milner/Goodale (1995, 2005) is characterized by these 
three theses: Vision-for-action and vision-for-perception are functionally distinguished, this 
functional distinction is reflected by the anatomical segregation between the dorsal and 
ventral stream of human vision, and awareness is restricted to vision-for-perception. This 
functional distinction is inter alia confirmed by the fact that people are not under certain 
phenomenal visual illusions (e.g., the Ebbinghaus illusion) if their behaviour is controlled by 
unconscious vision (Milner & Goodale 1995, Chapter six). 
According to a weakened version of the dual visual systems hypothesis (which avoids a strict 
isolation of these two streams), the degree of stream independence and the nature and extent 
of stream interaction are task- and attention-dependent (cf. Jeannerod 1997; Decety & Grezes 
1999). Moreover, Pascual-Leone and Walsh (2001) showed that feedback from high 
(V5/MT) to low-level visual (V1 and V2) areas is necessary for certain forms of conscious 
visual perception. Nevertheless, the crucial insight remains – fine-action-guiding visual 
processing is often carried out independently of the processes underlying phenomenal vision. 
Clearly, sensorimotor coupling can take place both at the non-phenomenal and at the 
phenomenal level. Thus it is well compatible with the two visual systems hypothesis. 
The following section draws a distinction that is in line with setting vision-for-phenomenal-
perception apart from vision-for-action.
1.5 Body schema and body image – double dissociated phenomena
A body schema is a system of sensorimotor processes which permanently controls posture 
and movement and thereby functions without reflective awareness and conscious perceptual 
monitoring. Body schemas can also be conceived of as an assemblage of sensorimotor 
interactions which define a specific movement or posture, such as the rotation of the ankle 
within the larger movement of curling a free-kick. The body image, by contrast, is a 
sometimes conscious system of perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and dispositions with reference 
to one's own body. It involves at least three different aspects: body percept, body concept, 
and body affect. The body percept is the subject's perceptual experience of his or her own 
body; the body concept is the subject's conceptual understanding of the body in general; and 
the body affect is the emotional attitude of the subject toward his or her own body. Whereas 
the   body   image   phenomenally   depicts   the   body   as   clearly   differentiated   from   its 
environment, the body schema functions in an integrated way with its environment.
14In a case of unilateral neglect, the patient has an intact body schema but a missing body 
image. Stroke patients sometimes do not perceive or attend to one side of their body. This is 
the result of brain lesions in the hemisphere opposite the neglected side (contralateral). As 
excluded from the body image, the respective side is ignored, denied, and sometimes 
disowned, as if it does not belong to the patient. Decisively, though those patients are not 
visually conscious of the body parts of the neglected side, they are able to use this side to 
dress, walk, eat, and so on. These complex spatial and motor skills are explained by an intact 
body schema. 
In instances of deafferentation, the contrary is the case: Though the patient (IW) has an intact 
body image, he lacks an intact body schema. If you ask the patient to close his eyes, point to 
his thighs, and if you move his thighs, he is unable to point to his thighs, since without 
phenomenal vision and proprioception (due to a lacking body schema), he does not know 
where his hand and his thighs are located. A person with normal proprioception has no 
problem with this task. The patient has no sense of touch and proprioception below the neck 
as a result of a sensory neuropathy in which large fibres below the neck have been harmed 
due to illness. 
The body-schema system can be considered as satisfying three functions: (1) processing new 
information about posture and movement; (2) producing movement patterns; (3) enabling 
intermodal communication between proprioception and other modalities. 
(1) Visual proprioception and visual kinesthesis (cf. Gibson 1979, Neisser 1976) provide 
information about the environment and the way the organism moves through it is directly 
related to the body schema. Supported by the vestibular system, these two sources of 
information allow one to distinguish between movements made by environmental objects and 
one's own movements. Non-visual proprioception, in the sense of somatic information about 
joint position and limb extension, is the major source of information of present bodily 
position and posture. The pre-reflective proprioceptive awareness (feeling one's thighs with 
one's eyes closed) has to be distinguished from non-conscious proprioceptive content 
processing – thus, somatic proprioception is twofold. (2) At the behavioural level, a motor 
schema corresponds to an elemental aspect (e.g., rotating one's ankle) of a larger movement 
(curling a free-kick). At the neural level, a motor schema corresponds to the neuronal activity 
required for this elemental aspect of the whole movement. Visually-guided movements 
usually activate the dorsal stream and feed into the system for initiating a motor program. 
IW's visual control of movement, in comparison, activates the ventral stream and orbito-
frontal cortex (areas responsible for cognitive and non-motor visual tasks). One way to 
15explain IW's lack of proprioceptive information about motor programs is that proprioception 
fails to note the present motor state and therefore the motor program cannot be accessed in 
that way (e.g., he cannot easily hold a conversation while he is dressing, since the latter needs 
his full attention). (3) Normally there is an intermodal translation between vision and 
proprioception  that allows visual perception  to inform and coordinate behaviour and 
proprioceptive simulations of another person's movements – an innate feature of the human 
sensorimotor system. The patient IW can compensate for the deficits by processing the 
relevant information about his own body via the body image. 
Since IW's sense of ownership was re-established very quickly, and we normally have a 
sense of ownership with closed eyes, the body image and the body schema play an important 
role in constituting our sense of ownership. The fact that IW's control over movements and 
his sense of agency were regained (cf. TMS study in Cole 1995) by using aspects of his body 
image shows that the sense of agency is not tied to proprioceptive feedback. Moreover, the 
more one can make one's movements automatic by using learned motor programs, and the 
less attention such movements thus take, the more holistically embodied they appear.
5 
1.6 At a subpersonal functional (non-neural) level – the inverse model and the 
forward model 
Also due to the fact that I will later draw on the forward model to reply to an objection to 
concept empiricism (namely, that solving the frame problem does not come for free for 
theories that ground higher-level cognition in the sensorimotor systems), I am now going to 
introduce the notions of 'forward model' and 'inverse model'.
The inverse model functions in a simple adaptive control system for general purpose motor 
control. This control system can be understood analogously to a thermostat consisting of six 
elements: (1) A target signal (the desired room temperature); (2) an input signal (the actual 
room temperature) that is the joint result of (3), exogenous environmental events and the 
output of the control system (heat output); (4) a comparator that determines whether target 
and input signals match and the degree of the match/mismatch (e.g., the room is seven 
degrees below the desired temperature); (5) output that is determined by comparing target 
5 Furthermore, the three notions of motor space, proprioceptive space, and conscious perceptual space have to 
be distinguished. Motor space and phenomenal perceptual space differ in that the former functions in an 
egocentric space of reference and the latter in an allocentric frame of reference. Mirror drawing also shows how 
proprioceptive directions come into conflict with phenomenal visual directions. (Gallagher 2005, first two 
chapters)
16and input signals (e.g., decreasing the heat output); (6) a feedback loop by which the output 
effects the succeeding input signal (e.g., actual room temperature decreases). The function 
which maps target signals to the output in the context of actual input signals is called an 
inverse model. The feedback which operates in real time is designated as re-afferent feedback 
– that is, input to a system resulting from the organism's own activity (by contrast with ex-
afferent input which results from exogenous events). Visual and proprioceptive inputs in 
consequence of moving one's limbs or movement through space are re-afferent inputs. This 
system is adaptive in that it adjusts itself to altering conditions in the environment and 
compensates for exogenous disturbances. The control process is dynamic and cyclical – 
information about inputs is not cut off from information about outputs; and the control 
process does not have discrete steps or a non-arbitrary start or finish. 
The idea of a forward model consists in mapping the output signal back onto the input signal 
(what is often called 'efference copy'). The function of the forward model is to predict the 
consequences of the output on input. Efference copies generate a simulation of the expected 
effects of the output which allows the speeding up of the control process and the smoothing 
of the respective behavioural trajectory. This simulation is low-level, because it can perform 
its speeding and smoothing without being globally available, whether it uses actual or 
simulated feedback. (e.g., Wolpert et al. 2003) Comparing efference copy with re-afference 
provides the required information to distinguish between self-activity and activity of the 
world. Cell assemblies which mediate the connection between efference copy and input 
signals could have both motor and sensory fields. Suppose that you grasp an apple and bite 
into it, then there will be an association between your efference copy for the grasping and 
eating movements and multimodal inputs characteristic of such movements. Canonical 
neurons are good candidates for such sensorimotor affordance neurons. (Hurley 2008) 
In the next I would like to demarcate our understanding of embodied and embedded mind 
from a position that is called ‘extended functionalism’. 
1.7 Embodied and embedded mind without extended functionalism
The theses of both embodied and embedded mind must be distinguished from the thesis of 
extended mind. According to the latter some mental processes are partially constituted by 
processes of environmental manipulation. Since mental states and environmental structures 
satisfy the same (coarsely individuated) functional roles, they are identical. These functional 
roles are taken as being multiple realisable – they are either realised by neural or non-neural 
17external structures. (Wheeler forthcoming, pp. 3-5) By contrast, the thesis of embedded mind 
only speaks of a dependence of mental processes on the environment – that is, some mental 
processes only function in connection with environmental structures. In other words, being 
situated in a wider system of scaffolding, mental processes are vitally facilitated. Since the 
thesis of embodied mind only says that some mental processes are partially constituted by 
non-neural bodily structures and processes, it is obvious that it must be separated from the 
thesis of extended mind. (Rowlands 2009, p. 54) As we will see later in more detail, the 
crucial problems of extended functionalism is an too undifferentiated view of multiple 
realisability and the neglect of neurally embodied conceptual structures.
That which advocates of extended functionalism consider as external is  regarded in the 
following chapter as belonging to a neurally generated phenomenal world model. However, 
that is not to say that extended functionalism is true within the scope of our phenomenal 
world  model.   Moreover,  Lakoff  and  Johnson's idea  that conceptual  understanding   is 
grounded in sensorimotor structures will be revisited in the second section of the following 
chapter. What’s more, the concept of simulation will be considered in respect of its 
epistemological status. 
2 Conceptual tools: Representation, simulation, and presentation
Presentata, through their output decoupling, enable the system to develop a larger behavioral 
repertoire relative to a given stimulus situation. Representata integrate those basic forms of 
sensory-driven content into full-blown models of the current state of the external world. 
Advanced representata, through input decoupling, then allow a system to develop a larger inner 
behavioral repertoire, if they are activated by internal causes – that is, as simulata. (Metzinger 
2003, p. 49) 
The overall  purpose of this chapter is to provide an exhaustive theoretical framework 
(including a uniform terminology) for mental content. The distinctions included therein are 
especially relevant to the Chapters four and six, because concepts like intentionality, 
reference,   and   truth   cannot   be   grasped   adequately   without   having   a   precise   and 
comprehensive typology of mental occurrences. This typology is mainly borrowed from 
Thomas Metzinger’s Being No One (2003).
182.1 A mind-dependent reality – conscious experience as a virtual world
Given that a naïve realistic understanding of phenomenal visual perceptions is subject of my 
criticism of classical theories of mental content, and given that, as previously mentioned, 
higher-level cognition is grounded in phenomenal representations and we will appeal to PSS 
as a theory of higher-level cognition later (see 4.3), it is not of no significance to clarify the 
epistemological status of phenomenal representations.
What is meant by reality? Everyday objects, such as tables, cars, or trees are mind-dependent. 
Irrespective of whether one speaks (possibly in the frame of philosophical theories) of them 
as ontological entities or in terms statements about those entities, they are nothing more than 
objects of our phenomenal world model created by the brain. With respect to those entities, 
the distinction between a 'minimal' and 'qualitative realism' is not particularly relevant, 
because their existence as basic elements of reality is already mind-dependent. This is a 
position that in the classical realism/anti-realism debate is called 'eliminative anti-realism' 
(Willaschek 2003, p. 12). 
What is meant by dependent? Does the classical distinction between causal dependency (an 
event A is causally dependent on another event B iff B belongs to the causes of A) and 
conceptual dependency of thought (the statement that p is conceptually dependent on the 
statement that q iff q is non-exclusively logically implied by p and q is a statement about 
mental occurrences) (cf. ibid., pp. 29-34)
6 work? An 'extensional' dubbed model of causal 
relations between ordinary objects is as phenomenally, and therefore neurally, constrained as 
our statements about mental processes. To act as if the whole problem of mind-world relation 
is nothing more than explaining how we can form reliable beliefs about phenomenally 
perceived objects falls significantly short, particularly as the seen table is not the cause of 
your phenomenal visual perception but the result of your brain's construction process. Any 
distinction between extensional (at least with respect to everyday objects) and intensional 
sentences takes place against the background of our phenomenal world model. To this extent, 
the phenomenally represented world is already mind-dependent, and in a causal way. 
Last but not least, what is mind – conceived in quite general terms? The dynamical self-
organisation of the brain, which, inter alia, generates processing on the level of global 
availability. More about this later. 
6 For example, when somebody kicks against a door and as a result the door begins to vibrate, then the vibration 
is causally dependent on the kicking. The sentence, “It is more reasonable not to protest against it”, is 
conceptually dependent on thought, because it implies that some people regard the renunciation of protest as 
more reasonable and this is a statement about mental occurrences.   
19Given that our physical body interacts with the physical world and that our phenomenal 
experiences function, inter alia, to enable complex behaviour, and given that phenomenal 
structures can be processed unconsciously within the organism also to coordinate behaviour 
in the physical world, phenomenal representations have to preserve some structures of the 
physical world. 
Considering that it is a strong, far-reaching, and, for our purposes, not unimportant thesis that 
our phenomenal perceptual world is neurally constructed, what reasons suggest that this is 
true? Firstly, the natural function of mental content is to generate intentional representations. 
In order to be behaviourally related to the environment, any biological agent must exchange 
information with the environment. On the physical level of description, the biological agents 
are exposed to diverse energies – electromagnetic, mechanical, and chemical energy. Only 
because of interaction with the living organisms can the energy be determined in terms of 
stimuli – that is, visual or auditory stimuli, for example. By virtue of interaction between 
organisms and energy, the resulting stimuli are transduced into a 'common informational 
code': The receptors of the different sensory modalities convert the different types of energy 
into action potentials (electrochemical excitability of cells), that is, the common code. This 
common code enables communication between billions of neurons of the central nervous 
system.   (Gallese   2003,   p.   1232)   The   components   of   our   visual  system   process   the 
information contained in photons that are part of the external world in order to make location, 
texture, movement, colour of environmental objects accessible for the mind. This is similar in 
the case of the auditory system, that uses information contained in atmospheric compression 
waves to determine the spatial position of objects. (Hardcastle 1999, p. 107) Secondly, as an 
argument against the justification of claiming that vision reconstructs the physical world, we 
ought to be able to compare the physical objects with our visual representations so as to 
decide whether a physical world is reconstructed. That, however, is excluded as a matter of 
principle: Even if we use high-tech instruments to extend the range of our senses, our visual 
system always has to generate a phenomenal representation. (Davies et al. 2002, pp. 79-81) If 
one admits phenomenal theoretical models of the the physical world as justificatory contrast, 
then to assume a strong reconstructive nature is wrong, given the above-mentioned first 
point. Thirdly, evidence from quantum mechanics suggests that the psychological spatial 
system (instantiated in networks of neurons – e.g., the hippocampus as the allocentric spatial 
mapping system), in which discrete entities causally interact with each other, does not 
correspond to the physical reality. For example, properties like position and velocity, which 
are independent of each other at the macroscopic level, are not so at the microscopic level. 
20(cf. O'Keefe 1993, pp. 47-51) Fourthly, clearly, from the fact that one can bring forth 
phenomenal presentations by electrically stimulating certain representational brain areas it 
does not follow that in normal circumstances our phenomenally perceived environment has 
no structural overlap with the physical world. What this at least entails is that the structures 
of   our   phenomenal   world   are   entirely   internally   constructable.   Fifthly,   the   fact   that 
neuroscientists have determined a wealth of neural areas respectively necessary for certain 
phenomena   or   capacities   (e.g.,   motion,   depth,   form,   colour)   and   given   that   those 
neurophenomenological structures are the product of evolution, to which other animals with 
another   neurophenomenological   structures   also   belong,   suggests   that   our   phenomenal 
experiences do not have direct access to objective reality. Sixthly, there is no one-to-one 
correspondence between physical properties and phenomenal experiences – the same green27 
is caused by different mixtures of wave lengths. (Metzinger 2009, p. 20) Seventhly, due to 
the fact that the transduction and conduction velocities of different sensory modalities differ 
from one another, the system itself needs a 'window of simultaneity' in which multimodal 
object representations occur (e.g., we experience the taste and colour of a red apple at the 
same). Thus, this temporal presence does not literally take place in physical systems, but is 
phenomenally generated. For example, it seems empirically plausible that elementary sensory 
information (e.g., colours, motion properties, shapes) is integrated into the conscious 
experience of a multimodal object by the synchronization of neural responses (Singer 2000).
If these points are not considered as sufficient reasons for the existence of a phenomenal 
world   model,   I   take   its   existence   at   least   for   granted   with   respect   to   my   further 
argumentation. 
2.2 Mental and phenomenal representation
Beforehand it is important to say that the subsequently presented concept of representation 
differs from Clark and Grush's notion of 'full-blooded representation' (1999) (see 1.3). The 
central functional property of 'full-blooded representation' (that is, internal structures that can 
reactivate multimodal experiences independent of ongoing environmental input) is taken into 
account by our concept of simulation  rather than by our or Metzinger's concept of 
representation. 
The first concept I explicate is mental representation. Mental representation is analysed as a 
three-place   relationship:   the   representandum   as   the   object   of   the   representation;   the 
representatum as the concrete internal state which carries information concerning the object; 
21the representation as the process by which the system as a whole produces the internal state.
7 
In the case of the representatum, it is important to make sure that one does not commit the 
'error of phenomenological reification' (Metzinger 2003, p. 22): What one is likely to 
experience as a stable content is itself constituted by an ongoing process that phenomenally 
erases its own temporality. Here, the phenomenal experience itself suggests the neglect of the 
transition from mental processes to stable mental objects. Moreover, the precise way we refer 
in natural languages to phenomenal contents erases the dynamics of phenomenal and 
informational processing. When we speak of a content of a single phenomenal propositional 
attitude, the experiential content of an ongoing representational process is reified. This 
reification brings with it the danger of committing the classical phenomenological fallacy: 
Clearly, the content of qualitative experiences such as a hallucination of a three-armed pink 
elephant, for example, cannot be analysed as a non-physical object that, inter alia, possesses 
the property 'pinkness'. The above-mentioned phenomenal now is a virtual actuality that is 
probably a teleofunctionalist property of the biological system: The representatum represents 
a part of the world (both external and internal) for a certain biological system in order to 
achieve its aims. 
Now let  us shift our attention to the notion of phenomenal representation. A functional 
criterion   for   demarcating   phenomenal   representations   is   that   they   carry   exactly   that 
information which possesses the following three dispositional properties: availability for 
guided attention, for cognitive processing (e.g., availability for generating concepts), and 
availability  for behavioral control.  It is useful to  distinguish between  four kinds of 
introspection: (1) Introspection as 'external attention' is a subsymbolic meta-representation 
that operates on an internally  generated world-model (thereby serving teleofunctional 
purposes) and takes its intentional content as external. It corresponds to the phenomenal 
experience   of   attending   to   environmental   objects.   (2)   Introspection   as   'consciously 
experienced cognitive reference' is a conceptual meta-representation that phenomenally 
represents the cognitive reference to an internal state whose content itself is regarded as 
external. The cognitive reference itself is phenomenally experienced (it operates on a world-
model as well). (3) Introspection as 'inward attention' is a subsymbolic meta-representation 
that operates on an internally generated self-model. Thus the introspective experience focuses 
7 This is not taken to mean that the representation ascribes properties to the representandum (to be understood 
against the backdrop of our phenomenality). The way in which the representandum is represented most often 
entails the information which is to be carried by the representatum. One could say that the something is 
represented as existent. 
Clearly, if one makes the assumption that our physical body exists in the physical world, then the brain must 
represent in a way which allows the more or less successful existence in the physical world. 
22on an internal state whose content is regarded as internal. (4) Introspection as 'consciously 
experienced cognitive self-reference' is a conceptual form of self-knowledge directed toward 
internal states that are internally regarded as internal (it operates again on a self-model). We 
consciously experience that we are currently cognitively referring to our own states.
8 
What does it mean  that conscious experience is  subjective  experience? Functionally, 
information is integrated into an internal model of reality of an individual system which 
thereby gets privileged introspective access to this information. At the phenomenal level, 
subjective information can be integrated into the conscious self-representation the system is 
currently   having.   Introspection   as   'inward   attention'   and   as   'consciously   experienced 
cognitive self-reference' are those processes which make information  subjective  in a 
phenomenal sense. 
Availability for cognitive processing can be characterized by the following principle: A 
necessary condition for becoming the content of cognitive reference is that the content is 
phenomenally   re-presented   –   what  is   called   the   'principle   of   phenomenal   reference'. 
Phenomenally   re-presented   information   can   be   categorized   and   memorized,   it   is 
'recognizable' information. Whereas processes like day-dreaming or low-level attention may 
be initiated by unconscious information causally functioning within the system, self-
triggered, explicit cognition exclusively operates on phenomenally re-presented information. 
Availability for the control of action with respect to phenomenally re-presented information 
is limited to a certain class of actions – namely, 'selective  actions' directed toward the 
phenomenally   re-presented   content.   This   kind   of   availability   is   clearly   reliant   on 
sensorimotor integration: In order that phenomenally re-presented contents are capable of 
controlling action, they have to be directly fed into the mechanism that activates motor 
representata. Since basic actions are physical actions or bodily motions, we need an internal 
representation of the body. Thus the functional role of the phenomenally re-represented 
content is that it can be directly fed and integrated into a dynamical representation of one's 
own body as a presently acting and ongoing acting agent. This agent, however, has the 
flexible   capability   of   swiftly   decoupling   motor   and   sensory   information   processing 
(autonomy). 
To conclude these remarks on representation, three forms of representations must be 
distinguished: Internal representations are structures in the brain that fulfil a function for the 
system as a whole, that admittedly possess certain contents (e.g., action-relevant information 
8 I take the concept of symbolic representations as those internal components that can be processed in the 
absence of externally triggered phenomenal representations which could be their contents. 
23processed in the dorsal stream or proprioceptive information of the body schema)
9, but are 
never conscious or have phenomenal content. Mental representations have the dispositional 
property of becoming available for attention, cognitive processing, and control of action. 
They carry certain contents but do not have phenomenal content, if certain additional criteria 
are not fulfilled. Phenomenal representations have to meet a number of different functional 
constraints. Two of them were already stated: temporal internality and global availability.
10 
2.3 Mental and phenomenal simulation
Mental simulation is the third concept we are dealing with. Mental simulation is a three-place 
relation composed of an individual content processing system for which a counterfactual 
situation is simulated by a physically internal representatum. The intentional content of the 
counterfactual situation can become available as representandum for subsymbolic forms of 
introspective attention, for symbolic forms of cognitive reference and for selective control of 
action. Interestingly, from a physical and epistemological point of view, phenomenal 
representations and simulations coincide – due solely to the fact that our brain creates a 
temporal frame of reference, we never have direct epistemic access to the surrounding world. 
Since the content, represented as phenomenally actual and objectively real, is not actual and 
objectively real, but internally defined that way for teleofunctional reasons (virtually), it can 
be considered as simulational, just like simulations of counterfactual situations. Representata 
and simulata differ only on the phenomenological level of analysis. The internal states taking 
part in simulational processes can admittedly be elicited by external stimuli, but are not 
stimuli-correlated in the strict sense. Typical examples are thoughts of things that are not 
sensorially present during routine activities, for instance, thinking about a TV show while 
driving a car. The intentional contents of mental simulations can become available for 
subsymbolic forms of introspective attention, for symbolic cognitive reference, and can 
become globally available for selective control of action. 
Now let us consider the phenomenal version of simulation. All states of affairs we can 
consciously simulate (imagine or conceive of) possess the property of being phenomenally 
possible. Clearly, what is phenomenally possible depends on the layout of our consciousness, 
which to a great extent can be characterized functionally. In addition to the notion of 
possibility, phenomenal simulations are characterized by a transparent representation of 
9 These examples at least express my interpretation of ‘internal representation’. Exceptionally, ‘internal’ is 
hereby used to mean those inner episodes that cannot become globally available. 
10 In the further discourse of the work, I will not go into the other constraints.
24temporal internality – the now is internally construed as real. At least as important as is the 
fact that phenomenal simulations always take place against the background of a phenomenal 
sense of ownership. They are experienced as belonging to a subject that is viewed as real. 
One function of phenomenal simulations is to produce world models that are biologically 
relevant, since they allow the planning of goal-directed actions, for example. To make this 
function possible, a representational frame is required that serves as 'evaluative context' for 
the simulational contents. This evaluative context is a world-model that is defined as actual 
for the system ('world zero hypothesis'). If there were not such an internally defined 
'reference model', phenomenal simulations would be experienced as currently real, and that 
would make important functions like future planning impossible. 
In the following section I am going to elucidate the concept of presentation. These remarks 
are especially relevant to the theory of nonconceptual mental content that is constructed in 
the fourth section of Chapter six.
2.4 Mental and phenomenal presentation
 
Now let us focus attention to the concept of mental presentation. To realize what is meant by 
mental   presentation,   blindsight   patients   are   a   good   example.   They   are   capable   of 
discriminating diverse colour stimuli by means of predicates like “blue” or “green” in normal 
perceptual contexts without any accompanying colour experience (cf. Weiskrantz 2009).
11 
That ability is based on their comparatively normal sensitivity for different wavelengths 
within the scotoma. This example is said to clarify that mental and phenomenal presentation 
differ at least in terms of the degree in which their stimulus information is globally available 
– although, for example, the content of phenomenal presentations is available for selective 
action, mental presentational information in the case of blindsight is only available for a form 
of motor selection.
12 
The last concept I delineate is phenomenal presentation. Phenomenal presentations can be 
characterized by four different principles: 'the principle of presentationality', 'the principle of 
reality  generation',  'the principle  of nonintrinsicality  and  context sensitivity',  and the 
'principle of object formation'. Phenomenologically, the principle of presentationality states 
that presentation is subjectively experienced present in the context of sensation – for 
11  It is believed that the discriminations are so much fine-grained that they cannot be considered as 
representations.
12 Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that the perceptual processing of non-phenomenal stimuli fulfils two 
significant functions: For one thing, it biases what is phenomenally experienced; for another thing, it influences 
how stimuli are consciously experienced (Merikle et al. 2001).
25example,  green17  is always experienced as  green17-now. Clearly, it is integrated into the 
higher-order phenomenal re-presentation of time. Normally, if it is the most simple form of 
phenomenal content, we are not able to deliberately imagine or remember it. Functionally, 
different forms of presentational content constitute the phenomenal frame of reference (that 
is world0). To have such a frame of reference allows us to separate phenomenally the present 
reality from mental simulations of counterfactual situations. On one hand, the presentational 
content as nonconceptual content points to a specific sensational feature, on the other, it 
invariably points to the fact that this feature in the environment or the organism's own body 
is given de nunc. The principle of reality generation stands for the subcognitive level of 
phenomenal presentations which almost inevitably suggests the existence of whatever is 
currently presented to us. Both the sensory now and the presentational appearance of 
objective existence have a virtual character that is generated by subpersonal processes which 
take time. The principle of nonintrinsicality and context sensitivity repudiates the well-
known philosophical notion that phenomenal properties are essential properties in the sense 
of being the non-relational, context-invariant essence that becomes exemplified by the 
contents of simple sensory experiences (Levine 1995). It has been shown, for example, that a 
homogeneous field of a single coloured light appeared neutral instead of coloured just as the 
perceptual context of the preceding visual scene disappeared.
13  The principle of object 
formation stands for pre-attentional processes of feature integration bringing about the 
experience of coherent perceptual gestalts.
In summary, it can be said that six different forms of content function within human beings 
as biological systems. Concerning higher-level cognition, the phenomenal kinds of content 
are the most relevant. Our concepts are only formed against the background of phenomenally 
accessible contents. Among these, only re-presentationally and simulationally processed 
contents have the dispositional property to be available for cognitive processing in the form 
of concepts. Of course, that is not to say that concepts once extracted from phenomenal 
representations cannot function non-phenomenally. It seems to be quite possible that non-
phenomenally  processed  content is  directly   fed  into  speech   behaviour  without being 
accompanied by phenomenal simulation.
14 
13 I do not explicitly argue for this, but there is a lot of empirical evidence that presentational content is a 
relational phenomenon which depends on the existence of a perceptual context and that it supervenes on 
complex causal relations and therefore is by no means capable of existing by itself across such contexts (cf. 
Metzinger 2003, pp. 100-4).
14 If one wanted to formulate a theory of thinking, it seems to me that speech supplied with non-phenomenally 
processed content would be a part of it.
262.5 Phenomenal mental models
What is a phenomenal mental model? Functionally, phenomenal mental models are globally 
available for cognition, attention, and the control of behaviour. Because phenomenal mental 
models consist of supramodally experienced objects (e.g., seeing and feeling an apple 
simultaneously), they are available for the formation of mental categories and concepts. Any 
phenomenal mental model has to be integrated into the dynamic process of modelling the 
current presence. Since the contents of subjective experiences are the contents of a mental 
model of the world as a whole, phenomenal mental models need to be currently integrated 
into the present mental world. Moreover, phenomenal mental world models contribute to the 
emergence of the first-person perspective: If the system phenomenally models the self-world 
boundary (the phenomenal self-model (PSM)) and the ongoing subject-object relations (the 
phenomenal model of the intentionality relation itself (PMIR)), the experience emerges of a 
subject that interacts purposefully in the world. Most phenomenal mental models are 
transparently represented – the fact that we are actually modelling a reality is not globally 
available for attentional processing. An exception are reasoning or planning processes that 
are phenomenally represented as internally generated representations. In other words, they 
are based on opaquely represented phenomenal mental models. Phenomenally representing 
inferential relations between language-like propositions can be understood as a phenomenal 
mental  model  in   which   the form/content  distinction   is  reintroduced  on  the  level  of 
phenomenal content. 
2.6 Thoughts on the vehicle-content distinction
What we need is embodied content, as it were – an ongoing and physically realised process of 
containing, not 'a' content. (Metzinger 2003, p. 166)
In view of the facts that the practice of cognitive neuroscience relies on mutual constraints 
between higher  and lower levels (see the next chapter) and that a strict vehicle-content 
distinction is the root of the symbol grounding problem (see 4.1) and insofar also of the 
weakness of classical theories of intentionality (see 6.2), we are now concerned with the 
vehicle-content distinction. Eventually it amounts to underpinning the negative claim that 
anything but a tight vehicle-content linking leads to too much problems. 
The notion of a vehicle can be understood in two different ways: On the one hand, vehicles 
of content are the bearers of content. In a trivial and unspecified sense, that is to say that 
27vehicles of content are analogous to sentences that carry content. On the other hand, and 
distinguished from the first understanding, vehicles are not regarded as static bearers of 
content, but as processes. This notion of vehicle covers the subpersonal and attentionally 
unavailable neural architecture in which non-phenomenal and phenomenal mental processes 
are implemented, the globally available processes themselves, and both together. (Rowlands 
2006, pp. 30-3) 
If one thinks of the vehicle-content distinction as a relation between states within an 
information processing system (that is, the vehicles) and external objects or events (that is, 
the contents), then the distinction is faced with the same objections as the model of causal co-
variance (which is criticized later). Treating the content endowing objects as well as the 
relation between contents and vehicles itself as external to cognitive systems does not capture 
the intrinsic aboutness of our phenomenal episodes that are environmentally decoupled. Thus 
especially in the case of environmentally detached mental episodes, anything but a tight 
content-vehicle distinction is implausible, because the contents of those episodes cannot 
come from externally triggered input.  
Could   it   not   be   that   the   model   is   adequate   for   non-phenomenal   presentational   and 
representational processing? Surely not, if one regards the non-phenomenally processed 
content in relation to the biological organism, and not as if the mental system processes 
organism-independent, “untouched” content (both in terms of physical stimuli belonging to 
third-person phenomenality
15 and in the form of mind-independent objective stimuli). Akins 
(1996) showed that neurons do not per se respond to absolute properties of physical stimuli 
like temperature, but rather to changes in the actual state of the organism. For example, 
neural responding indicates that stimuli are warmer or colder than the dominant condition.
16 
Indicating such changes may provide precisely that information an organism needs to assess 
possible   actions.   It  is  clear   that  in   this   case  neither   the   non-phenomenally   nor  the 
phenomenally processed content is organism- or mind-independent.
17 
It also interesting to ask about the motivation for externalising content. With a view to 
intersubjective objectivism and realism of cognition, it is convenient to externalise content. 
This seems to me to be the motivation behind it. As will be further articulated later, neither a 
strong intersubjective objectivism nor a strong realism of cognition is tenable when faced 
15 Visual illusions show that it is not like that. 
16 This idea can be comprehended by considering a simple example: The displeasing character of taking a cold 
shower fades over time. 
17 In my view it would be wrong to think that neural responding that is not phenomenally experienced processes 
completely different information than phenomenally experienced responding. If this is right, then Akins’ 
example a fortiori shows that the human organism does not respond to absolute properties of physical stimuli.
28with empirical evidence. To be precise, avoiding a strong realism of cognition means both: 
humans have no access to mind-independent entities via phenomenal perception, nor is it the 
case that humans almost always classify phenomenal presentations and representations as 
most humans would do under optimal conditions, quite apart from the fact that being under 
those conditions is constitutive of any kind of mental content. In respect thereof it seems 
extremely questionable to view epistemological properties as in any way constitutive of 
phenomenal content. 
I   think   preferring   undistorted   (optimal   conditions)   to   distorted   (resulting   in 
misrepresentations) connections between vehicles and contents (Dretske 1983; Fodor 1990a) 
in order to adequately grasp the vehicle-content relation comes close to this. If one thinks of 
vehicles and contents as interrelated aspects of the same process (Metzinger 2003, p. 4), it is 
quite clear that in the case of misrepresentations or of representations of non-existent entities 
internal   vehicles   generate   full-valued   phenomenal   content.   Particularly   phenomenal 
misrepresentations and simulations of non-existent entities should give rise to rethinking a 
strict distinction between vehicles and contents, the notion of cognitively impenetrable 
perception,   and   the   reliance   of   higher-level   mental   occurrences   on   external   stimuli. 
Moreover, even if one focuses on optimal conditions to state the vehicle-content relation, it is 
wrong to think of the phenomenal presentations and representations, to which conceptual 
simulations are applied, as containing mind-independent entities. However, it seems to me 
that binding to optimal conditions arises precisely from this naïve assumption. Insofar as one 
thinks of mental episodes under normal conditions as if they provided access to mind-
independent entities, this takes on an epistemological touch. If one does not make such a 
naïve realist assumption, why it is so important then to identify optimal conditions with 
respect to defining mental content?
18
In contrast to classical cognitive science accounts (for example, Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988) 
which start by comprehending vehicles that function in information processing systems and 
subsequently try to relate them causally to their external contents, neuroscientific accounts 
determine neural processes coming across as vehicles to sensorimotor systems that are 
already related to the environment (Bechtel 2008, p. 178). To be exact, both the neural 
responding to mind-independent entities (to be understood as those of physical theories) (to 
this extent neural vehicles generate a mental or phenomenal environment in the first place) 
and the neural responding to mind-dependent entities (e.g., in terms of concepts) (those that 
are visible to the naked eye) generates mental content. In respect thereof the sensorimotor 
18 Given that one is not only anxious to ensure intersubjective objectivism. 
29vehicles are related to the environment.
19  And even against the backdrop of such a 
phenomenal environment, by no means all of our parallel working mental occurrences 
causally co-vary with environmental objects.
20
If one deems only a tight interrelation of vehicles and content to be right, then the more 
specific   question   arises   of   how   non-phenomenal   or   subpersonal   processes   generate 
phenomenal or personal episodes. The already mentioned synchronization of activation 
patterns makes a proposal in this respect. 
Spivey (2007, p. 326) claims that a strict vehicle-content distinction implies the homunculus 
problem: Determining vehicles independently of the contents they are supposed to process 
raises the questions of who reads-out or processes the contents or especially in what way.
21 
Answering the latter question by deferring to further homunculi gives rise to an infinite 
regress. (cf. Damasio 1992) It also shows the explanatory weakness of referring to a central 
processor at all. Classical computational models are faced with this problem because they 
grasp cognition in terms of a central executive that processes language-like symbolic content. 
Actually, the virtual processor (vehicles) and the processed (contents) belong to the same 
collection of dynamic patterns. Vehicles and contents are two sides of the same coin – the 
ongoing dynamic brain-body-environment coupling generates more or less phenomenal and 
non-phenomenal content that is often intrinsically tied to neural, bodily, and environmental 
aspects. (Spivey 2007, pp. 324-8) More about this later.
By emphasizing the multilevel character of cognitive neuroscience, the following chapter 
will play an important part in contributing toward envisaging a tight connection between 
vehicles and contents. 
3 The mechanistic framework 
Higher level entities and activities are […] essential to the intelligibility of those at lower levels, 
just as much as those at lower levels are essential for understanding those at higher levels. It is the 
integration of different levels into productive relations that renders the phenomenon intelligible 
and thereby explains it. (Machamer, Darden, & Craver 2000, p. 36)
19 Both ways of being related to the environment are believed to generate meaningfulness.
20 It seems to me that principally all accounts which conceive of the contents as mind-independent and thereby 
strictly separate vehicles and contents are in need of correction. I think this is applicable to all accounts of 
causal co-variance (Dretske 1981, 1988; Fodor 1990) and of conceptual role semantics (Block 1986; Harman 
1987). Apart from the reasons given so far, I will criticize such accounts in the second section of Chapter six.
21 I read Spivey’s claim as suggesting that an externalisation of mental content raises the question how those 
external entities are intelligible within the frame of mental systems. 
303.1 The metaphysical mind-body-environment problem
At the beginning of the first chapter we referred to a statement of Polger according to which 
the decisive question of the current mind-body problem is how the mind is part of the natural 
world. If we have a look at the accepted notion of supervenience, it is apparent that it gives 
no answer to this very question.
Since the supervenience relation itself is a purely formal notion, the subvening properties can 
range from neural to non-neural bodily to environmental properties. The supervenience 
relation is neutral on the issue of reducibility and the supervening properties asymmetrically 
covary with the subvening properties. (Walter 2007, pp. 135-8) The metaphysical mind-body 
or mind-body-environment problem is to explain why and how the mind supervenes on 
bodily or bodily and environmental structures.
22 Simply claiming that the mind supervenes on 
the physical does not answer the metaphysical problem, it merely states the problem (Kim 
1998, p. 13-4). Phenomena are only explanatorily reducible if the supervenience relation is 
not only ascertained, but if it is also explained why (Walter 2007, p. 147; Horgan 1993) and 
how the relation exists. The embodied mind paradigm and neurophenomenology precisely 
achieve the fleshing out of the supervenience relation. Describing mechanistic explanations 
provides further methodological comprehension of cognitive neuroscience. 
 
3.2 Central properties of mechanistic explanations
The   mechanistic   framework   provides   an   adequate   description   of   neurobiological 
explanations. Furthermore, we will show that mechanistic explanations meet conditions that 
constitute good explanations.
In the following I will outline central properties of mechanistic explanations with an example 
from neurobiology, namely, the spatial memory of mice. Broadly speaking, spatial memory 
is the capability to learn to navigate through an unknown environment.
To describe a mechanism is to explain how a phenomenon is generated (e.g., Bechtel 2008; 
Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005; Machamer et al. 2000; Darden 2006), how a task is 
accomplished (Bechtel & Richardson 1993) or how the mechanism as a whole behaves 
(Glennan 1996). 
22 If the supervenience claim is limited to the mind-brain relation in the actual world (purely hypothetical), and 
if the supervenience claim is said to allow the multiple realisability of mental occurrences and leave room for 
non-identity, then one could reply in the following way: As we shall see later, to the extent that, if neural and 
phenomenal properties are specified at certain levels, identity claims are intelligible, and insofar as mental 
occurrences are not multiple realizable at all levels, this notion of supervenience is questionable.  
31What are mechanisms? Clusters of entities and activities organized in the generation of 
regular changes from set-up to termination conditions (Machamer et al. 2000, Chapter one). 
Examples of neurobiological entities are pyramidal cells, neurotransmitters, brain regions, 
and   mice.   What   these   entities   engage   in   are   the   activities:   pyramidal   cells   fire, 
neurotransmitters bind, brain regions process, and mice swim in water while searching for a 
means of escape. The entities and activities that compose the mechanism are organized, in a 
manner so as to do something or perform some function. This activity or behaviour of the 
mechanism as a whole is the phenomenon to be explained in terms of describing the 
mechanism. Examples of neurobiological phenomena are the mastery of a language, the 
storage of spatial memories, the release of neurotransmitters, or the generation of action 
potentials. A first aspect of this organization is temporal in nature. The stages of the 
mechanisms proceed in an orderly manner from the beginning to the end. Complete 
descriptions of mechanisms exhibit  productive continuity  – the course from set up to 
termination conditions is complete (or ‘gapless’). Productive continuities between the 
different levels make their explanatory connections intelligible. (Machamer, Darden, & 
Craver 2000, p. 3) Secondly, mechanisms are spatially organized. The components of the 
mechanisms are often compartmentalized, which allows us to individuate stages in a natural 
way. In our example, there are pre- and post-synaptic components of the mechanism of long-
term potentiation (LTP). The thought of LTP is that the the simultaneous activation of pre- 
and post-synaptic neurons strengthens their synapses. Moreover, components are localized, 
such as the hippocampus in the mechanism of spatial memory. If one has analysed the 
components of the hippocampus, one can describe connections between them. LTP is often 
studied in the mammalian hippocampus – an entity centrally involved in the mechanism of 
spatial memory. The hypothesis is that spatial memories are formed by changing the synaptic 
strengths between neurons in the hippocampus, and LTP is thus embedded into the 
mechanism of spatial memory. A third aspect of the organization of mechanisms is their 
hierarchical character. This makes our example pretty clear: Describing the mechanisms 
comprises mice learning to navigate, the hippocampus generating spatial maps, synapses 
inducing LTP, and macromolecules bending and binding. Those hierarchical descriptions 
require the integration of entities and activities at different levels. On the one hand, these 
components have to be attributed a functional role within the mechanism of the phenomenon 
to be explained (upward looking) (the question of the role of LTP in the mechanisms of 
spatial memory). On the other hand, the components have to be explicated in terms of lower-
level mechanisms (downward looking). This can be continued as long as we obtain bottom-
32out entities (in molecular neurobiology there are macromolecules, smaller molecules and 
ions) and their activities (geometrico-mechanical, electro-chemical, energetic, and electro-
magnetic). Crucially, each new decomposition exposes a lower-level mechanism until we 
obtain elements for which decomposition is no longer possible. If one does not find such a 
mechanism for the component, then there is a gap in the productive continuity of the 
mechanism. Hence, integrating multilevel mechanisms requires both the contextualisation of 
an item within higher-level mechanisms and the elucidation of that item in terms of lower-
level entities and activities. Those multilevel considerations are characteristic of mechanistic 
explanations. (Darden et al. 2006, pp. 45-7)
I would  now like to make an important point concerning evolutionary  explanations. 
Evolutionary explanations narrow down to why explanations. If one says that intended offline 
simulation has evolved because it enables more complex forms of action planning, then how 
a human neurophysiology (blending out other explanatory paradigms in psychology) brings 
forth environmentally detached offline simulation remains open or in need of explanation.
23 
To put it briefly, why explanations are not how explanations. (Cummins 2000, pp. 27-8) 
What concept of causation do proponents of the mechanistic framework adhere to? They 
speak of interlevel causation (both bottom-up and top-down) without interlevel causes: To 
understand the thought, we have to make clear what it means to speak of mechanistically 
mediated effects as hybrids of causal and constitutive relations. The respective lower-level 
organised activation of entities simply constitutes the higher-level phenomena (e.g., the 
hippocampus generates spatial maps). Thus the interlevel relations take in the synchronous 
constitutive relations of the hybrid. On the other hand, the hybrid is complemented by 
etiological causal relations  within levels  (e.g., the binding of glutamate to the NMDA 
receptor). Top-down causation means that, for example, environmental stimuli causally 
affect the whole mechanism (this corresponds to intralevel causes) that is constituted of parts 
(this corresponds to interlevel causation). The change of the parts is a necessary condition for 
the change of the whole mechanism. In the case of bottom-up causation, changing a part in 
the mechanism causes the alterations of other parts in the mechanism (this corresponds to 
intralevel causes). This alters the mechanism as a whole (this corresponds to interlevel 
constitution) which might then cause changes in its environment (this corresponds to 
intralevel causes). Hence, mechanistically mediated effects are hybrids of constitutive 
interlevel relations and causal intralevel relations.
24 
23 As we shall later, Barsalou’s PSS connected with Damasio’s theory of convergence zones provide a how 
explanation of environmentally decoupled offline simulation. 
24 Correspondingly, some mechanistic explanations are constitutive, because they explain a phenomenon by 
describing its underlying mechanism, and some are etiological, because they explain an event by describing its 
33Mechanistically mediated effects, as hybrids of causal and constitutive relations, allow us to 
avoid well-known problems with causation (Craver & Bechtel 2007). Accordingly, causal 
relations are exclusively intralevel, whereby different levels are bridged by constitutive 
relations. Since causal relations occur within both higher and lower levels, lower-level 
accounts do not have to be viewed as primary and higher-level accounts as superfluous. 
Because interlevel relations are constitutive and synchronous, the higher-level phenomena do 
not have to be effects caused by temporally preceding and independent events. Constitutive 
interlevel relations also avoid the problem of overdetermination – changes in the behaviour 
of a component can only be caused by events internal to the mechanism, not additionally by 
factors affecting the mechanism as a whole. In other words, macroscopic stimuli can only 
affect the mechanism as a whole qua being constituted by the organisation of lower-levels 
components. (Bechtel 2008, pp. 152-5) 
What concept of level does the mechanistic framework adhere to? Determining levels by 
means of mechanisms begins with identifying the mechanism in terms of the phenomenon it 
brings about. At a next lower level, the working parts of the mechanism are assigned. 
Consequently, levels are only identified with reference to a certain mechanism – they do not 
spread over the natural world. Hence, this account of levels does not try to answer whether 
dogs, for example, are at a higher level than valleys, because they are not working parts of a 
common mechanism. This local nature of levels also appears at still lower levels, whereby 
the question of whether the sub-parts of two decomposed components (that were originally 
the working parts) are at the same or at a different level cannot be answered because there is 
no account of how they are combined in bringing about a common component. An important 
consequence of this local account of levels is that it does not aim at a causally closed and 
comprehensive   lower-level,   because   lower-level   components   function   as   lower-level 
components only in relation to higher-level phenomena.
25 
Moreover, Kim's causal exclusion argument against higher-level causes
26 is not true of levels 
of mechanisms
27 (1998, p. 84).
28 Why? The lower- (P) and higher-level (M) variables do not 
compete as sufficient causes and explanations. The behaviour of the mechanisms as a whole 
(M) does not compete with the organised behaviour of its components (P) as the cause of any 
antecedent causes (e.g., dehydration belongs to the etiological explanation of thirst) (Craver 2009, pp. 107-8). 
25 Clearly, this proposal is distinguished from sorting out levels in terms of scientific disciplines. Moreover, the 
interacting working parts that build a level do not have to be of the same size (e.g., cell membranes as large 
parts can interact with individual sodium ions as small parts).
26 Kim’s argument is said to show that properties at higher levels of realisation have no causal properties over 
and above those of their realisers.
27  Levels of mechanisms are understood as part-whole relations – the organisation of lower-level parts 
constitutes the whole mechanism. 
28 That is not to say that Kim intended to apply this argument to levels of mechanisms. 
34downstream processing. Indeed, the lower-level variables constitute the behaviour of the 
mechanisms   as   a   whole.   Moreover,   the   causally   relevant   processes   of   lower-level 
components are specified subject to higher-level phenomena. In respect thereof it does not 
make sense to say that non-organised realisers have all causal properties that the realisers at 
higher-levels are supposed to have.
Importantly, by virtue of their organisation, mechanisms can produce behaviour that their 
parts cannot do individually (that is, non-organised): The primate visual system, for example, 
responds differentially to motions, shapes, and objects. Generating patterns of activity which 
correspond to features of visual stimuli (from the viewpoint of third-person phenomenality) 
(e.g., a bouncing yellow tennis ball) requires the organisation of a host of neurons across 
several   functionally   distinct   brain   areas.   Thus   the   organisation   of   components   in   a 
mechanism enables the mechanism to be influenced by environmental aspects which thus 
cannot impinge on the components individually.
29 In addition to that, there are explanatory 
generalizations comprising contrastive relations of causal relevance
30  that apply to the 
realised variables but not to the realizers: If, for example, a pigeon pecks because the paper is 
red, then changing the paper from scarlet to crimson does not change the pigeon's behaviour, 
though it does alter the activation vector in its nucleus rotundus. (Craver 2009, pp. 196-227)
How can hierarchical mechanisms be tested? By either intervening (stimulatory or inhibitory) 
at the lower level and detecting at the higher level (bottom-up) or by intervening at the 
higher-level and detecting at the lower level (top-down). An example of the former is the 
case study H.M. (reported by Scoville/Millner 1957): After portions of his temporal lobes, 
including the hippocampus, were removed, he lost the ability to remember recent facts, 
although he was still able to learn new skills. Zola-Morgan and Squire (1993) concluded 
therefore that the hippocampus is an essential component in the mechanisms which realize 
'declarative' memory. An example of top-down intervention are fMRI studies that show, for 
example, specific activations of the motor strip (tongue, leg, hand) while reading action 
words (lick, kick, pick).
31 But more of that later. (Bechtel forthcoming)
29 One can add to this that it underpins our interactionist or embedded view of neural processing (cf. Northoff 
2004). The stimuli with which the brain is supposed to interact can be regarded as belonging to our phenomenal 
world model. By the way, the stronger claim that properties like motion and shape are primary qualities is quite 
intelligible – against the backdrop of our phenomenal world model.
30 Importantly, that is only to say that higher-level phenomena are causally relevant, not that they exercise novel 
causal powers in a metaphysical sense.
31  Besides, here mechanistic explanation is understood as an epistemic activity of scientists. This can be 
justified by considering that many scientific explanations turn out to be false. What scientists delineate are 
phenomenal representations of a mechanism, not the mechanism itself. A related question is to ask about the 
way in which scientists represent mechanisms. Hegarty (1992) introduces the notion of 'mental animation' 
which expresses well the dynamic visual simulation of the activity of the mechanism. In addition to visual 
simulations, linguistic representations and inferences can engaged. (Bechtel 2008, pp. 17-22) I would even go 
35Now let us shift attention to the normative part of the mechanistic framework. There are 
implicit norms about what does and does not count as acceptable constitutive explanation in 
cognitive neuroscience. These norms shall come across as epitomizing the thought that good 
explanations in neuroscience show how phenomena are situated within the causal structure of 
the phenomenally accessible world. With respect to the implicitness of these norms we 
attempt to provide both an adequate description of neurobiological explanations and criteria 
being supposed to evaluate explanations. Here I do not argue for the claim that these norms 
are indeed implicit in the practice of neuroscience.
32 I only want to show that the mechanistic 
framework has a concept of explanation that meets these conditions and that the Covering-
Law model does not do justice to them. These norms are as follows: (1) Mere temporal 
sequences are not explanatory; (2) causes explain effects and not conversely; (3) causally 
independent effects of common causes do not explain one another; (4) causally irrelevant 
phenomena are not explanatory; (5) causes need not make their effects more probable to 
explain them (cf. Cummins 2000, pp. 1-6). 
In what way does the concept of mechanistic explanation satisfy (1)-(5)? Consider the 
following argument: Causal relevance is analysed in terms of the manipulationist view (cf. 
Woodward 2003). The manipulationist view satisfies (1)-(5): (1') The explanandum cannot 
be   explained   by   a   temporally   preceded   event,   because   one   cannot   manipulate   the 
explanandum by intervening to change the preceded event. (2') Similarly, effects do not 
explain their causes, because one cannot change the past by intervening in present states of 
affairs. The same principle applies to (3') and (4'): The variable whose alteration does not 
lead to a manipulation of the explanandum does not belong to the explanation. (5') If the 
explanatory   relevant   variable   is   manipulated,   then   the   probability   of   the   respective 
explanandum should change.
33 This can be linked with an account of constitutive explanatory 
relevance that is understood as sufficient condition for causal relevance. What is meant by 
constitutive explanatory relevance? Mutual manipulability is characteristic of constitutive 
explanatory relevance: The explanandum phenomenon can be changed by intervening to 
change a component (as exemplified by stimulation experiments), or the component can be 
manipulated by intervening to change the explanandum phenomenon (as exemplified by 
activation experiments). 
so far as to say that the entities and activations of the mechanisms are ontic components, but that any ontic 
components we regard as external and causally efficient belong to our phenomenal model of reality. 
32 Craver shows this using the example of neurotransmitter release (2009, pp. 22-8).
33 This account of causal relevance remains silent in regard to the ultimate metaphysical nature of causation. 
36Because the following objections to the CL model are quite familiar to many, I make it short: 
Firstly, this model cannot distinguish laws of nature from non-explanatory generalizations 
(that is, it does not satisfy (1)-(3)).
34  Secondly, it provides no account of explanatory 
relevance.
35 Thirdly, one need not demonstrate that a phenomenon was to be expected in 
order to explain it.
36 (Craver 2009, pp. 21-106)  
The following remarks on multiple realisability are based on the ideas of the mechanistic 
framework.
3.3 Thoughts on multiple realisability
Since we deal with neurobiological information all along, the following deliberations also go 
into the matter whether certain kinds of multiple realisation are or would be sufficient for the 
irrelevance of neurobiology for the understanding of mental occurrences. Moreover, because 
variable embodiment – that is, the claim that basic differences in neurobiological equipment 
are sufficient for different mental lives – is one consequence from PSS (see 4.3), and due to 
the fact that it is prima facie incompatible with multiple realisation, now I am going to 
develop a notion of multiple realisation that is compatible with this implication of PSS.
Now, I would like to answer the following questions: (1) Is multiple realisability an 
empirically justified claim? (2) Why did or does the thesis of multiple realisability look 
34  Cummins also argues for the thesis that the CL model does not apply to psychological explanations: 
Psychological laws are laws in situ that specify effects, not explanatory principles. Psychology's primary 
explananda are capacities. Effects and capacities in special kinds of systems are explained by the structure of 
those systems. The deductive-nomological model of explanation states the subsumption of antecedence 
conditions under a general law as the explanans that is deducible from the explanandum. Hence, the CL model 
of explanation does not apply to psychological explanation – that is, psychological explanation is not 
subsumption under laws.
Actually a psychological law is the explanandum, not the explanans. A psychological law is the explanandum 
because it specifies an effect (e.g., the McGurk-Effect: the perception of an acoustic speech signal (e.g., da-da) 
is influenced by simultaneous observation of lips movements (e.g., ga-ga)). Nobody can seriously think that the 
McGurk effect explains the data it subsumes, though it is a well confirmed regularity or law. Laws of 
psychology are laws in situ – laws that concern a special kind of system that is specifically constituted and 
organized. They specify regular behavioural patterns distinctive of a certain kind of mechanism, that is, effects. 
(Cummins 2000, pp. 1-15) But do not understand me wrong, I am only saying that subsumption under 
psychological laws in the fashion of the McGurk effect are not neuropsychological explanations. This does not 
preclude that the mechanistic framework could develop a new kind of neuropsychological law whose 
subsumptive force would come to be a match for a neuropsychological explanation. 
The primary explananda of psychological explanations, however, are not effects (that is, psychological laws) 
but capacities, such as to understand a language, to grasp other minds, to see depth, to plan, to have self-
consciousness, or to present philosophical theories in the form of written inferential relations between 
propositions. 
In summary it can be stated that the decisive merit of Cummins is the insight that psychological laws in the 
depicted sense specify at best what the minds does, not how the mind does what it does. This well suits the 
quotation of Polger that is written down at the beginning of the first Chapter.
35 For example, although there is a generalisation that if the Na
+ concentrations had been high, then the opening 
of the Ca
2+ would be more probable, this opening is indeed explained by a rise in membrane voltage.
36 For example, Ca
2+ channels frequently open under conditions in which their opening is improbable.
37plausible? (3) Does non-reductionism entail the truth of multiple realisability? (4) Assuming 
that multiple realisability is true, would this be sufficient for the falseness of brain-mind 
identity theories? (5) Would the empirical truth of multiple realisation be sufficient for the 
irrelevance of neurobiology for understanding psychological
37 phenomena? At first, however, 
I am going to give a metaphysical account of the realisation relation. Without such an 
account, none of these question can be meaningfully answered. Moreover, I will show that 
this metaphysical account adequately apprehends the neurobiological practice.
Since the realisation relation depends on the kind of function the realizer is supposed to 
realize, and there are various kinds of functions, the concern is not a single realisation 
relation (Polger 2004, p. 113). What we need are specific 'realisation theories' (Poland 1994) 
for specific mental functions or capacities of the human organism. 
In order to provide a working account of a specific realisation relation, I am now going to 
outline a specific concept of function. This notion of function belongs to the mechanistic 
framework: The function of X is what X is supposed to do in the mechanism in which X 
operates. The respective function of X is not its overall causal role, but a subset of its causes 
and effects which are relevant for certain explanatory purposes. Such an individuation of X's 
causal role shows how X is spatially, temporally, and actively integrated into a higher level 
mechanism.   Additionally,   functions   are   hierarchically   realised   insofar   as   higher-level 
functions are brought about by the performance of subfunctions which are in turn composed 
of further mechanisms with more specific functions, and so on. This division depicts a 
hierarchy of mechanisms, as previously mentioned. 
Descriptions of mechanistic realisers are always selective – the components are individuated 
with reference to the mechanism's whole behaviour (which also has to be selected). 
Mechanistic realisations differ from material, aggregative, and structural realisations in the 
following   way:   Unlike   mechanistic   realisations,   structural   ones   only   determine   the 
interaction and organisation of structural properties, not activities. In the case of aggregative 
realisation, the lower-level properties are merely summed, not organisationally connected. 
Descriptions of material realisations simply determine spatially bounded entities as being 
composed of certain materials. 
Does realisation have to be compositional? The account of emergence held by proponents of 
the mechanistic framework differs from mysterious varieties of emergence insofar as they 
say that the whole is not greater than the parts, plus their being organised. (Craver & Wilson 
2006; Craver 2009, pp. 216-7; Van Gulick 1993; Wimsatt 1997)
37 ‘Psychological’ is synonymous to ‘mental’.
38Because there are different realisation relations according to different notions of functions, 
the question of whether psychological functions are multiple realisable cannot be answered 
per se. It only makes sense to ask whether a certain function is multiple realisable or not. 
The question of whether a certain psychological function is multiple realised also depends on 
the level at which the realisers occur. It is quite possibly that a certain psychological function 
is multiple realised at a lower level, whereas the same function is uniquely realised at the 
next higher level. (Funkhouser 2007, p. 18) Clearly, we are interested in querying whether 
psychological phenomena are multiple realisable by neural processes which function at the 
same level. 
So what necessary conditions have to be satisfied so as to be justified in speaking of multiple 
realisation? The same psychological phenomenon has to be realised by two different types of 
realisers which function at the same level (Shapiro 2004). 
Before I answer the questions, let us consider two more final remarks: The claim of multiple 
realisability can only be justified or rejected by means of empirical evidence.
38 Secondly, our 
considerations are limited to the question of whether organisms of the species homo sapiens 
occurring on earth have psychological properties that are multiple realisable. (Aizawa & 
Gillett 2007, pp. 2-3)
(1) At first, I would like to reconstruct the 'methodological argument' (cf. ibid.) against 
multiple realisation: (P1) If higher-level properties are multiple realised by lower-level 
properties, then there is no inter-theoretic constraint between the sciences studying lower-
level properties and those studying higher-level properties (no constraint principle), and we 
would not find brain mapping studies that compare the brains of diverse animal species. (P2) 
There are inter-theoretic constraints (including mutual revision) between psychology or 
cognitive   science   and   the   neurosciences   and   interspecific   comparisons.   (C)   Hence, 
psychological properties are not multiple realisable by neural properties. (Bechtel & Mundale 
1999; Shapiro 2000, 2004) Actually the entire project of cognitive neuroscience (cf., e.g., 
Bechtel forthcoming) corroborates the second premise. No doubt the first premise of the 
argument is the contentious claim. I argue for the compatibility of multiple realisability and 
inter-theoretic constraint (that is, the falsehood of the no constraint principle) and hence the 
inconclusiveness of the argument: Consider a very brief depiction of a case study of human 
colour vision: Properties and relations of amino acids and 11-cis-retinal realise the light 
absorbing property of the human green photopigment and this can be realised by distinct 
amino acids having the same absorption spectrum. Properties and relations of photopigment 
38 Using conceivability claims does not count, because they are, as we shall see later, epistemically unreliable.
39cells, water molecules, etc. realise a cone's property of transducing light. This property of 
cones is realised by G proteins with distinct activation properties. Human colour processing 
is realised again in the human retina by properties of the cones, amacrine cells, bipolar cells, 
horizontal cells, and retinal ganglion cells. Human colour processing is multiple realised by 
variations in the cone mosaic and by a varied number of distinct cone opsins. What this case 
study is supposed to show is that neuroscientific explanations are inherently multilevel in 
nature, that there are inter-theoretic constraints in practice, and that psychological properties 
are multiple realisable at different levels (by virtue of the transitivity of the realisation 
relation). (Aizawa draft, pp. 12-24) 
Secondly, let us consider two classical arguments for the truth of multiple realisation offered 
by Block and Fodor (1972): (i) brain plasticity
39  and (ii) the possibility of artificial 
intelligence. The problem with the first  argument is that it is not sufficient for the truth of 
multiple realisation. Only if the substituting brain areas brought forth the same phenomena 
via a different type of mechanical realisation, could brain plasticity be a case of multiple 
realisation.
40  As for the second argument – the contentious claim is not whether AI can 
behaviourally   simulate   the   human   mind,   but   whether   artificial   intelligences   with 
sensorimotor systems distinctly different from ours can realise the same mental processes 
(Barsalou 1999, p. 639).
We  are now going to deal with four classical 'conceptual' arguments: (i) argument from 
computation; (ii) argument from machine functionalism; (iii) argument from functional 
analysis functionalism; (iv) Putnam's likelihood argument (1967). (i) Each argument which 
derives the independence of the neural implementation of cognitive systems
41 from defining 
cognitive systems in terms of computational systems, and from defining computational 
systems independently of neural implementation (cf. Eliasmith 2002), is subjected to 
objections to computational models. In the fifth Chapter I will raise such objections. (ii) The 
claim that cognitive mental states are machine-functional states is an empirical hypothesis. 
39 The plasticity of the brain is supposed to show the multiple realisability of psychological processes: Areas 
that were originally used solely to process information of one modality, were adapted to process another 
modality's information, because the originally responsible areas were damaged. For example, Melchner et al. 
(2000) have explored lesion-induced neural rewiring in the auditory cortex of young ferrets. By severing the 
normal linkage between inferior and superior colliculus in the midbrain and the medial geniculate nucleus 
(MGN) in the left hemisphere, a lesion was induced in a part of the auditory system upstream from the auditory 
cortex. The result was that, over time, the MGN received projections from the retina and in turn passed that 
information to auditory cortex. Therefore the rewired ferrets could “see with their auditory systems”.
40 This reply is somewhat underdetermined concerning its content. Nevertheless, I think that it rightly points to 
the fact that the objection per se is not sufficient for the truth of multiple realisability. Conversely, calling 
attention to this insufficiency does not preclude that the phenomenon of brain plasticity can be sufficient for 
multiple realisability against the backdrop of certain assumptions. 
41 We confine ourselves to the question whether these arguments provide an adequate description of episodes 
which we call ‚cognitive’.
40Turing machines are defined by input-output relations and by relations between mental states 
which are purely syntactical in nature. Since different physical systems can be described with 
the same machine table (identical causal relations), multiple realisability is a natural 
consequence   of   viewing   cognitive   mental   states   as   Turing   machine-functional   states. 
(Putnam 1960, 1967) What is wrong with this argument? As we shall see later in more detail, 
defining mental operations purely in syntactical terms is not true of causally efficient mental 
processes. Moreover, if such a functional isomorphism were to provide an adequate 
simulation of mental processes, an explanation why the mind is the kind of thing that can be 
duplicated by such a functional isomorphism would still be required. It is no less plausible to 
view something as a hurricane that satisfies a machine-functional description of a hurricane 
(Block 1978; Searle 1980; Sober 1992).
42  Moreover, it does not provide an adequate 
description – I think the mere fact that mental operations are not purely syntactically grasped 
from a phenomenal point of view (e.g., phenomenal experiences of imagery) suffices for a 
rejection. (iii) Attempts to derive multiple realisability by adopting a functional attitude to the 
mind (Fodor 1968) are not conclusive, as they in no way exclude that a certain concept of 
function can be uniquely realised by neurobiological mechanisms that are appropriately 
individuated. (iv) Putnam makes the following assumptions: pain is a mental state present in 
mammalian,  reptilian,  mollusc, and conceivable extraterrestrial brains (PA); plus two 
opposite claims: on the one hand, the mind is type-identical with the brain (TI), on the other 
hand, the mind is multiple realisable (MR). Hence P(MR | PA) > P(TI | PA). Yet again, 
P(MR | PA) is not per se greater than P(TI | PA) – it depends on the granulation in which 
mental and neural processes become individuated (we will presently see what this means), 
and on whether Shapiro's two conditions
43 are satisfied. (cf. Shapiro 2004 pp. 13-33)
(2) There are two interesting reasons why the thesis of multiple realisability looked or looks 
plausible. Firstly, philosophers often applied double standards – psychological phenomena 
were individuated very coarsely (e.g., a functionalist-behavioural individuation of pain in the 
form of pain behaviour), whereas brain states (which may be considered as philosophical 
fiction,   since   neuroscientists   speak   of   complex   activation   patterns   that   bring   forth 
phenomenal experiences (Bechtel & Mundale 1999, p. 177)) were often individuated very 
finely (humans and other organisms clearly have different brains). It is thus not surprising 
that psychological functions are multiple realisable by brain states. If both sides are coarsely 
individuated,  then  multiple  realisability   is not  quite probable;  the same is  valid  for 
42 This broaches the subject that the fact that a certain behaviour is computable does not entail that the behaviour 
itself is a computation. This is a famous objection to computationalism. 
43 That is, the same mental phenomenon (first condition) is realised by different mechanical realisers (second 
condition).
41corresponding fine-grained individuations of both sides. Secondly, the context or frame of 
reference for developing psychological and neuroscientific taxonomies was often neglected. 
That is, it is only appropriate to speak about sameness and difference with respect to some 
consideration or other – for example, both humans and dogs can certainly whimper, but their 
phenomenal experiences accompanying their whimpering is likely to differ. (ibid., pp. 201-3) 
(3) To answer the question of whether non-reductionism implies multiple realisability, one 
needs a clear idea of what reduction is taken to mean. Since there are also etiological causal 
processes   at   different   levels,   thereby   allowing   different   scientific   levels,   you   have 
independence without multiple realisation. Because we adhere to a mechanistic notion of 
realisation  and explanation,  we have the following view of reductionism: High-level 
phenomena   like   mental   capacities   or   observable   behaviour   must   be   known   to   be 
constitutively explainable in terms of lower-level mechanisms.
44 In other words, one has to 
get an idea of the explanandum. So these phenomena are epistemically and heuristically (cf. 
Bickle 1998; 2003) indispensable. Even if high-level phenomena are uniquely realised at a 
certain level, this does not imply that the high-level phenomena are epistemically irrelevant. 
If this epistemic indispensability is considered as non-reductionism, then non-reductionism 
does not entail multiple realisability. 
Additionally, with respect to the fact that the specification of neural processes is dependent 
on higher-level phenomena (that is, lower-level components are determined in relation to 
higher-level phenomena), higher-level phenomena are epistemically relevant. If it is assumed 
that this downward specification of neural processes provides a neurobiological ontology, 
and if the debate on the ontology of mental processes bases on this ontology, then the 
ontology of mental processes is epistemically and heuristically dependent on higher-level 
phenomena. Thus the ‘ontologically mind-independent’ entities would be the respective 
components   that   constitute   a   higher-level   phenomenon.   The   advantage   of   such   an 
understanding of neurobiological ontology is that it makes mutlilevel relations intelligible. 
What is more compelling, as already mentioned, is that the whole mechanism exhibits 
emergent behaviour (e.g., the visual system responds to motion) and there are contrastive 
causal relations applicable to the realised but not to the non-organised realisers. To this 
extent one could say that the behaviour of a mechanism as a whole is not reducible to its non-
organised realisers. However, that does not entail that this whole behaviour is not uniquely 
realised by a type of a complex neural activation pattern (to be understood as being 
organised) which is already specified in terms of relations to macroscopically observable 
44 Clearly, that is not a reduction in the sense of reducing one theory to another. 
42environmental stimuli (e.g., the function of the complex neural activation pattern is to 
respond to motion). 
(4) Since neurobiologists specify brain processes at various levels, asking for the truth of 
brain-mind identity claims per se does not make sense. As already mentioned, this multilevel 
character also implicates that the question of whether mental phenomena (put the case that 
they are identically specified) are multiple realisable depends on which lower level is chosen. 
Hence, the fact that mental phenomena are multiple realised at many neurobiological levels 
does not entail that they are multiple realised at all those levels. This again implies that 
endorsing multiple realisation at some levels is compatible with brain-mind identity at 
another level (Aizawa draft, p. 9; 2009, p. 2). 
What’s more, one could construe identity claims as hypotheses that are supposed to guide 
subsequent research: It is assumed that mind and brain are identical in order to integrate and 
improve neurobiological and psychological theories. To this extent the identity claim is not a 
conclusion, but a premise of neurobiological research. This heuristic hypothesis is justified 
by its predictive (e.g., property verification or property generation tasks) and explanatory (in 
the sense of constitutive explanatory relevance: stimulation and activation experiments) 
success. In respect of these experiments the heuristic usage of the identity claim is common 
practice in cognitive neuroscience. Importantly, the heuristic identity theory is a type identity 
theory.
45 (cf. Bechtel & McCauley 1999)
(5) Now I will give a reconstruction of the 'argument for strong psychological autonomy': 
(P1) If higher-level properties are multiple realised by lower-level properties, then there is no 
inter-theoretic constraint between the sciences studying lower-level properties and those 
studying higher-level properties. (P2) Psychological properties are multiple realised by 
neural properties. (C) There is no inter-theoretic constraint between psychology or cognitive 
science and the neurosciences. (cf. Aizawa & Gillett, pp. 18-9) Again, the first premise is the 
contentious   assumption.   Since   the   case   study   of   human   colour   vision   showed   that 
psychological properties are multiple realised at many levels, and that inter-level constraints 
are common practice in neuroscience, the first premise is wrong. Hence, multiple realisation 
per se does not entail the irrelevance of neurobiology for understanding psychological 
phenomena.
45 Bechtel and McCauley emphasize (1999, p. 70) that the practice of cognitive neuroscience adheres to the 
principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, as the converse of Leibniz’s law (that is, the identity of the 
indiscernibles).    
43As we have shown that multiple realisability per se is compatible with a certain concept of 
type identity, what about other arguments against identity theories in addition to multiple 
realisability?
3.4 Some objections to other classical arguments against identity theories
Because we adhere to a certain kind of identity theory, we are interested in challenging other 
classical arguments against identity theories. These include the argument from explanatory 
gap, Jackson's Mary argument, Kripke's argument for the contingent truth of brain-mind 
identity, and Davidson's anomalous monism.
(a) The following considerations are attempts to bridge the explanatory gap.
What is the explanatory gap, at least in the sense of Levine (1983) and Chalmers (1995, 
1996, 1997)? 
What is Levine's argument? Taking the deductive-nomological model of explanation for 
granted, the explanans causally explains because it necessitates the explanandum. Thus, if 
mind-brain identity is contingent, it is impossible to explain the mind in terms of the brain. If 
mind and brain were identical, then the identity would not leave an explanatory gap. 
According to Levine, only 'reductive' explanations can close the gap. Such explanations are 
functionalist – firstly, we determine our concepts by identifying their respective causal roles, 
and then we empirically ascertain the mechanisms that underlie these causal roles. But, so the 
argument, our psychological concepts of qualitative conscious states cannot be analysed in 
terms of their functional roles. Hence, an explanatory gap is left and therefore the mind-brain 
identity is wrong. 
What is the objection? The more the structures of the phenomenal side and the structures on 
the side of the brain are adjusted to each other, the more intelligible identity assumptions will 
be. The more we can ascertain structure within the phenomenal real, the better chance we 
have of giving neurobiological explanations. Both sides have to have corresponding degrees 
of granularity. (Bechtel & Mundale 1999) Moreover, as we will presently see, it is simply 
wrong that qualitative conscious states cannot be analysed in functional terms.
According to Chalmers, the difficult problem of consciousness is to explain why mental 
occurrences have phenomenal properties. In other words, the challenge is to explain why it 
feels like anything at all. He claims that regardless of how precisely we determine the 
respective neural mechanisms, we do not come closer at an answer.
46
46 It could be that both versions of the explanatory gap identify consciousness with the classic concept of a quale 
(CI Lewis 1929). We have a much more inclusive concept of consciousness that corresponds to the view of the 
44According to an interesting hypothesis that has already been mentioned several times, the 
central evolutionary function of consciousness is to make certain facts globally available for 
an organism. That is, consciousness allows us to attend to them, to think about them, and to 
react behaviourally to them in a flexible manner which more (in the case of behavioural 
control) or less (in the case of cognitive processing) automatically considers the overall 
context. The fact that a world appears to you, allows you to grasp that there is an outside 
reality and that you exist as well. Moreover, you can consciously experience emotions and 
thereby discover that you have goals and needs; you can experience yourself as a thinking 
being;   you   can   discover   that   there   are   other   agents   with   phenomenal   experiences. 
Consciousness as a virtual organ also allows you to grasp the notions of truth and falsity, and 
the difference between transparent and opaque phenomenal occurrences. Additionally, your 
unified global model of a single world provides you with a single frame of reference that 
makes the distinction between actuality and possibility (simulations) possible. (Metzinger 
2009, pp. 57-62) I think that this functionalist neurophenomenology provides an answer to 
the  question  of  why  biological  organisms  have  phenomenal  experiences   (contrary  to 
Chalmers’ claim), and analyses phenomenality in functional terms (contrary to Levine’s 
assertion).
Moreover, the multilevel nature of mechanistic explanations shows how phenomenal and 
non-phenomenal processes can be bridged in neurobiological terms (productive continuity). 
How can non-functionalist neurophenomenology
47  play a part in contributing towards 
bridging the explanatory gap? Let us consider a neurophenomenological pilot study (Lutz et 
al. 2002): There are two different phenomenal experiences (phenomenological invariants) 
(first-person data) which underlie specific neural and behavioral patterns (third-person data). 
In the first cluster (A), subjects reported being prepared for the stimulation, undergoing a 
feeling of continuity when the stimulus occurred and an impression of merger behind 
themselves and the phenomenal percept. In the second cluster (B), subjects reported being 
unprepared, diverted, and having a strong feeling of discontinuity in the stream of their 
mental   occurrences   when   the   stimulus   was   presented.   During   (A),   a   frontal   phase-
synchronous ensemble arose early between frontal electrodes and maintained throughout the 
trial. This group of trials exhibited a relatively short average reaction time (300 ms). The 
energy in the gamma band (30-70 Hz) increased during the preparation period. In (A), the 
energy in the gamma band was always higher in the anterior regions during the pre-stimulus 
phenomenological tradition (there is no phenomenality without intentionality).
47  ‘Non-functional neurophenomenology’ only means that it is unlike Metzinger’s functional analysis of 
consciousness.
45period compared with cluster (B), whereby the energy in the low band was lower. This 
indicates that paying attention during preparation is characterized by an increase in the fast 
rhythms accompanied by a decrease in slow rhythms. By contrast, in the cluster (B), when 
the   stimulus   occurred,   a   complex   pattern   of   weak   synchronisation   and   strong 
desynchronisation between frontal and posterior electrodes was ascertained. Moreover, the 
reaction time was significantly longer (600 ms). This discontinuity of brain dynamics was 
strongly correlated with the subjective impression of discontinuity. This study is believed to 
show that first-person data can be linked to stable phase-synchrony patterns (measured in 
EEG  recordings),  and that  subjectively  reported  states  of  perception   and  preparation 
modulate both kinds of third-person data (reaction times and EEG recordings). The focus of 
the pilot study was the the dynamics of the interplay between experiential context of the 
subject leading up to the phenomenal perception and the phenomenal perceptual event itself. 
Whereby their interdependency was especially interesting: On the one hand, the way the 
antecedent and ongoing experiential context of the subject determines how the stimulus 
appears; on the other hand, this phenomenal perceptual object again reflects the flow of 
experience. This global process-stimulus structure and its temporal dynamics stand for the 
endogenous, self-organizing  activity  of the embodied  brain  that is understood  as an 
autonomous dynamical system. What does this experiment say about the explanatory gap? 
By augmenting our view of both first- and third-person dimensions of consciousness, and by 
creating experiments in which they mutually constrain each other, neurophenomenology 
contributes to narrowing down the epistemological gap between subjective experience and 
neural processes in cognitive neuroscience.
48 Currently, neurophenomenologists do not assert 
that they have given explanatory bridges, but that they have provided a scientific research 
programme for advancing that task. (Lutz & Thompson 2003) 
(b) What about Jackson's Mary argument?
Firstly, it is questionable whether Mary can really know nothing about sensations and their 
properties, if she knows everything there is to know about brain states, precisely because 
cognitive neuroscience works multilevel by its nature.
49 Secondly, the two premises of the 
argument invoke two different concepts of knowledge. The fact that Mary has concepts, 
whatever they may be (since conception is normally largely grounded in phenomenal vision), 
48 Moreover, I think that this neurophenomenological study already shows that it is not true that most that 
empirical evidence could ever establish is the ‘correlation’ between mental and neural states. What’s more, if 
one considers mutual manipulability as characteristic of constitutive explanatory relevance in the context of 
cognitive neuroscience, then activation and stimulation experiments exhibit constitutive explanatory relevance. 
In respect thereof cognitive neuroscience provides explanations instead of ‘mere correlations’. 
49 This point concerns conceptual or theoretical knowledge.
46and the ability to undergo phenomenal visual experiences do not coincide. Thirdly, and this is 
the decisive point, what seems to be out of the question is that it is a non-sequitur to conclude 
explanatory irreducibility of phenomenal experiences from phenomenal differences of mental 
systems   (conceptual   knowledge   in   distinction   from   more   embodied   phenomenal 
experiences). And this is sufficient for rejecting this objection to our concept of type identity. 
(c) Now let us shift attention to Kripke's argument for the contingent truth of brain-mind 
identity.
Firstly, the claim that it is possible to be in pain without being in a certain neural state is 
epistemically unjustified, since it is determined by conceivability. And, as we will see later 
(cf. 6.9), conceivability is of no empirical theoretical relevance. Secondly, the apparent 
contingency of brain-mind identity may be explained by the fact that we do not know the 
identity conditions hitherto. It should be added that this concerns the knowledge of 
phenomenal experiences in the same way – we do not have an infallible capacity to specify 
our conscious life. Individuating phenomenal experiences is a skill that has to be learned. 
(Polger 2004, pp. 51-8). Thirdly, since identity claims rely on intelligibility and an adequate 
description of neural processes, the talk of 'C-fibres' or scattered brain states does not play a 
part in contributing to identity claims. Fourthly, as already shown, there are concrete 
proposals for explaining phenomenal experiences like pain (cf. Hardcastle 1999). 
(d) According to Davidson's anomalous monism, every causally interacting mental event is 
identical to some physical event (monism, token-identity). There can be no strict laws on the 
basis of which any mental event-type can be explained, predicted, predict or explain 
(anomalous).
Because neurophenomenological or neuropsychological identity claims are only intelligible 
in terms of types (e.g., synchronized activation patterns), speaking of token-identity has no 
purpose. As we said above, scattered tokens of brain states do not exist. That is not to say 
that the type-token distinction makes no sense, but that the notion of token identity is hardly 
intelligible against the background of current cognitive neuroscience. Moreover, because the 
subsumption under psychophysical laws provides no explanations (with respect to Cummins’ 
concept of psychological law) and because the practice of cognitive neuroscience does not 
search for laws as principles of universal applicability, but for specific phenomena or 
behaviour brought about by specific mechanisms consisting of an organised interplay of 
components, the possibility that there are no strict psychophysical laws is irrelevant for the 
question of whether brain-mind identity is true. 
47While   this   chapter   also   was   concerned   with   interlevel   constraints   on   mechanistic 
explanations,  Barsalou’s theory of perceptual symbol systems (PSS) endorsed in the 
following chapter attempts to explain higher-level cognition in terms of sensorimotor 
processing. This theory may be considered as an instance of mechanistic explanations.  
 
4 Barsalou's theory of perceptual symbols systems (PSS)
In an embodied mind, it is conceivable that the same neural system engaged in perception (or in 
bodily movement) plays a central role in conception. […] Indeed, in recent neural modeling 
research, models of perceptual mechanisms and motor schemas can actually do conceptual work 
in language learning and reasoning. (Lakoff & Johnson 1999, pp. 37-8) 
4.1 The symbol grounding problem and the Chinese Room 
Because it is one of the main problems for theories of amodal symbol systems, now we take a 
look at the symbol grounding problem.
An usual way of obtaining the meaning of a word one does not know is to look it up in a 
dictionary. Yet it might be that one also does not know any of the paraphrasing words, nor 
any of their circumscribing definitions, and so on. This possible infinite regress, that can only 
be avoided if some words are grounded by resources other than ungrounded paraphrases, is 
known as the 'symbol grounding problem' (e.g., Harnad 1990, 2003). Looking for meaning in 
such a way is analogous to looking for meaning in a Chinese/Chinese dictionary when one 
does not have any knowledge of Chinese besides syntactical information (Searle 1980). 
Solving the symbol grounding problem requires endowing symbols with meaning without 
going back to an external interpretation or external entities. That is, the symbols have to be 
grounded within the cognitive system itself, if they are supposed to explain what we do when 
we think. (e.g., Harnad 1992, 1993) 
What if one grounds mental content in sensorimotor simulation? Then, as we shall see later 
in detail, either the symbol grounding problem does not arise at all (cf. 4.3) or it is solved by 
linking arbitrary linguistic tokens to sensorimotor simulations (cf. 4.5). In the case of non-
linguistic conceptual processing, the symbol grounding simply does not arise, because the 
sensorimotor simulations are intrinsically meaningful (cf. Cummins 1996, Chapter nine). 
Language plays a role in conceptual processing only to the extent that areas responsible for 
processing word forms (perception of language and speaking) are connected with content 
bearing sensorimotor simulations. Hence, because the needed contents come into play within 
48the cognitive systems themselves, be it non-phenomenally or phenomenally, the symbol 
grounding problem is overcome. 
As   phenomenal   representations   are   intrinsically   meaningful
50,   and   because   offline 
simulations are activations of structures being extracted from phenomenal representations, 
sensorimotor simulations neither have to be interpreted by inner homunculi (homuncular 
fallacy) nor present themselves to an understanding system  as  having a certain content 
(communicative fallacy).  Committing the homuncular fallacy is to assume that inner 
homunculi literally interpret such-and-such internal representations as standing-ins for such-
and-such states of affairs. Indeed, there is no interpreting, but the causally efficient 
processing or operating is content-sensitive itself. Anyone who proceeds on the assumption 
that “a state […] presents itself to an understanding system as having a certain content” 
(Wheeler & Clark 1999, p. 126) commits the communicative fallacy.
Damasio's hypothesis of convergence zones is introduced next, because it is required for the 
subsequent reconstruction of PSS.
4.2 Feature maps and convergence zones (Damasio’s hypothesis)
The pivotal idea can be explained by the following function of convergence zones: Once an 
active pattern in a feature map is captured by conjunctive neurons in a CZ, these conjunctive 
neurons can later reactivate the pattern in the absence of environmental input (Simmons & 
Barsalou 2003, p. 455).  Conjunctive neurons of CZs can only function as stand-alone 
representations, if they feed forward to automatically to linguistic responses under very 
routinised conditions, such as word associations. Non-automatised conceptual processing 
requires the activation of feature maps. (ibid., p. 456)
Each of the six sensorimotor modalities contains the same configuration of four subsystems: 
Feature maps,  analytic convergences zones (CZs),  holistic CZ, and  modality CZs. Every 
modality (olfactory, gustatory, motor, somatosensory, auditory and visual processing areas) 
includes feature maps that code the content of modality-specific states, e.g. colour is coded in 
visual processing areas, whereas somatosensory processing areas coding surface conditions. 
In contrast to feature maps that are to a great extent  independent of attention, analytic 
properties result from selective attention towards phenomenal perception. Furthermore, while 
feature maps provide the construction  of perceptions,  analytic properties  support the 
representation of cognitive-level categories. Once the subject has turned its attention to a 
50  If one assumes that meaningfulness is not intrinsic to phenomenal representations, where does the 
meaningfulness of higher-level cognition come from then?
49specific configuration of features in a single subregion (e.g., a doorknob), the features 
become tied together in an analytic CZ. Subsequently, these linked features build an analytic 
property which can be utilized for a multitude of conceptual tasks (e.g., inferences, 
categorization). The conjunctive neurons within analytic CZs are organized in accordance 
with the similarity in topography (SIT) principle, as a consequence of which the spatial 
proximity of two neurons in a CZ mirrors the similarity of the features they compound. 
Instead of organizing the analytic properties by category, the SIT principle arranges them by 
property type  (e.g., shape, colour, movement).  For instance,  although  crocodiles  and 
elephants are both animals (at the superordinate level), they vary widely in respect of visual 
properties – following the SIT principle, these highly diverging property types should be 
broadly dispersed in the analytic CZs in vision. Conversely, if different categories share more 
characteristics of respective property types than instantiated properties within a category, 
then these inter-categorical properties should be located spatially more adjacent than intra-
categorical properties. Given the case that a category has a relatively unique visual property 
type, then of course we have an instance of category-specific topographic organization inside 
analytic CZs.
Corresponding to analytic CZs, holistic CZs comprise conjunctive neurons that  capture 
activation   patterns   in   feature   maps   for   holistic   properties.   Holistic   CZs   capture   the 
configuration between manifold analytic properties, for example, the arrangement of eyes, 
nose, ears and mouth in a face. In the manner of the SIT principle, the topographical 
proximity of the conjunctive neurons reflects the similarity between the holistic properties 
they are encoding. 
As distinguished from feature maps and analytic and holistic CZs, modality CZs neither 
process features, nor do they combine features to conceptual properties. Instead they capture 
correlations between diverse analytic and holistic properties. Although these property 
correlations   are   decisive   for   category   structure,   modality   CZs   configure   category 
representations. Consider an example: Because different bottles have similar analytic and 
holistic properties, spatially close conjunctive neurons in modality CZs will capture them. 
Assume that this is respectively true of cans and dogs. Now as dogs vary more from bottles 
and cans than bottles and cans differ from each other, the conjunctive neurons for bottles and 
cans are relatively removed from those of dogs. Consider another example: Since the 
diversity of visual properties of artefacts is much greater than the one of animals, the 
conjunctive neurons that capture the property cluster of artefacts should be more dispersed. 
50Beyond the configurational similarity between the six modalities via sharing the same four 
subsystems, the cross-modal CZs connect properties between modalities. Cross-modal CZs 
do not rely on uniting the representational format because their conjunctive neurons simply 
detect the simultaneous firings of conjunctive neurons in the modality CZs. What is more, 
they are determined by the same principles as modality CZs, unless the conjunctive neurons 
of the cross-modal CZs couple the modality CZs, which again link conjunctive neurons in 
analytic and holistic CZs. Let us illustrate the relation between modality and cross-modal 
CZs by an example: Although real cars and toy cars have adjacent conjunctive neurons in 
visual modality CZs because they bear similar visual properties, their cross-modal CZs lie 
more remote, because real and toy cars differ significantly in somatosensory, olfactory and 
auditory properties. (AR Damasio 1989, AR Damasio & Damasio 1994, cf. Simmons & 
Barsalou 2003)
4.3 Reconstructing PSS
The pivotal idea of PSS is that feature maps of sensory-motor brain areas become re-enacted 
during offline cognition. Offline cognition is thus embodied. In principle it is no different 
than the already introduced notion of neural exploitation (see 1.3).
51  PSS provides a 
characterisation of central higher-level cognitive phenomena, from intentionality through to 
concepts, understanding, thought, and language. As we will presently see, in contrast to 
McDowell (1994), the phenomenal world not only rationally influences our thoughts if our 
experience is already conceptually structured, but also if our thoughts themselves are re-
enactments or simulations of perceptual experiences. If one objects that this idea confuses the 
subpersonal-personal distinction
52,  then  it  can   be  answered   that  the processes  at  the 
subpersonal and personal level can only be adequately understood, if they are specified 
interdependently – just what the mechanistic framework has in mind.
51  PSS's model of conceptual knowledge can be localised as follows: According to Barsalou, a single 
multimodal representation system of the brain (that is, feature maps) sustains various types of simulations 
across different cognitive processes (such as high-level perception, implicit memory, working memory, long-
term memory, and conceptual knowledge) which are constituted by specific mechanisms. In high-level 
perception   and   implicit   memory,   convergence   zones   capture   representations   and   subsequently   initiate 
simulations that accomplish perceptual completion or repetition priming, for example. Conceptual knowledge 
utilizes the same representational system but controls it with the help of convergence zones in the temporal, 
parietal and frontal lobes. The working mechanism in turn employs the same representation system, but controls 
it by means of medial temporal systems and different frontal areas. Corresponding to PSS, simulation is the 
allying concept for diverse neural processes that control a single representation system. (Barsalou 2008)
52 That is to say that PSS is a theory at the subpersonal level, whereas McDowell’s position is a theory at the 
personal level.
51In the following, I will reconstruct the substantial components of PSS. These remarks are 
borrowed mainly from Barsalou's “Perceptual Symbol Systems” (1999). 
Modal perceptual symbols
53  are analogically and non-arbitrarily linked to phenomenal 
perceptual states. What does this mean? They are modal because the same neural systems 
that underlie perception also underlie perceptual symbols, in other words, perception and 
conception have a common representational
54 system. Due to their modal character, they are 
analogical – to a certain extent phenomenal perceptual states and perceptual symbols have a 
common structure. Non-arbitrary linking to perceptual states means that the representational 
vehicles of perception and conception are isomorphic. By contrast, to the extent that words 
bear no systematic similarities (representational schemes and constitutive principles) to the 
phenomenal perceptual states they refer to, they are amodal. For example, whereas within 
amodal accounts symbols for  tables  have no similarity to tables, perceptual symbols for 
tables are similar to phenomenal perceptions of tables. Because the symbols in a perceptual 
symbol system are modal, they are non-arbitrarily linked to their phenomenal perceptual 
forerunners. 
I will  now outline five central properties of PSS. This is not aimed at specifying these 
properties in terms of concrete neural mechanisms, rather it should be considered as a 'high-
level functional account' (Barsalou 1999, p. 6; my italics) of how the brain could implement a 
conceptual system via sensorimotor areas.
Firstly, a perceptual symbol is a record of the neural activation that underlies perception. 
What is the difference between perception, conceptual representation, and imagery? Whereas 
imagery and perceptual symbols come quite close together according to PSS, and whereas 
the sensory-motor representations are more conscious and detailed in imagery than in 
conceptual processing (if one conceives of imagery as relatively conscious), perception 
fundamentally differs from processes engaging concepts. On the neural level, the causal 
influence of CZs to re-enact sensory-motor areas only amounts to conceptual processing, it 
exceeds perception; more about this later (see 4.9). Another important issue concerns the role 
of  consciousness.   Basically,   perceptual   symbols   are  unconsciously   processable  neural 
representations. Perceptual symbols also serve as material for more or less conscious mental 
53 To speak of ‘symbols’ is slightly misleading because one could be inclined to consider them as pictorial signs 
that have to be interpreted by a homunculus in order to be contentful. In fact they are intrinsically meaningful 
modality-specific bodily stand-ins that can be simulated. 
54 In this section I use ‘representation’ (or ‘representational’) to mean internal neural stand-ins. If they are 
activated in full-blooded conceptual tasks, they are supposed to correspond to multimodal feature maps. If these 
neural stand-ins are not activated, they are supposed to correspond to CZs. It would be wrong to think of non-
activated features in terms of CZs as non-activated full-blooded representations – CZs merely capture the 
activation of feature maps in order to be able to re-enact multimodal bodily states in the absence of 
environmental input.   
52simulations. Research on skill acquisition shows that consciousness falls away in the course 
of routinization. 
Secondly, perceptual symbols are schematic. The record of the neural activation realizing the 
phenomenal perceptual state does not grasp the total brain activation of the phenomenal 
percept, but rather a small subset of neurons represent a part of it. The symbol formation 
process explains the schematic nature of perceptual symbols:  A subset of neurons that 
underlie phenomenal perceptual states is selected and stored in long-term memory. Quite 
possibly, conscious experience may be necessary for the first occurrence of this process. 
How do perceptual symbols function once they are stored? Since perceptual symbols are 
associative patterns of neurons, they exhibit a dynamical, non-discrete character: If other 
perceptual symbols are subsequently stored in the same CZs, the connections in the original 
pattern will be altered, whereby possible future activations would be changed. Additionally, 
because different contexts can bias activations towards some particular features in patterns, 
the original pattern could crucially be changed. In terms of dynamical systems theory, a 
perceptual symbol is an attractor state. As the network changes (connections), the attractor 
changes. Context and activation of attractor co-vary. To close the circle, as the attractor 
changes, the network changes. 
Need the construction of the schematic representation of shape be integrated into a holistic 
image, comprising orientation, colour, shape, and so on? Not at all. Inasmuch as perceptual 
symbols are defined as unconscious neural representations, the perceptual symbol for a 
particular shape could stand in for the shape componentially, while perceptual symbols for 
other dimensions remain inactive. Even if phenomenal experiences accompany perceptual 
symbols, they do not have to be holistic – in terms of being irreducible to schematic 
components.
Furthermore, in virtue of schematicity, it would not be surprising if a phenomenal individual 
is never simulated completely. Moreover, the forgetfulness and reconstructive vein of human 
memory do not allow accurate remembering. 
Thirdly, perceptual symbols are  multimodal  in nature. The symbol formation process 
operates not only on vision but also on the other four modalities – audition, haptics, olfaction, 
and gustation – and on proprioception and emotion. Just like subjects acquire perceptual 
symbols for speech from audition, they also acquire symbols for colours from vision, 
symbols for taste from gustation, or symbols for leg positions from proprioception (and 
vision). Fourthly, related perceptual symbols become organized into a simulator that allows 
the construction of a potentially infinite set of simulations. What does this mean? Consider 
53the symbol formation process while viewing a particular racing bicycle. As one regards the 
racing bicycle as a whole, forming symbols of the chainstays, the handlebars, the fork, and 
the tyres, neural records become selected and integrated into the spatially organized system. 
As one subsequently looks at the handlebars, further individual symbols for the handlebar 
tape, the stem, and the brake levers become integrated into the spatially organized system. 
This   spatially   related   coding   enables   coherent   simulations   during   offline   processing. 
Additionally, imagine a specific event sequence, for example, riding the bicycle. Imagine that 
you grasp the handlebars, climb on the saddle, and finally begin to pedal. Due to the fact that 
the symbols for each subevent are stored in a temporally related way, one can later simulate 
this event sequence. This event simulation will probably be multimodal, including, for 
instance, the proprioceptive information on pedalling or sitting on the saddle, the auditory 
information of the rattling chain, and the haptic experience of the blowing wind. Importantly, 
the symbols extracted from a phenomenal entity or event become integrated into a frame 
(using the example, a frame of a racing bicycle) that comprises a great amount of multimodal 
content. A frame is seldom if ever experienced entirely, depending on which context subsets 
of the frame become active so as to simulate a specific experience. In conclusion, a simulator 
consists of a frame that integrates perceptual symbols across a variety of category instances 
and the dispositional property of generating endless sets of simulations.
55
According to PSS, a simulator is a concept, the knowledge and the attended processes that 
allow subjects to adequately represent types of phenomenal entities or events. An adequate 
representation for a table, for instance, means in general that the subject can simulate 
multimodal   experiences   which   are   predominantly   shared   in   a   culture.   The   different 
simulations,   retrievable   by   a   simulator,   are   viewed   as   different  conceptualizations. 
Meaningful components within our phenomenal representational system involve individuals 
and categories (e.g., natural kinds or artefacts). A category is a set of individuals belonging 
to our phenomenal environment or to introspection. A perceived entity belongs to a category 
if a simulator for that category can produce a satisfactory simulation of the phenomenally 
perceived entity, which is called successful categorization. 
What about concept stability, intra- and intersubjectively? Is it possible at all, considering the 
widely diverging simulations of categories within and between individuals, prevalently 
influenced by context (including environment and currently active contents of the respective 
individual)? Intrasubjectively, if one simulator of a category produces different simulations, 
55 Running simulators is not only bound to the empirical course of sense impressions, the processing of space, 
objects,   movement,   and   emotion   is   also   genetically   predisposed.   Naturally,   the   actualization   of  these 
dispositions also substantially relies on interactions with the environment. 
54they can be viewed as exemplifying the same concept. If different subjects have similar 
simulators, then we also need not abandon concept stability between subjects. Are there 
reasons for this? On the one hand, contextual constraints during communication lead to 
similar simulations between subjects. Furthermore, a similar neurobiological equipment, a 
shared phenomenal physical environment, and conventions brought about by socio-cultural 
institutions contribute to stability. It is very possible that subjects have the principal 
possibility to simulate the other person's conceptualization, adequate constraint allows proper 
intersubjective coverage. Clearly, to determine whether intersubjective stability is the case or 
not depends on the level of granularity – in the strict sense, nobody shares concepts with 
someone else, because every subject made specific experiences leading to specific context-
sensitive re-enacted concepts.
56 Let us consider an experiment that examines the degree of 
consensus between pairs of individuals for typicality judgements of different category 
members (e.g., different typical instances of [BIRDS]): Across a variety of studies, the 
degree of consensus was only about 40%. Intrasubjectively, when the same subject judged 
the typicality of the same instances twice, at an interval of two weeks, the corresponding 
average was around 80% (as reviewed in Barsalou 1993). With respect thereof, the 
representations of categories vary both inter- and intrasubjectively, depending on the 
situations the people are anticipating, which again depends on the whole context in which the 
people are embedded at a certain time. 
The concepts can also be similar because the experienced entities allow similar affordances 
(e.g., many people share the concept of a CHAIR insofar as it contains a simulation of taking 
a seat). 
Fifthly, as already mentioned, a  frame  integrates perceptual symbols into a spatially 
organized system in order to create specific simulations of a category. 
Let us now look at four core properties of frames: attributes, predicate-value binding, 
constraints, and recursion. Predicates are more or less identical to unspecified frames, 
considering our example, the comprehensive representation of the racing bicycle depicts a 
predicate. Predicate-value binding occurs if different specializations (e.g., handlebars for 
time trial or normal handlebars) become tied to the same subregion (handlebars), hence, 
different values become bound to the same predicate. The associated activity between 
different specializations (e.g., handlebars for time trials and smaller front wheel), thereby 
simulating specific bicycles, signifies the property constraint. In virtue of simulating within a 
specific simulator, recursion arises. Initially one only simulates the schematic overall shape 
56 This indirectly shows a great potential of an multimodally embodied notion of the mind: It allows a quite fine-
grained specification of non-phenomenal and phenomenal mental episodes. 
55of the handlebars, subsequently one focuses on more specific components, such as the brake 
levers or the handlebar tape. 
If one considers conceptual relations (at least in respect to the ordinary psychological 
representation of such related contents) as a case of background knowledge, PSS has two 
ways in which background knowledge specifies the content of concepts, namely, framing and 
background meaning. In framing, specifying the content of a focal concept necessarily 
depends on the content of another concept, for example, hand is specified relative to arm and 
body or handlebar is specified in relation to bicycle. In background-dependent meaning, the 
content of the focal concept co-varies with meaning of the background concept. Changing the 
background from human to bear, the content of the focal concept arm changes. 
The following remarks deal with additional properties of PSS that can be derived from the 
core features  so far presented here: productivity, propositions, variable embodiment, and 
abstract concepts.
How them can a perceptual symbol system be productive, in other words, how can it produce 
a principally infinite amount of representations from a finite number of symbols and thereby 
transcend experience? Because built schematic representations are enriched with once 
filtered out types of information – for example, the simulator of a racing bicycle, lacking 
colour and labels, produces a comparatively rich bicycle simulation with the help of a 
simulator for blue and some for labels – the process of productivity could be understood as 
the   reverse   of   the   symbol   formation   process   (schematization   and   specialization   are 
complementary). However, productivity does not amount to nothing more than filling-in 
already established schematic regions, it can also arise from substitutions, transformations, or 
deletions of an encountered structure. It is possible to simulate never seen entities, such as a 
flying table via a simulator for an event sequence of flying and one for a table. Are there any 
constraints on the production of simulations? There are some, which can be traced back to 
certain affordances. Consider an example: It seems almost impossible to link the perceptual 
symbol for  running  to a simulated football, because the football lacks a critical feature, 
namely legs. Furthermore, the spatio-temporal features of the simulation itself generate 
emergent properties – for example, imagine the specific way a simulation of a running table 
might look. Language also contributes to make productivity possible: If a friend tells you of 
an exciting experience you did not undergo, you can understand his story only in virtue of 
56linguistically-initiated conceptual simulations.
57 Given that you do not need to experience 
everything first hand in order to acquire information, PSS exhibits productivity.
58
Let us now shift attention to the capacity of PSS to implement propositions. Firstly, consider 
type-token mappings. Imagine you see a bottle standing on a table. If you bind a simulator 
for a bottle, for instance, via a simulation of a bottle with the phenomenally perceived 
individual bottle, then you have all you need for instantiating a type by a token. Naturally, 
the mapping can be true or false – to simulate a cup and bind it with the phenomenally 
perceived bottle would be a false mapping. Since perception and simulation reside in the 
same representational format, the final phenomenal representation of the bottle is a fusion of 
both,   bottom-up   and   top-down   information.   Secondly,   mapping   a   simulator   onto   a 
phenomenally   perceived   individual  allows   one  to  draw  categorical  inferences.  If  the 
bottleneck is occluded, but the cap and the rest of the bottle visible, the binding of your bottle 
simulator enables you to infer that there is a bottle. Or imagine perceiving the bottle attached 
to a rope that steadily moves the bottle up and down. If you turn away for a moment, and 
then simulate the trajectory of the bottle, you can predict its position when it reappears. A 
given phenomenal perception can be manifoldly interpreted, just as you could map your 
simulator for a table onto the perception.
59 A hierarchical simulation of the bottle upon the 
table could be constructed productively from the simulators for bottle, table, and upon. With 
reference to my first Chapter (see 1.2), the simulator for upon may be considered as a good 
example   of   an   image   schemata.   Another   way   in   which   simulators   yield   different 
interpretations of the same phenomenal perception consists in shifting focus from one part of 
the hierarchy to another, in the example, using the simulator for  below  to produce a 
simulation of the table below the bottle. Typically, propositions capture a gist that can be 
paraphrased manifoldly – in PSS captured by the fact that different sentences (“a upon b” or 
“b below a”) can initiate the same simulation.
60 
Next we will deal with the opposite ‘SETI’ version of multiple realisability
61, namely, 
variable embodiment. This implies that the mind varies with the biological system that brings 
them forth. To put it another way: Changing the biological system is sufficient for changing 
the system’s mental processing. Variable embodiment is a natural consequence of PSS. 
57  According to Langacker (1997), the productive combination of adjectives, nouns, and other linguistic 
components corresponds to the productive combination of properties, individuals, events, and other conceptual 
elements.   This   coincident   productivity   is   a   necessary   condition   for   the   human   ability   to   understand 
communicated sentences in the absence of the respective entities.
58 There is a pertinent illustration of how PSS implements productivity in the appendix (upper illustration).
59 That is not to say that the phenomenal representation is not meaningful unless the simulator is mapped onto it.
60 There is a pertinent illustration of type-token mapping in the appendix (lower illustration).
61 “SETI MRT: Some creatures that are significantly different from us in their physical composition can have 
minds like ours.” (Shapiro 2004, p. 7) “SETI” stands for the Search of Extraterrestrial Intelligence project. 
57How? Since the way in which the brain creates phenomenal perceptions has a direct bearing 
on simulational content, because symbols and percepts rest upon the same representational 
format, one can speak of variable embodiment. As we have already seen (see 3.3), such a 
strong neural constraint still allows certain kinds of multiple realisation.
Variable embodiment fulfils at least two important functions: adapting simulations to specific 
environments,   and   warranting   that   different   individuals   optimally   map   their   specific 
simulations to phenomenal perception.
62 
Finally, let us look at PSS and abstract concepts. Irreconcilable opposites? Not at all. We 
concentrate on analysing the way of representing the everyday sense of TRUE, exemplarily. 
How is truth represented? Imagine a speaker says, “Look, there’s a bottle bobbing up and 
down above the table behind you.” Almost automatically, you construct a simulation of the 
event sequence described. Subsequently, you turn around and try to map your simulation to 
the phenomenal perception of the event. You then judge whether your simulation adequately 
represents the perceived situation. If it is the case, the speaker's sentence is true. What is the 
simulator for truth then? After repeatedly performing the event structure of simulating, 
focusing,   and  comparing   simulation   and   phenomenal   perception,   individuals   learn   to 
simulate the experience of successful mapping, and such simulations could constitute 
people's concept of truth. 
Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) give evidence for the following four hypotheses: (1) 
Concrete and abstract concepts are reliant on situational content. Just as you have to know 
the application, the usage, and so on of hammers to understand the concrete concept 
HAMMER, so a complex situation is also necessary to represent TRUE. (2) Concrete and 
abstract concepts differ in situational focus. Concrete concepts are processed by focusing on 
objects against their background situations. Abstract concepts, however, are aimed at events 
and phenomenally opaque properties. (3) Abstract concepts are more complex than concrete 
concepts. Concrete concepts are quite localized, confining themselves to spatially limited 
situations (hammers occupy a certain region). The contents of abstract concepts, by contrast, 
are   distributed   across   situations.   Moreover,   their   being   extraordinarily   related   to 
62 Imagine that two individuals interact from time to time with specific tokens of the same type of coke can in 
different contexts; the one uses it as container for watering flowers, whereas the other one takes it to decorate 
his living room. In perceiving their respective cans, they have more or less differing perceptual symbols to 
represent them, depending on their respective behavioural functions. What about the second function? 
Exemplified by colour vision, due to the fact that different subjects have slightly differing colour perceptions, 
and that subjects' simulators for colours are grounded in finely discerning perceptions, their symbols also subtly 
differ. However, precisely this fine intrasubjective tuning at best allows matching symbols to perception during 
categorization. Such variation should also arise in phenotypic characteristics other than colour, such as shape, 
smell, or movement. 
58phenomenally opaque states may play a part in contributing to this complexity. (4) The 
content of abstract concepts can be simulated. Event structures as well as phenomenally 
opaque mental episodes (e.g., emotions) can be readily simulated in multimodal terms. 
Is the claim that abstract concepts are directly experienceable not incompatible with what 
was said before, namely, that abstract concepts are metaphorically grounded in sensorimotor 
domains (basic-level and image schematic structures)? No. One could say that metaphors 
only augment the contents of abstract concepts (Boroditsky & Ramscar 2002), whereby 
direct experience of abstract concepts is nevertheless central to their content. 
The following section aims at connecting dynamical systems theory and PSS.
4.4 PSS and dynamical systems theory: context sensitivity, embodiment, and 
temporality 
It often  happens that the same type of input – conceived of as a focal point in the 
environment – is processed in different ways, because active inner processing and peripheral 
environmental characteristics form a different context. This dynamic variability is noticeable, 
neurally as well as phenomenally. In representational and simulational terms, on a given 
occasion those features of a category become active that have been processed most 
frequently and most recently and that are to this extent most closely associated with the 
current context. These activated features make up only a small subset of the variable contents 
that a person has gathered over a lifetime. Even if simulators are stable in a sense, features 
can be retrieved, combined, and applied in such ways that they nicely suit the dynamicist's 
intuition that minds are never in the same state or process twice.
What about embodiment? For dynamicists, brain-body-environment interactions are central 
to almost all intelligent behaviour. By contrast, disembodied representations are language-
like  codes  involving   nothing   that suggests  their   grounding  in   perception,  body,  and 
environment. 
PSS is embodied, since conception and perception share a common representational system. 
PSS is inherently representational insofar as conceptual simulations are mapped onto 
phenomenal perceptual representations, and insofar as permanently changing stand-ins for 
aspects of phenomenal representations are used in offline simulations. 
Since simulating a category consists of having multimodal sensorimotor knowledge (e.g., of 
a racing bicycle) that enables the generation of specific simulations of that category in 
specific situations, context sensitivity is a natural consequence of simulation. Context-
59sensitive retrieving of relevant simulations may be a question of statistical frequency and 
resemblance   between   simulations   and   phenomenal   representations.   Depending   on   the 
respective context, a specific simulation is tailored to it. For example, representing racing 
bicycles that were used in the 1980s looks differently to representing ones that are used 
today. Similarly, representing racing bicycles being ridden may generate simulations from 
the cyclist’s perspective, while representing racing bicycles being repaired may create 
simulations of a racing bicycle's shifting system or its brakes. Insofar as PSS's simulations 
evade the costly transduction into amodal symbols, they are at least more capable of 
satisfying real-time constraints than amodal models. More importantly, since conceptual 
processing is based on re-enactments of feature maps, it more or less exhibits the temporal 
dynamics of original experiences. (Prinz & Barsalou 2000) Clearly, just as the temporality of 
stimuli-correlated representations ranges from the elementary scale (varying between 10 and 
100 milliseconds) to the integration scale (varying between 0.5 to 3 seconds – corresponding 
to the experienced lived present) (Varela 1995; Varela et al. 2001), so offline simulations 
exhibit a temporality that spans from unconscious to more or less conscious processing. 
Importantly,   even   the   multimodal   phenomenal   side   of   stimuli-correlated   experiences 
inherently exhibits a temporal dimension.
4.5 A neurally embodied theory of language
Since it turned out that cognition is not quasi-linguistic, that language does not carry content 
if it is not processed within contextually embodied cognitive systems, and that the content of 
linguistic symbols is individuated in terms of context-sensitive phenomenal representations 
and simulations corresponding to a subject, which role plays language then? This very 
question is answered in what follows.
According to Pulvermüller's theory (2008), language is grounded in, and embodied by, action 
and perception mechanisms. The basic idea is that there are strong functional links between 
superior temporal speech perception, comprehension circuits (residing in perception- and 
action-related brain regions) and inferior frontal action control circuits. Pulvermüller et al. 
(2006) showed that distinct motor regions in the precentral gyrus which fired during 
articulatory movements of lips and tongue (syllables including [p] and [t] sounds), also fired 
when   subjects   listened   to   the   lip-   or   tongue   related   phonemes.   This   neuroimaging 
corroborates the thesis of specific links between the phonological mechanisms for speech 
perception and production (phonological somatotopy). The fact that high-frequency cortical 
60responses (gamma-band) occurred in the case of meaningful words (“crocodile”), but not in 
the   case   of   meaningless   word-like   items   (“crodobile”),   suggests   that   high-frequency 
responses are generated by memory networks. Such an explanation predicts that a memory 
network should amplify the cortical activity. The mismatch negativity (MMN) is a standard 
indicator of cognitive processes being elicited by auditory stimuli. The enhanced activity of 
the MMN of familiar linguistic tokens in contrast to meaningless but pronounceable ones has 
been confirmed comprehensively (e.g., Näätänen et al. 1997; Endrass et al. 2004; Pettigrew 
et al. 2004). 
Interestingly, it was shown that lesions in the superior temporal (speech perception) or 
inferior frontal cortex (speech production) causing aphasia normally impair both speech 
production and comprehension (Pulvermüller et al. 1991). Moreover, Horwitz et al. (2004) 
probed that the links between superior temporal and inferior frontal language areas depend 
on the amount of contentful information that is carried by words. These strong functional 
links between speech perception, comprehension, and speech production circuits depict the 
embodiment of word forms and semantics. 
Where and how is word meaning represented in the human brain? Hearing the word “bird”, 
for example, frequently together with certain visual perceptions, strengthens the connections 
between visual neurons (e.g, form and colour detectors in the primary cortex) and perisylvian 
language areas which process the word form. In the case of action words, neural networks in 
the motor, premotor, and prefrontal cortex responsible for action control are linked to those 
word form processing language areas. A number of neuroimaging studies have confirmed 
category-specific activation for the processing of action and visually-related words and 
concepts (e.g., Chao et al. 2001; Kiefer 2001; Cappa et al. 1998). 
According to the idea of category-specific semantic processes, different kinds of word 
meaning reside in different parts of the brain. However, could it not be that the differential 
activation is explained in terms other than semantic? Since nouns often have more highly 
imageable content than verbs, while verbs tend to occur more frequently, any difference in 
brain activation could be brought about by an imageability-frequency dissociation.
63 What we 
therefore need is evidence of category-specific semantic activation at precisely those 
locations the brain-based sensorimotor semantics predicts. Somatotopic activations in action 
word processing provide this: Hauk et al. (2004) reported fMRI data demonstrating that 
tongue, finger, and foot movements lead to specific somatotopic activation patterns which are 
63 Moreover, predictions on where category-specific activation is to occur have not always been precise. Martin 
et al. (1996) showed, for example, that semantic information about colour and motion occurred ~2 centimetres 
anterior to the areas that respond maximally to colour and motion.
61similar to activation patterns, while subjects silently read action words related to face, arm, 
and   leg   (whereby   psycholinguistic   variables,   such   as   word   frequency,   length,   and 
imageability were pretty much identical). Moreover, Tettamanti et al. (2005) showed that 
hearing action words embedded into spoken sentences (e.g., “The boy kicked the ball”) 
triggers the activation of specific body part representations. 
Why is somatotopic activation semantic and not epiphenomenal in nature? Pulvermüller 
gives three criteria that are supposed to separate comprehension from epiphenomenal 
processing – immediacy, automaticity, and functional relevance. In order that motor areas 
contribute to semantic processing, their activation should take place immediately, that is, 
within the first 200 milliseconds after stimuli can be uniquely identified as an incoming 
word, since it is known that early lexical and semantic processing occurs around 100-200 
milliseconds after critical stimulus information comes in (Sereno et al. 1998). Indeed, early 
activation differences between motor representations of the face and leg while silently 
reading face and leg words have been ascertained (Hauk et al. 2004). Automatic processing 
purports that hearing or seeing a word almost inevitably leads to comprehending its content, 
even if the subject does not intentionally attend to the stimulus. Here, too, the semantic role 
of somatotopic activation was confirmed: Subjects, distracted by spoken language input 
(face-, arm-, and leg-related action words) through watching a silent video film exhibited 
somatotopic activation (Näätänen et al. 2001; Pulvermüller, Shtyrov et al. 2005). Motor areas 
are only then functionally relevant, if changing the functional states of these motor systems is 
sufficient for measurable effects on the semantic processes. Pulvermüller, Hauk et al. (2005) 
showed that strong magnetic pulses that elicited muscle contractions in the right hand led to 
faster processing of arm words compared with leg words, whereby the reverse result occurred 
when transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) was employed on the cortical leg area. This 
underpins the specific influence of somatotopic activation on the understanding of action-
related words. 
How is language, understood as comprising word forms (phonological and orthographical) 
and semantics, processed in the brain? The widely distributed networks representing words 
('word webs') become active in a discrete manner, that is, they are either active or inactive, 
and the full activation of a word web competes with other word webs. Assuming discrete 
activations is not to say that those representations are not context-specific. Other brain states 
in general, and other cognitive network activations in particular, form contexts that prime the 
way a word web fires. If you like, this neurally underpins Wittgenstein's (1953) idea of word 
62meaning as a family of similar context-dependent semantic feature sets.
64 Moreover, discrete 
representations allow the disambiguation of a semantically ambiguous word – the respective 
semantic context primes one of the semantic subassemblies. 
I am now going to add some further considerations concerning language with reference to 
Barsalou (2008): Linguistic symbols are also modal symbols (as visually and auditorily 
perceived forms). They are schematic memories of perceived written or spoken words that 
are integrated into simulators. As simulators for words are established in memory, they get 
connected to simulators for phenomenal entities to which they refer. For example, whereas 
the simulator for the word “racing bicycle” becomes associated with the overall simulator for 
racing bicycle, other simulators for words become linked to simulators' subregions, such as 
the one for “handlebar tape” to the respective part. From the point where simulators for 
words are associated  with simulators for concepts, simulators for words can control 
simulations. While reading a linguistic symbol, the associated content-bearing simulator 
becomes activated, thereby simulating a potential phenomenal entity and in this way 
providing   a   semantic   interpretation   (insofar   as   language   symbols  index  simulations). 
Inversely, while producing speech within communication, the content-bearing simulation 
activates words and syntactic forms which, if spoken, function as guidelines for the semantic 
simulations of the hearer (in respect thereof, linguistic symbols control simulations). 
Although word associations function as heuristics for correct conceptual performance (e.g., 
synonym judgements), they do not amount to deep conceptual processing, but rather are 
superficial.
65 Simulations provide the true comprehension, often being indicated by linguistic 
forms. Additionally, extensive interaction occurs between the simulation and the linguistic 
system: The initial activation of linguistic forms activates simulations. Subsequently, words 
that refer to the simulated space-time regions become active. Finally, simulators that 
conceptually interpret these regions are activated. Since people constantly hear linguistic 
tokens corresponding to phenomenally-perceived situations or simulated situations, the 
statistical structures of the two systems (frequencies of properties and relations between 
them) mirror each other. 
I will now outline some evidence for mixtures of the linguistic and semantic system in 
higher-level cognitive behaviour. Firstly, in property verification, participants produce more 
64 Pulvermüller makes the proposal that the distributed neural assemblies themselves, as a whole (that is, the 
nearby simultaneous activation of cortical processing word forms and conceptual content) implement the 
linguistic binding instead of one central locus. The bilateral nature of neural degeneration of semantic dementia 
(Patterson & Hodges 2001) speaks against clinging to one focal binding area.
65 As already shown (see 4.1), performing symbolic operations (such as predication or conceptual combination) 
merely on linguistic forms, like manipulating symbols in an unfamiliar language, is not sufficient for real 
understanding.
63object-situation responses and fewer linguistic responses, because the task is more conceptual 
and their responses take longer periods into account. Furthermore, it is confirmed that 
linguistic   responses   should   significantly   precede   object-situation   responses.   Besides, 
superordinates were produced quite early, whereas subordinates and ordinates were as slow 
as object-situation responses. These findings indicate that superordinates were linguistically 
processed, whereby subordinates and coordinates were conceptually simulated. Various 
assumptions were also corroborated by fMRI: The word association task primarily activated 
left-hemisphere language areas, especially Broca's area. The situation simulation  task 
activated bilateral posterior areas, typically responsible for mental imagery. In property 
generation, conceptual processing activated both localised regions; activations of the words 
association localiser occurred earlier than the activations found in the situation localizer. 
Secondly, consider evidence from research on property verification: As predicted by 
Solomon and Barsalou (2004), if information of the linguistic system is exclusively sufficient 
for adequate task performance, then participants will adopt the linguistic strategy. This 
strategy is sufficient if the words for true properties are related to the words for the target 
object (e.g., “WATERMELON-seed”), and if the words for false properties are unrelated to 
the target object (e.g., “LION-wire”). When, however, the words for the false properties are 
related to the target object (e.g., “BANANA-monkey”), participants will use conceptual 
simulations. These predictions are neurally corroborated: Related false trials showed the 
activity of the left fusiform area – a region that contributes to visual imagery. In the case of 
unrelated false trials, this area was not active.
Thirdly, to revisit the discussion on abstract concepts, consider the following evidence: For 
abstract concepts too, mixtures of language and semantic simulation systems do the 
representational work. As confirmed by Wilson et al. (2007), the linguistic system was not 
more active for abstract concepts than for concrete ones.
66 
Chaffin (1997) found that high-frequency words often produced semantic responses that 
described events, whereas low-frequency words often generated linguistic responses – for 
example, synonyms and sound or orthographical similarities.
67 One explanation is that high-
frequency words strongly activate situated simulations in the simulation systems and low-
frequency words mainly activate linguistic tokens in the linguistic system. Due to the fact 
that low-frequency words have not been linked enough to experiences to activate the 
66  Other neuroimaging experiments had only confirmed the thesis that abstract concepts are exclusively 
linguistically represented because the tasks posed encouraged superficial linguistic processing.
67 This thought of linguistic responses can be linked with the theory of convergence zones: For example, cross-
modal CZs associate spoken (auditory) and written (visual) forms of “table”, for instance (Simmons & Barsalou 
2003, p. 16). 
64simulation of familiar situations, they are associated with linguistic information. Conversely, 
since high-frequency words activate event simulations well known from experience to 
support situated action, they are associated with pragmatic information.
68 
Consider the complex interactions between linguistic and simulation processing again: The 
activation of linguistic forms leads to activation of simulations. In turn, these activate words 
that manipulate and describe the simulations. Generally, Barsalou assumes that the symbolic 
structures and symbolic operations result from the interactions between the language and the 
simulation system. There is evidence that shows that syntactic structures and affordances 
available from simulations are related (Glenberg & Robertson 2000).
69 
In the following section, we deal with empirical evidence for concept empiricism.
4.6 Further empirical evidence for concept empiricism
With a view to making the whole notion of embodiment more intelligible and in order to 
justify PSS in particular and concept empiricism in general, we outline now further empirical 
evidence that suggest the truth of concept empiricism.
Importantly, the following evidence makes up the central justification for the truth of PSS 
and   the   inadequacy   of   amodal   symbols   systems   accounts.   Purely   behavioural   and 
neurobehavioural evidence is outlined.
(1) Occlusion effects during property generation: Wu and Barsalou (2005) induced half of the 
participants to generate properties for the noun concept [LAWN], and the other half for the 
same noun by a modifier (ROLLED-UP LAWN). Decisively, the participants of the first half 
hardly generated internal properties of [LAWN], such as DIRT and ROOTS, whereas the 
second half generated them much more frequently. What does this speak for? According to 
amodal theories, the meaning of the compounded linguistic token ROLLED-UP LAWN is a 
function of the meaning of its components. Here more importantly,  without ad hoc 
68 Moreover, Following the principles of content addressability and encoding specificity, depending on the kind 
of cue (sensory-motor (a picture, for instance) or linguistic), the conceptual system activates faster either 
simulations or linguistic tokens respectively. This may be considered as another variable that has to be taken 
into account in order to explain the variations in activations and time. 
69 The basic ideas involved are reflected in Glenberg and Robertson’s indexical hypothesis (1999, 2002). This 
thesis says that language comprehension consists of three processes: First, phrases are indexed to actual 
phenomenal objects or corresponding perceptual symbols. Second, by means of the indexed phenomenal object 
or perceptual symbols (which are integrated into a frame) affordances are derived (e.g., sentences that contain 
“chair” are understood by deriving 'you can sit on'). Third, the affordances are meshed guided by the sentence's 
syntax (e.g., to understand the sentence “John sits on the chair” one has to mesh the affordances of the chair and 
of John, so that John is on and not under the chair). 
65assumptions the accessibility of DIRT and ROOTS as properties for [LAWN] should not 
vary by adding the modifier ROLLED-UP, according to amodal theories. Yet, exactly the 
opposite occurred. Modal theories explain this in terms of internal simulations – the first half 
simulated the lawn's surface, whereas the second half simulated a rolled-up lawn, thereby 
accessing more internal properties than the first half. It was ensured that the modifier 
ROLLED-UP   did   not   increase   the   number   of   occluded   properties   at   every   word. 
Furthermore, this finding also appeared both for familiar (e.g., HALF WATERMELON) and 
for novel noun combinations (e.g., GLASS CAR). 
(2) Size effects during property verification: During property verification, the data in need of 
explanation are error rates and response times. Critically, the larger the property, the longer 
the verification times. This indicates that the respective properties to be verified are 
perceptually   simulated.  Moreover,  scans  of  participants'   performance  via  fMRI  show 
activation in the left fusiform gyrus – a region often active in mental imagery and high-level 
object perception. 
(3)  Shape effects  during property verification: Solomon and Barsalou (2001) examined 
whether verifying a property (MANE) for one concept (LION) facilitates verifying the same 
property for another concept (PONY). If MANE is represented by a single amodal symbol, 
abstracting over variously shaped manes, processing MANE for [LION] should facilitate 
subsequently processing MANE for [HORSE]. If, however, participants simulate manes 
during verification, simulating a lion mane should not benefit simulating a pony mane, 
because lion and pony manes have different shapes. Accordingly, if participants successively 
verify MANE for [PONY] and MANE for [HORSE], the former should facilitate the latter 
simulation.   Not  surprisingly,   simulating   MANE   for   [PONY]   was  only  facilitated   by 
previously simulating MANE for [HORSE]. By the way, it was ensured that the effect did 
not arise from the greater similarity between [HORSE] and [PONY] than between [LION] 
and [PONY], the property was the critical factor. 
(4) Modality switching during property verification: Pecher et al. (2003) showed that, for 
instance, verifying LOUD for [BLENDER] worked faster when RUSTLING was previously 
verified for [LEAVES] than when TART was verified for [CRANBERRIES]. Corresponding 
to modality switching during perception, the comparative delay is explained in terms of 
modality shifts during simulation. Probably, selective attention has to shift from one to 
another modality. Obviously, it is not the sole explanation – perhaps properties from the 
same modality are more closely associated among themselves than properties from different 
modalities, thereby priming across verifications trials. Yet, when checked, neither properties 
66from the same modality were more associated than one from different modalities, nor were 
highly associated properties verified faster than unassociated properties. 
(5) Shape and orientation during language comprehension: Zwaan, Stanfield, and Yaxley 
(2002) stated the influence of coincidence/anti-coincidence between reading a vignette and 
the response time subjects take to name objects of shown pictures, especially in respect of the 
object’s shape. Using the example, if a bird with outstretched (or folded) wings was shown 
and the participants previously read sentences that described a flying (or sitting) bird, they 
designated objects faster than when the sentences' implicit shape did match the pictures' 
shape. 
Furthermore, Stanfield and Zwaan (2002) demonstrated that the orientation of objects affects 
language comprehension. For instance, some participants read sentences about someone 
pounding a nail into the wall, whereas others read sentences about someone pounding a nail 
into the floor. Directly afterwards, participants saw a picture of an isolated object and had to 
show whether it had been named in the sentences. If the orientation between sentences and 
pictures (in both a horizontal nail or in both a vertical nail) coincided, the verification was 
faster  than   the one  in  which  orientation  between   sentences   and  picture  differed.   In 
conclusion, both experiments ought to show that people simulate objects during sentence 
comprehension. 
(6) Movement direction in language comprehension: Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) intended 
to demonstrate that people's understanding of sentences that describe actions are based on 
simulating the actions in their motor systems. They ascertained a correlation between the 
coincidence of the direction of the press button movement (whereby participants indicated 
whether sentences are grammatically correct/incorrect) and the direction of the described 
action and the response times. Using the example, the sentences “Open the drawer” and 
“Close the drawer” were verified faster, if the former was verified via pressing the button 
towards their bodies and the latter with a button pressed away from their bodies than when 
the described action and the indicating movement were contrary. 
(7)  Category-specific deficits: Since visual processing is significant for interacting with 
[LIVING THINGS], such as [MAMMALS], and, according to modal theories, knowledge of 
those categories resides not insignificantly in areas responsible for visual processing, lesions 
in visual areas should increase the probability of loosing knowledge of those categories. Or, 
because action  is central for interacting  with [MANIPULABLE OBJECTS], such as 
[TOOLS], and, according to modal theories, knowledge of those categories resides to a great 
extent in motor areas, damage to motor areas should increase the probability of loosing 
67knowledge of those categories. Both cases are depicted in Damasio and Damasio (1994) or in 
Humphreys   and   Forde   (2001).   Analogously,   lesions   in   areas   responsible   for   colour 
processing cause colour knowledge deficits, damage to areas responsible for space lead to 
deficits in knowledge of location. 
(8) Neuorimaging studies of category knowledge: Processing categories that strongly depend 
on visual information, such as [ANIMALS], shows considerable activation in visual areas. 
Analogously, handling categories that heavily depend on action, such as [TOOLS], displays 
striking activation in the motor systems (Martin et al. 1996). The analogue was also found for 
processing colour categories (Shao & Martin 1999). More concretely, while participants 
looked at manipulable objects in isolation (for example, a hammer) lying in an fMRI scanner, 
a brain circuit that underlies the grasping of manipulable objects became active (besides, a 
clear confirmation of sensorimotor coupling). It is worth noting that while participants were 
viewing animals, buildings, and faces, this brain circuit did not become active. Since the 
participants neither moved nor viewed pictures of others' actions (to exclude the causal 
efficacy  of  mirror   neurons),  Shao   and  Martin   concluded   that  the circuit's   activation 
constitutes a motor inference which includes the way to act on the perceived object. 
Similarly, Simmons, Martin, and Barsalou (2005) induced participants to view food pictures 
in an fMRI scanner, whereby such brain areas became active as represent the taste of food, 
elsewhere being activated during ingestion. They construe this to indicate that as participants 
viewed food, category knowledge became active which generated taste inferences by use of 
simulations in the gustatory systems.
To what extent do these experiments determine the empirical or philosophical theories? In 
any case to the effect that knowledge resides in sensorimotor areas. Because those areas 
generate phenomenal experiences in online processing, and we have no phenomenal 
experience of amodal symbols, I would even go so far as to say that those experiments also 
entail that there are no amodal symbols.
70   
Now,   let   us   consider   evidence   that   shows   how   subjects   make   use   of   situated 
conceptualizations consisting of four types of situated inferences: Inferences about (i) the 
goal-relevant properties of the pertinent category, (ii) the background properties, (iii) the 
appropriate actions for achieving the focal goal and (iv) the phenomenally opaque states that 
the agent will probably have to go through while interacting with the category (e.g. 
evaluations, emotions, cognitive operations). 
70 This is believed to anticipate the objection that empirical evidence underdetermines the truth of the respective 
theories.
68(1)  Inferences about goal-relevant properties of the pertinent category: Barsalou (1982) 
demonstrated that the time participants take to verify a property for a noun depends on the 
context that is indexed by the sentences they previously read which contained the focal noun. 
Using the example, participants verified FLOATS 145 ms faster after reading the sentence, 
“The basketball was used when the boat sank”, than after reading “The basketball was well 
worn from much use.” Thus, the concept for [BASKETBALL] did not produce the same 
representations across both contexts. Similarly, context effects on word encoding within the 
frame of memory were shown, moreover context effects on lexical access during sentence 
processing. Hence, a category is not represented by one general description (not to mention 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions) that functions across different 
situations, but rather tailored to contextual requirements. 
(2)  Inferences about background settings: The decisive point is that instead of being 
represented   isolated,   categories   should   be   accessed   situationally   embedded.   Vallée-
Tourangeau et al. (1998) induced participants to give instances of common taxonomic 
categories (using the example, [FRUIT]) and of ad hoc categories ([THINGS PEOPLE 
TAKE TO A WEDDING]). Afterwards, they inquired about the generation strategy that 
participants   had   used,   the   choice   being   that   instances   came   to   mind 
automatically/unmediated, via semantic taxonomy or by means of retrieval from experienced 
situations. More than half of participants reported the experiential strategy. Quite possibly, 
this experiment can be understood as checking the self-conception that the respondents had.
71 
The experiments described earlier also showed the situational embeddedness of category 
representation (e.g., to generate properties for [WATERMELON], participants inadvertently 
produced setting properties, such as PARC or PICNIC TABLE), thereby not relying on 
introspection. 
(3) Inferences about actions the agent could take to reach an associated goal: This is to show 
that the situated conceptualizations of categories place the conceptualizer in the represented 
situations. Reading a sentence about an action (without mentioning an agent) activates a 
motor representation of it (Glenberg & Kaschak 2002). As already mentioned, the grasping 
circuit was activated when participants looked at manipulable artifacts in isolation (Chao & 
Martin 2000); similarly, merely reading an action word activated the respective part of the 
motor strip (Hauk et al. 2004). As was intended, these findings demonstrate the action-
71 This may be considered as an objection to the view that the classical folk psychology reflects the self-
conception of the participants. Clearly, if claims about self-conceptions are not the result of empirical studies, 
they cannot be count as justified. Apart from that, one might challenge the relevance of self-conceptions for a 
theoretical understanding of mental processes. 
69orientation of the conceptual system by priming relevant actions in the motor system; the 
activation of a concept prepares the conceptualizer for interacting with its instances. There is 
further evidence  in social cognition: While  viewing other's faces to  categorize  their 
emotional states, participants simulated the respective emotional expressions on their own 
faces (Wallbott 1991). Analogously, banning the simulation of other's emotional states 
decreased their ability to categorize (Niedenthal et al. 2001); or the accuracy of participants' 
categorizations correlated with the extent to which their facial simulations were recognizable 
(they were videotaped). To this extent, simulating others' emotional expressions is regarded 
as motor inference of the conceptual system in order to support situated action – usually, it is 
useful for the perceiver to adopt the same emotional state as the perceived person. 
(4) Inferences about mental states, that are phenomenally regarded as internal, which the 
conceptualizer will have while interacting with instances of the conceptualized category: As 
participants simulated particular situations with the category [WATERMELON], in addition 
to background properties, they also generated properties about presumptive internal states 
that they should experience in imagined situations, such as evaluations whether the objects 
are good/bad, effective/ineffective, emotional reactions to objects, such as happiness or fear, 
and cognitive operations relevant for interacting with the respective objects, such as 
comparing the object to alternatives (Wu & Barsalou 2005).
While we dealt with empirical evidence for concept empiricism in this section, the next one 
revisits mechanistic explanations. 
4.7 Identifying PSS as a mechanistic explanation
                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
The aim of the following section is to make a proposal on how PSS could be conceived of as 
a mechanistic explanation. As we have argued for the rightness of mechanistic explanations 
(see 3.2), and since we adhere to PSS, this intention is natural.
The empirical evidence  is provided by both bottom-up (lesions correlated by conceptual 
deficits) and top-down (fMRI studies of conceptual tasks) experiments. It thus also seems 
appropriate to say that PSS takes several levels into consideration – at least two functionally 
individuated brain regions, and correlated behaviour of the cognitive system as a whole. I 
think that one could divide PSS into the following three levels: very high-level functional 
account, high-level functional account, and the activity of brain regions. Very high-level 
functional properties are productivity or variable embodiment, for example. High-level 
functional properties are the frame structure, the possession of simulators, or filling-ins, for 
70example. Simulators, for example, are controlled by cross-modal and modality CZs residing 
in the perirhinal cortex; entorhinal cortex, amygdala, and hippocampus, respectively (cf. 
Simmons & Barsalou 2003, pp. 471-2). 
Clearly, PSS is a how explanation – the re-enactment of sensorimotor areas explains why we 
are able to think about things in their environmental decoupling, or why our thoughts are 
often accompanied by phenomenal imagery.
Moreover, the re-enactment of feature maps of sensorimotor areas constitutes understanding 
or offline cognition (interlevel constitution). An example of an intralevel (at high-functional 
level) causal relation is the ongoing alternation of stored frames brought forth by selectively 
attending to phenomenal representations of the environment.
Consider an example that illustrates in what way PSS might be productively continuous: 
Imagine that a friend tells you that the ceiling in his cellar starts going mouldy. Thereupon 
you screw up your nose and you reply that it has to smell his cellar. How can your capacity to 
add an emotion (disgust) and an olfactory feature to the talking (what is supposed to stand for 
the very high-level functional property of productivity) be explained? Your brain could make 
use of CZs occurring in vision to categorize CELLAR, CEILING, and MOULDY. More or 
less parallel to this cross-modal CZs, that capture the correlation between visual and 
olfactory   properties,   could   re-activate   the   feature   maps   constituting   the   disgust. 
Approximately in parallel with this feeling CZs that reside in somatosensory areas in the 
right hemisphere link your disgust to your facial expression (cf. Adolphs et al. 2000). Lastly, 
this complex bodily simulation (what is supposed to stand for the high-level functional 
property of a simulation) feed activation to the linguistic response systems. 
4.8 Problems for the postulation of amodal symbols
Now we are going to look at objections that exclusively take issue with amodality. 
Perceptual states of the perception system are transduced into a new representational system 
whose symbols bear no structural similarity with the entities of the perceptual states that 
produced them. No structural similarity means that the amodal symbols do not retain the 
systematic relation between the phenomenal perceptual states to which they refer (e.g., the 
amodal symbols “red”  and “orange”  are not more similar to each other than “red”  and 
“blue”). 
What are the problems for amodal theories? First, they are unfalsifiable. All conceivable 
empirical evidence is explainable post hoc in terms of amodal symbols. By means of ad hoc 
71assumptions they can explain every possible behavioral and neural evidence.
72 Second, the 
thesis that concepts are amodally grounded lacks direct evidence. There is no direct evidence 
that amodal symbols are causally relevant for conceptual processing. Third, although theories 
of amodal symbols are indirectly confirmed by their capacity to implement conceptual 
systems (productivity, type-token distinction, systematicity, propositional structure), they 
cannot implement all computational functions – such as spatio-temporal knowledge (Clark 
1997). Moreover, as we have seen, modal symbols can implement computational functions 
too. Since in addition to that modal theories are empirically well confirmed, the justificatory 
force of implementing conceptual functions by amodal symbols is quite debatable. Fourth, if 
it is assumed that phenomenally perceivable things count among the contents of offline 
thoughts and that these contents are created in online cognition by our sensorimotor systems 
and if offline thought is about phenomenally perceivable things and makes use of arbitrary 
representations, then the representational format being constructed by our sensorimotor 
systems has to be transduced into the format of arbitrary representations. This transduction is 
problematic, however, for the following reason: Because pervasive interactions between 
higher- and lower-level types of mental processes exist, a substantial additional cost were 
required   in   comparison   to   the   possibility   that   higher-level   cognition   use   the   same 
representational format as lower-level types cognition. Fifth, as already shown, they also do 
not satisfactorily answer the symbol grounding problem – how amodal symbols get their 
contents within individual cognitive systems. Sixth, a related problem is how human beings 
are able to understand sentences in the absence of their phenomenal referents, if the 
processing of amodal symbols is exclusively syntactical. There is no doubt that people do 
comprehend such sentences. But if nothing in their environment can be responsible for the 
symbols' grounding, how do they understand them? Seventh, one solution to the last three 
problems reveals another weakness in the theories of amodal symbol systems. Namely, one 
could assume mediating perceptual representations (Harnard 1987). Accordingly, perceptual 
representations  are assigned  to amodal symbols in  long-term memory  (e.g., CAT is 
associated with perceptual memories of cats). Since the perceptions of cats activates 
perceptual memories of cats, which activate CAT as amodal symbol, the transduction 
problem is solved. During symbol grounding, the inverted course of activation is the case. 
Now to the problem. If sensorimotor memories and speech perception and production areas 
72 It is no wonder that they are unfalsifiable because such theories take neither phenomenological nor neural nor 
neurophenomenological constraints seriously. As one can model or explain in principle all conceivable 
behavioural evidence in terms of representations of amodal symbols and map them onto all conceivable neural 
activations, such theories cannot be wrong.
72do all the work, why additionally postulate amodal symbols? Are they anything more than 
redundant?  
The subsequent section anew provides indirect reason for concept empiricism by challenging 
the objections being made to it. 
4.9 Discussing objections to concept empiricism
In the following I am going to discuss several objections to PSS in particular, or to perceptual 
symbol systems altogether. The objections stem from, or are noted in (i) Weiskopf (2007, 
forthcoming), (ii) Machery (2007), (iii) open peer commentaries on Barsalou's “Perceptual 
Symbol Systems” (1999), and (iv) Siewert (1998) and Strawson (1994).
(i) (1) If the vehicles of thought are the vehicles of perception, how can thinking be separated 
from perceiving? (cf., p. 6) Let me call on several points that make the separation clear: 
Perceptual presentations and representations comprise non-attended contents (in other words, 
perceptual   symbols   are   schematic   in   consequence   of   selective   attention);   conceptual 
processing relies more on memory than perception; a common set of sensorimotor contents is 
used by different systems; CZs initiate the re-enactment of feature maps; whereas feature 
maps code modality-specific information in order of perception, analytic and holistic CZs 
conjoin features to conceptual properties; besides, in capturing the correlations between 
various   analytic   and   holistic   properties,   modality   CZs   are   constitutive   of   category 
representations; as cross-modal CZs concentrate on statistical correlations between the six 
modalities,  they are far from being mere bottom-up perceptions; since PSS exhibits 
productivity, it can simulate non-experienced entities. 
(2) According to Weiskopf, convergence zones satisfy the necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions for being representations: They are endogenously deployable and causally 
implemented in categorization and inference. To this extent they are amodal representations 
and from this he concludes that not all concepts are completely composed of percepts (strong 
global empiricism). Weiskopf refers to a strategy the concept empiricist could pursue to 
elude this objection: Convergence zones are not representations at all, but mechanisms for 
controlling representations. Let me shortly elaborate this answer of the concept empiricist: 
Remember (see 4.2) Simmons and Barsalou’s suggestion that the conjunctive neurons of 
convergence zones only function as stand-alone representations, if they feed forward 
automatically to linguistic responses under very routinised conditions, such as categorization 
or word associations. Nevertheless, non-automatised processing requires the activation of 
73feature maps. (2003, p. 456) Subsequently, Weiskopf alleges three different reasons for 
rejecting this reaction of the empiricist. I think that the distinction between representational 
system and controlling mechanism is precisely right under conditions that are not highly 
routinised, and therefore I am now going to contest the three reasons being adduced by 
Weiskopf. Firstly, he claims that systems could contain mechanisms in virtue of implicitly 
representing rules, such as the modus ponens. As we have already seen, referring to a logical 
syntax as the scaffold of thought is empirically unjustified. Secondly, he says that neural 
mechanisms themselves can contain explicit representations (e.g., the amodal representation 
CAT tokened in a convergence zone re-enacts lower sensory regions). As evidence for this 
claim he refers to the mechanistic framework – that is, CAT is an example for the notion of a 
'part'. To take only a single point again – it seems quite flawed and ad hoc to regard an 
arbitrary linguistic symbol that occurs at best in a mechanism's whole behaviour as a causally 
efficient part which participates in the generation of the whole behaviour. It is a match for the 
'fallacy of phenomenological reification'. Thirdly, he claims that nomic co-variation is 
sufficient therefore that convergence zones are representational (that is, the function reliably 
brings about perceptual representations). He further says that if one adds the condition of 
playing the role of 'standing in' for absent entities or sensorimotor experiences in the first 
place to the condition of nomic co-variation (because it is too wide as an individual 
condition) in order to be sufficient for representation, one excludes not only convergence 
zones from being representational but also motor representations, and this seems to be 
untenable. (2007, pp. 11-4) Why should motor representations be excluded? Somatotopic 
activation patterns are nice examples that they are not. 
(3) Consider the following example of an action compatibility effect: Participants responded 
faster when the direction they took to press the button corresponded with the direction of the 
movement described. For example, when reading the sentence “John gave me the back bag”, 
they were faster to move the response key towards themselves than away. Glenberg and 
Kaschak (2004) explain this in terms of the influence between action-oriented motor 
representations that ground sentence understanding and the corresponding execution of 
bodily movements.  If the directions of representation and movement correspond, the 
execution of the bodily movement is facilitated, if not, the action-oriented representation 
interferes with the execution. Weiskopf correctly criticizes that the compatibility effect in the 
example “John gave me the back bag” cannot be explained by corresponding directions, 
since the reader's action-oriented representation of its own action consists in reaching out his 
arms to take the back bag. Borregine and Kaschak (2006) provide another explanation: 
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situation whereby selective attention is paid to the giver. These representations comprise 
entities that are transferred from one place to another. Since perceiving and acting have a 
common representational code, corresponding directions of simulated transfer (simulating the 
motor behaviour of the perceived giver) and executed motor movements (pressing the button) 
facilitate the latter. 
(4) Weiskopf argues for the thesis that linguistic understanding does not require enactive 
simulation. Knowing the truth condition of a sentence is sufficient for comprehending it. This 
knowledge implies being able to draw certain inferences (e.g., “John wears glasses” entails 
“Someone wears glasses”). He claims further that the decisive point is whether these 
inferences comprise knowledge of appearances and affordances of the described objects. He 
finally says that syntactic and semantic features of sentences are available to anyone without 
being committed to being able to enactive simulation. (forthcoming, pp. 15-7) It seems to me 
that his objection is unacceptable. How is the knowledge of truth conditions implemented? Is 
it not in the form of offline simulations? What are the semantic and syntactic features 
independent of simulations? If one really draws such inferences without simulating, is it 
conceptual processing at all? Is it more than playing meaningless language games? And does 
such a game not consist of simulating written or spoken words? How are inferences actually 
represented? There is a lot of evidence that inferences reside in sensorimotor simulations (cf. 
Schmalhofer   2007).   Furthermore,   mastering   inferential   linguistic   behaviour   free   of 
conceptual processing is no objection to concept empiricism, because it can be simulated by 
making use of the superior temporal (speech perception) or inferior frontal cortex (speech 
production).
(5) Simulations are not fine-grained enough to distinguish between certain sentences that 
have different truth conditions: For example, the enactive simulations of “A man stood in the 
corner” and “A man waited in the corner” cannot account for the different truth conditions of 
both sentences (Weiskopf, forthcoming, pp. 17-8). I think this objection is indicative of a 
widespread misunderstanding of perceptual symbol systems: What could be the difference 
between the two sentences if one understands simulation as an isolated static picture of a man 
in a corner that appears in the mind's eye? I think that because in perceptual symbol systems 
emotional states also belong to concepts, for example, waiting and standing could easily be 
differentiated by simulating the different emotional states that accompany waiting and 
standing. 
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items indicates that visualization is not constitutive of understanding (e.g., inferring from 
“the dax was sleeping on a bed” that the dax is a living creature, since only living things can 
sleep) (ibid., p. 18). It is neither a matter of conscious visualization (that is, re-enactment of 
multimodal sensorimotor areas does not have to be conscious), nor does such a case speak 
against simulation. How do we understand SLEEPING and LIVING if not in the form of 
more or less conscious simulations? 
(7) The argument from content-vehicle conflation: Affordance compatibility effects, for 
example, only show that our psychological states carry content about affordances in 
linguistic understanding. It by no means shows that this content is carried out by the same 
vehicles that are responsible for sensorimotor processing. In other words, the fundamental 
point is that processing content about affordances or visual properties does not imply that the 
processing vehicles are themselves sensorimotor. Additionally, the affordance compatibility 
effects   do   not  even   show   that   information   about   affordances   is   perceptual   and   not 
conceptualized   content   (reasoning,   thinking).   (ibid.,   pp.   20-1)   Already   mentioned 
neuroimaging studies show the utilization of sensorimotor vehicles. The latter point is quite 
weak   but   not   unusual.   The  point   of   perceptual   symbol   systems   is   precisely   that   a 
sensorimotor system can implement a fully functional conceptual system. 
(8) The frame problem arises for amodal and embodied approaches. The reason for this is 
that the frame problem is quite independent of the choice of representational vehicles. (ibid., 
p. 29) Actually, the contrary is the case. Bearing in mind that contents and vehicles are 
inherently connected and that higher-level cognition (including action planning) makes use 
of sensorimotor vehicles and contents, a functioning link between higher-level cognition and 
action is readily possible. To solve the frame problem, the decisive point is to recognize the 
wide range of subpersonal processes working in parallel (motor processing of the dorsal 
stream; non-phenomenal simulations of the forward model; situated conceptualizations) that 
manage the contextual selection of action-relevant contents. Moreover, since perception and 
conception make use of the same sensorimotor structures, resemblance relations make the 
selection of action-relevant content particularly easy. Moreover, the basic idea of the global 
workspace hypothesis (Baars 1988, 1997) is that multiple parallel processes are responsible 
for the selection of relevant information. Several parallel specialist processes (such as those 
responsible for language production or some aspects of perception) compete and cooperate 
for access to the global workspace. If some information has accessed the global workspace, it 
is sent back to all specialist processes. Precisely because of the interplay between parallel 
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causally effective. 
(ii) (1) It is one thing to claim that re-enacted feature maps are tailored to the respective 
current context; it is quite another thing to determine the mechanisms that successfully 
enable context-specificity of re-enacted feature maps. Context-sensitivity does not come for 
free for perceptual symbol systems. (2007, p. 12) As we said above, resemblance relations, 
the   forward   model,   non-phenomenal   vision   and   situated   conceptualizations   are   good 
candidates for those processes. 
(2) Some proponents of the amodal approach (e.g., Fodor 1975) acknowledge that perceptual 
simulation plays a role in conceptual tasks. Thus perceptual simulation is not suitable for 
distinguishing neo-empiricist and amodal models. (2007, pp. 17-24) I think that drawing on 
amodal quasi-linguistic propositions that are supposed to be causally efficient is incompatible 
with embodied cognition.
(3) There is a lot of behavioral and neuropsychological evidence for amodal and analogical 
representations of cardinality. (2007, p. 37) This objection cannot be rejected completely. 
What can be held against it is that Lakoff & Núñez (2000) made a proposal on how the 
embodied mind processes mathematics. 
(iii) (1) The fact that lesions in particular sensorimotor areas are sufficient for knowledge 
deficits which depend on these areas (e.g., knowledge of BIRDS depends highly on visual 
processing) is consistent with claiming that amodal symbols represent concepts, and that 
amodal symbols reside in sensorimotor areas (Adams & Campbell 1999; Aydede 1999). 
Behavioral   findings,   however,   tell   another   story:   Occlusion   effects   during   property 
generation or modality switching effects are neither predicted nor adequately explained in 
terms of amodal symbols. (Barsalou 1999, p. 637) Moreover, the approach of amodal 
symbols suffers from the frame, the symbol grounding (ibid., p. 638) and the symbol 
transduction problem. Postulating amodal symbols as supposedly residing in sensorimotor 
areas entirely neglects interlevel constraints on multilevel explanations (cf. Craver 2009, p. 
249). 
(2) Could it not be that CZs stand in for feature maps during symbolic activity, thereby 
processing something like amodal symbols? Could it not be that sensorimotor processing is 
ultimately epiphenomena? (Adams & Campbell 1999, p. 610) Aside from the fact that 
Damasio (1989) assertively says that the CZs do not stand in for full-blooded conceptual 
sensorimotor simulations in the absence of re-enacted feature maps, if this (amodal symbols 
in association areas) were the case, how did the above-mentioned behavioral evidence come 
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studies that can determine the activity of feature maps and association areas during 
perceptual and conceptual processing. If it were then the case that lesions in specific 
sensorimotor   areas   separated   from   local   association   areas   would   be   sufficient   for 
corresponding   knowledge   deficits,   sensorimotor   simulations   could   not   be   mere 
epiphenomena. Clearly, if one claimed that concepts neither reside in sensorimotor areas nor 
in adjacent association areas and that insofar perceptual simulations were epiphenomena, 
then lesions in particular sensorimotor areas could not be sufficient for knowledge deficits 
that depend on those sensorimotor areas.
(3) Landauer (1999) takes Barsalou to mean that human-like knowledge cannot be learned or 
represented without human bodies (that is, a silicon-based system cannot acquire human 
knowledge).   Landauer   shows,   however,   that   computers   implementing   latent   semantic 
analysis (LSA) emulate humans on several knowledge-based tasks. Yet Barsalou did not 
exclude that amodal symbols could emulate humans in behavioral forms. All that he claimed 
was that if knowledge is grounded in sensorimotor areas – and compelling evidence of this 
exists   –     then   humans   and   computers   represent   knowledge   differently,   since   their 
sensorimotor systems differ. Conversely, if future computers could have sensorimotor 
systems closer to ours, quite possibly they could represent knowledge similar to humans. 
(Barsalou 1999, p. 639) Moreover, empirical evidence shows that knowledge does not 
consist of word co-occurrences: Aphasics loose language without loosing knowledge 
(Lowenthal 1992); affordances influence language comprehension that cannot be explained 
in terms of word co-occurrence (e.g, ad hoc categories) (Glenberg et al. 1987). To anticipate 
the objection that affordances or perceptual variables are merely correlational, not causal, it 
was shown that non-linguistic factors significantly influenced behaviour in a task that 
involved only linguistic stimuli, when linguistic factors remained constant (cf. Solomon & 
Barsalou 1999a, 1999b). 
(4) Oehlmann (1999) confronts PSS with the problem of explaining how people can know 
that they know a solution to a problem without the need to simulate the entire solution. 
Barsalou gives the following explanation: While simulating a solution, only the initial and 
final states are selectively attended to and therefore stored in working memory. One then 
switches back and forth between initial and final states and a shortened version of the 
simulation becomes associated with the complete simulation. If one later perceives or 
simulates the initial conditions, the shortened simulation is sufficient for producing a 
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regarding PSS as a recording system. (Barsalou 1999, p. 645)
(5) Abstract concepts: (i) Landauer (1999) and Ohlsson (1999) regard perception as entirely 
improper for representing abstract concepts. To decide, however, whether PSS or any other 
approach can account for abstract concepts, it is necessary to identify the contents of those 
cognitive representations. (Barsalou 1999, p. 664) Without a cogent individuation of their 
contents, how can one claim to understand them and that this understanding cannot go back 
to perceptual structures? (ii) How is it possible that people understand abstract concepts of 
non-existent entities (such as the end of time or electromagnetic field), if those entities cannot 
be  experienced?   (Ohlsson   1999;   Toomela   1999)   Very   simply,   because  PSS   exhibits 
productivity – extracted components of past experiences are combined to produce novel 
simulations. The end of time, for example, could be understood via simulating the ends of 
familiar processes, like the end of a journey, and applying it to a simulation of time that could 
consist of a clock which stops running. Moreover, it is worth noting that abstract concepts do 
not come for free for amodal symbol systems. Why should non-experienced entities be easier 
for amodal theories to handle than for perceptual symbol systems? (Barsalou 1999, p. 647) 
And, as already mentioned, to decide whether they can handle them easier or not, one needs 
an individuation of the content of those concepts. And where is one supposed to search for 
them if not in transparent representations of the environment or internal processes. 
(iii) Ohlsson (1999) criticizes Barsalou's notion of falsity: The lack of fit is not sufficient for 
the falsity of a simulation. Or, to put it more trenchantly, the absence of evidence is not 
evidence for the absence. For example, imagine seeing a book on a table. While you are 
turned away, someone removes it. According to Barsalou's account – as the objection goes – 
if you turn around again, your simulation is false. What is wrong with this objection? 
Crucially, a simulation is  purported to be  about a perceived situation. Of course, some 
simulations are only false if one failed to find a fit in any relevant situation – naturally, 
advocates of PSS do not want to conclude from failing to see Martians in one situation that 
they do not exist. (Barsalou 1999, p. 648)
(6) According to Ohlsson (1999, p. 630-1), Barsalou wrongly confuses selection with 
abstraction – selectively storing handlebars while perceiving a bicycle is tantamount to 
creating an abstraction of bicycles at large. Yet another easily refutable objection. Barsalou 
approximately identifies selection with schematization (abstracting a focal content from a 
perceived situation). He is by no means assuming that schematization is abstraction, or that 
schematization is sufficient for having concepts. Something only counts as a concept when 
79many schematic memories have been integrated into a simulator. Whereby he never focused 
on abstraction per se. If he were depicting abstraction with regard to PSS, he would define it 
as the deployment of a simulator that re-enacts an abundance of experiential forms. (Barsalou 
1999, p. 642)
(iv) Finally, let me present an objection that is written large in a serious misunderstanding of 
embodied simulation. The fact that you experience hearing a sentence you understand 
differently from hearing a foreign one you do not understand, though the imagery (auralizing 
each sentence) is nearly identical in both cases, suggests that the experiential difference 
cannot be explained in terms of imagery. What if one realizes that the multimodal re-
enactments of feature maps – that is, imagery – differs decisively from one another? It seems 
obvious that this objection is motivated by wrongly considering imagery as nothing more 
than hearing, speaking or seeing meaningless linguistic tokens, like the misapprehension of 
imagery in terms of static pictures that have to be read by a central processor to generate 
content at all. As we have seen, according to Pulvermüller's theory of language, the 
phenomenal difference amounts to drawing on sensorimotor contents stored in memory in the 
case of understanding, as distinct from hearing a foreign sentence. If you like, processing 
word forms and processing content bearing sensorimotor simulations as a package constitutes 
mental imagery. 
Because we have presented a lot of empirical evidence and formulated a theory of the mind 
against the backdrop of this evidence, we are now able to consider which of the available 
models of the mental is most adequate to grasp the causally efficient processes being 
determined. 
5 Against computationalism (both symbolic and connectionist)
The aim of the following chapter is to present core properties of three different models of 
mental processing. I will argue that two of them are inappropriate in several respects. It is 
important to point out that what I want to provide is at best an intuitive, non-mathematical 
understanding of the non-computational dynamical model that is hereby endorsed.
5.1 A critique of symbolism
It is important to make clear that the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) grasps the mind 
as a digital computer in a literal sense.  It is a much stronger claim than merely seeing 
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that is computable is directly equal to a computation.
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The Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) says the following: Intentional states such as 
beliefs and desires are relations between certain propositional attitudes and language-like 
symbolic representations (the contents of propositional attitudes). For example, hoping and 
believing that the table is green are different propositional attitudes with the same semantic 
value, namely, that  the table is green.  Different propositional attitudes take on different 
functional relations to symbolic representations. (Fodor 1975)
According to the Computational Theory of Reasoning (CTR), symbolic representations have 
both semantic and syntactical properties, whereby reasoning processes are only sensitive to 
the syntax of the symbolic representations ('structure sensitivity'). Symbolic representations 
are manipulated according to rules which operate only on the representations' shapes, which 
are arbitrarily related to their potential contents. Due to the fact that mental representations 
have a syntactical and semantic combinatorial structure, so Pylyshyn, classical operations can 
apply   to   them   by   referring   to   their   form.   Accordingly,   transforming   one   mental 
representation   into   another   one   happens   by   logical   rules,   such   as   transforming   the 
representation of the form P and Q into P, or the representations of the forms P or Q and not-
P into Q.
The interpretation of symbolic representations is not intrinsic to the computational system. 
Therefore computation counts as formal symbol manipulation. That is not to say that 
computational manipulations do not have to be interpretable, on the contrary. More precisely, 
all interpretations of symbols and manipulations have to be aligned with another (Fodor & 
Pylyshyn 1988). 
The CTM aims at showing that 'intentional realism' and the assumption that all mental 
processes   are   causal   processes   in   need   of   mechanistic   specification   are   compatible. 
Intentional realism purports that mental states have semantic properties and that mental states 
are causally relevant for behaviour. 'Formalization' and 'computation' are the decisive 
technical concepts. Formalization denotes how semantic features of symbolic representations 
can be encoded in syntax-based inference rules that are independent of semantics. In doing 
so, the semantic values can be processed in a manner that is only sensitive to syntax, without 
relying on a reasoner who must use semantic intuitions. Thus, formalization depicts how 
semantics can be linked to syntax. Since any processes that are only sensitive to syntax can 
be mechanically duplicated (Turing's computing machine), such mechanisms can assess any 
73  The CTM also has to be distinguished from viewing the software-hardware distinction characteristic of 
computers merely as a guiding metaphor for grasping some properties of the mind.
81formalizable function. Thus, computation shows how syntax can be linked to causation. 
Since causation and semantics are both connected to syntax, causation and semantics are 
linked with each other. Reasoning processes that factor in the representations' semantic 
values can be executed purely mechanically, namely, by having a 'syntactic engine' that 
tracks all semantic properties by corresponding syntactical properties and is causally 
efficacious as regards reasoning. 
Fodor (1980) and Pylyshyn (1980, 1986) (1988) further claim that the symbolic level, as a 
natural functional level of its own, is independent of physical implementation.
Succinctly, computation is implementation-independent, systematically interpretable formal 
symbol manipulation. 
Furthermore, Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988, p. 13) claim that both the semantic and syntactical 
combinatorial structures have physical counterparts in the brain: 
[...] the symbol structures in a Classical model are assumed to correspond to real physical 
structures in the brain and the combinatorial structure of a representation is supposed to have a 
counterpart in structural relations among physical properties of the brain. For example, the 
relation ‘‘part of,’’ which holds between a relatively simple symbol and a more complex one, is 
assumed to correspond to some physical relation among brain states [...] (1988, p. 13)
Mapping quasi-linguistic structures (structurally atomic concepts or structurally molecular 
propositions) onto the brain with a view to determine causally efficient structures was called 
conceptual and propositional modularity, respectively, by Stich (1983) and Clark (1993, pp. 
190-214). First, let me give an example of conceptual modularity: If the same individual 
responds in two different contexts to the linguistic input, “Smith is a bachelor” with the same 
output, “Smith is an unmarried man”, then his linguistic behaviour is caused/explained by the 
fact  that   he  has   the  same  representation   of  the   concept  bachelor  in   both   contexts. 
Importantly, here, mental states are individuated by linguistically represented concepts – 
epistemically possessing the concept bachelor consists in representing an unmarried man in a 
language-like   manner.   Subsequent   to   conceptual   modularity,   what   does   propositional 
modularity mean? According to Ramsey et al. (1991), propositional modularity says that 
propositional attitudes are “functional discrete, semantically interpretable states that play a 
causal role in the production of other mental propositional attitudes, and ultimately in the 
production of behaviour”. They are functional discrete, because agents lose and gain 
individual beliefs; they are semantically interpretable, because people's behaviour can be 
generalized on the basis of folk psychology – specifying people's propositions (attitude and 
content) allows the lawful prediction of their behaviour; they play a causal role because 
specific propositions are supposed to explain specific behaviour causally.
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real-time   process   which   always   has   a   temporal   dimension.   Secondly,   the   high-level 
discreteness of symbolic computational models makes them quite brittle – that is, the 
destruction of individual representations collapses the whole system. (Eliasmith 2005, pp. 
149-50) Thirdly, low-level perceptual processes are inadequately described: (i) Evidence for 
pervasive interactions between lower-level and higher-level types of cognition (e.g., the 
continuing multicortical area input to the thalamus and to motor structures) (Churchland et al. 
1994, pp. 39-47) queries the classical conception of a mainly unidirectional, strict low-to-
high processing hierarchy. (ii) Recognitions in real-world cases depend on rich recurrent 
patterns that involve visuomotor patterns (ibid.) (that is, affordances) (e.g., the chair with the 
slightly broken leg will break if I sit down). This is at odds with the assumption that the 
visual system is connected to the motor system only after the scene is fully recreated. (iii) If 
one thinks that one of the central functions of vision is to guide behaviour, then the 
assumption that the three-dimensional world is perfectly internally recreated might be 
problematic. To fulfil this function there is no need for a perfect recreation. Fourthly, if 
symbolicists invoke the classical hardware-software distinction and the irrelevance of neural 
implementation for understanding mental phenomena involved, then they are confronted with 
the fact that cognitive neuroscience explanations are multilevel in nature – the hardware level 
does not exist (PS Churchland 2002, p. 26). Without a correct view of the scientific practice 
of cognitive neuroscience, it seems to be inadvisable and unjustified to claim the explanatory 
irrelevance of neural processes. Fifthly, neither phenomenal nor non-phenomenal neural 
processes consist of formal symbol manipulation. The evidence for visual and motor imagery 
tells   another   story.   All   we   have   are   sensorimotor   vehicles   and   contents.   Mapping 
propositional structure onto the brain to reconcile intentional realism and causal efficacy may 
not be considered the best solution. Embodied cognition warrants this compatibility better. 
Sixthly, even if it were phenomenally tenable to speak of formal symbol manipulation, it 
seems a bit adventurous to map those language-like structures onto the brain without any 
knowledge of neural processes. Seventhly, as we will dwell on more detailed later, there are 
no context-insensitive representations, and even less if they are conceived of as language-
like. Hence, conceptual modularity  is wrong. Eighthly, neither phenomenal nor non-
phenomenal neural processes consist of tokens of propositional attitudes standing in relation 
to linguistic representations. All we have is auditory and visual processing of word forms and 
content bearing sensorimotor simulations. Hence, propositional modularity is wrong. Of 
course, that is not to say that we cannot give a reformulation of words like 'belief' or 'desire' 
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Ninthly, it is a fundamental mistake to limit causal processing to non-phenomenal neural 
processing.   Not   only   because   the   problems   of   epiphenomenalism   and   causal 
overdetermination arise, but because the phenomenal experiences themselves belong to us as 
biological organisms which rely on them in order to coordinate behaviour. According to 
Craver (2009, p. 216), phenomenal experiences and non-phenomenal neural activation do not 
compete for causal efficacy. Then the question of mental causation that remains to be 
explained is how phenomenal processes are linked to motor areas and effectors. But that 
should not be too difficult, since all phenomenal experiences (including conceptualization) 
consist of sensorimotor activations.
While we have dealt with the older and more disembodied version of computationalism in 
this section, we are now going to be concerned with a kind of computationalism that is more 
bottom-up than symbolism, namely connectionism. 
5.2 A critique of connectionism
I  would now like to outline the basic features of connectionist modelling of mental 
processing.
At the centre of connectionist modelling of cognition is the notion of parallel distributed 
processing. It is contrasted to serial processing and forgoes explicit representations of rules 
and the compositional character of representations. As a kind of computation, connectionism 
aims to capture how cognition brings about responses/outputs formerly caused by stimuli. To 
this extent it adheres to the classical notion of information. Just as neurons comprise 
information about the firing of their inputs and transfer the processed information from their 
inputs to a wealth of other neurons, so too the computational unit receives inputs that either 
excite or inhibit its own activity, sums them up and transfer information about the sum via 
output connections to other computational units. Like information flows through different 
physically independent structures of the brain (retina – lateral geniculate body – optic 
radiation  – visual cortex),  connectionism models  the information  processing between 
independent layers of input, hidden, and outputs units. The input of the receiving unit is a 
product of the activation-level of the sending unit and the strength of the connection between 
the sending and receiving unit. Learning takes place if the strengths of the connections are 
changed. 
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and 'fault tolerant'. In contrast to serial processing using local representations, memory can be 
assessed by content. 
What are the weaknesses of connectionist models? Firstly, their disembodiment. The 
processing of inputs is often grasped in terms of purely linear or sigmoid response functions. 
However, real neurobiological activation patterns have heterogeneous, non-linear, spiking 
neurons. Secondly, methodologically connectionist models are explanatorily quite limited: 
Simple nodes are connected and trained in order to compute complex functions. Connecting 
ten billion nodes (the brain consists of so many neurons) and training them will get you 
nowhere. Thirdly, as the mechanistic framework strikingly illustrates, the comprehension of 
complex biological systems requires the interplay of bottom-up and top-down information. 
The individuation of conscious and behavioral phenomena and the individuation of neural 
networks are mutually dependent. Since connectionist models by no means consider the 
whole properties of cognitive systems qua behavioral or phenomenal ones – except for 
properties like statistical character, parallelism, or content assessable memory – and since 
they are bottom-up approaches, if at all, they disregard one essential component. (Eliasmith 
2005, pp. 151-2) Fourthly, what is critical is that an adequate computational modelling of 
properties of cognitive processes (such as their statistical sensitivity, their fault tolerance or 
parallelism) is in no way the same as mechanistically explaining those properties. Clearly, 
one could say that connectionism, unlike CTM, should be understood as a model that can 
adequately model or simulate cognitive systems. It is not claimed that mental processes are 
connectionist, only that they are computable by means of connectionism. However, the 
question still arises as to why this should be sufficient. Fifthly, though it is the case that a 
simple feed-forward connectionist net realises productivity in a context-specific way, it is 
inherently disembodied. Why? The layer of input units is understood as a perceptual system 
that detects sensory features, or if you wish, constructs a phenomenal outlook. The layer of 
hidden units is regarded as giving conceptual interpretations of inputs. Decisively, the 
mapping from input to hidden units is arbitrary and merely mirrors the random weights that 
were assigned to the connections before learning. Insofar as connectionist models describe 
concepts as strings that bear an arbitrary relation to their perceptual and motor referents, 
concepts   are   disembodied.   What   these   last   remarks   make   indirectly   clear   is   that 
connectionism itself can model almost everything – this means in reverse, however, that it 
itself provides hardly any substantial elucidations. Sixthly, the excitation-inhibition model is 
an oversimplification or a partial picture, given that 'modulatory' neurotransmitters change 
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87).   Seventhly,   also   the   point-to-point   signalling   model   distinctive   of   mainstream 
connectionism does not do justice to the complexity of real brains, in view of the fact that 
diffusible modulators (e.g., the gas nitric oxide) demonstrate that neurons can interact and 
change one another's properties although they are not synaptically linked (Husbands et al. 
2001). 
In distinction from the first two sections of this chapter, we are now going to make a positive 
contribution. This consists in reconstructing the pivotal ideas of the dynamical systems 
theory of cognition.
5.3 Spivey's understanding of dynamical systems theory
Rather than the mind being composed of independent systems for perception, cognition, and 
action, the entire process is perhaps better conceived of as a continuous loop through perception-
like processes, partially overlapping with cognition-like processes, and action-like processes, 
producing continuous changes in the environment, which in turn, continuously influence 
perception-like processes. (Spivey 2007, p. 10)
Spivey's Continuity of Mind (2007) provides an account of the dynamical systems theory of 
the mental abundant with information. Instead of focusing on computing static, discrete 
representations being temporally marked-off, the entire continuous trajectory which the mind 
undergoes is looked at. The relation between sensory stimulation and mental activity and the 
relation between mental activity and action are not thought of as linear, one-directional 
progressions that can be studied independently of each other. Rather, actions as temporally 
executing processes permanently change environmental stimuli (accompanied in parallel by 
proprioception)   that   again   continuously   alter   mental   activity,   which   is   permanently 
manifesting and recasting its propensity for action. To put it simply, one perceives one’s own 
actions when one is performing them – the actions brought about mentally continuously 
provide new stimuli for mental processing, which in turn changes behaviour. Sensory 
stimulation, mental activity and action cannot be taken to mean separable components in a 
linear sequence of stages, but have to be considered as participating in a continuous 
inseparable loop. I think that this inseparable loop absolutely applies to online processing.
74 
What about offline cognition (e.g., pondering a philosophical problem)? (i) Clearly, the 
74  This concept of online processing is supposed to incorporate higher-level cognition. In terms of PSS, 
simulations permanently influence environmentally embedded processing. In respect thereof one could speak of 
online cognition. By the way, one has to thought of this ongoing influence of higher-level cognition as dynamic 
and temporally extended process (it is not a static mapping of a static simulator onto a static phenomenal 
representation).
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input, but by memorized representations. In respect thereof they are not embedded in the 
respective environmental context. Hence, offline cognition does not fit into the depicted 
sensation-cognition-action loop. It does however make use of memorized sensorimotor 
contents and thus depends on the context of previous conceptual processing. (ii) Insofar as 
the brain consists of sensorimotor couplings that are inter alia reflected in phenomenal 
experiences, and higher-level cognition is nothing more than environmentally decoupled re-
enactment of those sensorimotor couplings, we have an inseparable sensation-cognition-
action loop. In respect thereof the three components are structurally inseparable. To put it 
succinctly, making use of sensorimotor areas and being environmentally embedded do not 
coincide. 
Mental processing is a continuous trajectory through state space. This replaces the classical 
computational   notion   of   static,   context-insensitive   amodal   representations.   Unlike 
connectionist modelling, the updating of neural activation is not considered as taking place in 
lockstep corresponding to arbitrary time spans. Rather, the dynamical systems theory 
presents cognition as a continuous trajectory through a state space grounded in real-time 
processing. Clearly, assuming something like a continuous trajectory is a fortiori at odds with 
the CTM that regards the mind as a central executive performing inferences on discrete 
language-like entities. 
To get an intuitive understanding of the notion of  non-linear attraction  it is helpful to 
consider an example in visual perception, the Necker cube. Sometimes the cube is seen from 
slightly   above,   sometimes   from   slightly   below.   The   two   perspectives   are   constantly 
alternating. In terms of dynamical systems, this bi-stable pattern of perspectives corresponds 
to attractor basins that compete against one another. What is important is that though a 
classical logical symbol system can model flipping back and forth between quite stable sates, 
it cannot pay attention to variations of intermediating transitions, as distinguished from 
dynamical systems. Additionally, it is indeed the case that the perspectives are not alternating 
with a step function (either the one perspective or the other), but rather the transition 
corresponds to a sigmoid function which involves descriptions of processing (autonomous 
periods) during the two perspectives. Since there is more than one attractor in a dynamical 
system at any time, it is grasped as non-linear (imagine a graph with at least two y-values at 
one moment (x-value)). This interpretation of non-linearity is also reflected in the parallelism 
by which mental occurrences are characterized: For example, phenomenal presentations and 
representations, non-phenomenal simulations of prospective sensory input, and phenomenal 
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“fundamentally continuous, graded, and partially overlapping (before overt action converts 
them into discrete actions)” (Spivey 2007, p. 10). 
According to Spivey, 'pure mental states', that is, the maximized firing rate of a population of 
neurons for “I see a table”, for example, never take place. What de facto happens is that 
neurons are probabilistically activated. For instance, the time a listener needs to understand a 
word travelling to the respective attractor basin in his state space is greater than the time he 
has to understand that word without being influenced by a new word. In real-time 
circumstances, new stimulation is permanently in play – bottom-up sensory stimulation, 
stimulation brought about by mental imagery or by new motor behaviour. Considering that, 
the abundance of time spent in an attractor basis is probably far smaller than the abundance 
of time spent in covering distances toward attractor basins. To avoid misunderstandings, the 
mentioned 'pure mental states' are not irrelevant or inexistent. They are possible positions in a 
neural system's state space. As I said, however, they never really happen. To think it through 
to the end, if one considers real-time cognition, nowhere are states instantiated. What occurs 
are mediating mental processes across-the-board. That is not to say that brain states cannot be 
theoretically described – at a given point in time the neural activation across the brain 
corresponds to a brain state.
75 Within this framework, such brain states are presented as more 
or less approximated to pure mental states. Moreover, the notion of a temporally distinct 
stimulus that is waiting on its individual response also never takes places in the normal 
course of processing: “Instead, we continuously interact with a flowing train of multimodal 
perceptual arrays containing objects, agents, and events.” (ibid., p. 47) In contrast to the 
information-processing framework, whereby external stimuli encounter the senses in static 
copies which are subsequently processed through several mental stages and whereby every 
stage waits until the foregoing stage is finished before it can start its own work, mental 
processing is better grasped in terms of non-linear, continuous trajectories in mental state 
space. 
Regard the following passage: 
According to the continuity of mind thesis, that introspective impression of one discrete mental 
state after another is an illusion caused largely by the discreteness of the semantic labels we use 
in our internal monologue and by the discreteness of some of our-goal directed motor output. […] 
Thus, although you might feel as though you think p and then q and then r, what you are actually 
thinking during that period is mostly p and partly r, and so on. (Spivey 2007, p. 308) 
75  For example, you are currently reading this sentence by means of auditory imagery while you are 
simultaneously undergoing phenomenal perceptions triggered by bottom-up stimuli. 
88Surely, as already mentioned (chapter two, section  two), discrete linguistic forms used 
publicly purport the notion of static, discrete representations. Apart from this, one could 
readily doubt whether an attentive introspection really creates the illusion of step-by-step 
processing of discrete symbolic representation. I believe that it is the theoretical notion that 
mental processes are language-like which engenders such an illusion. By contrast, I think that 
phenomenally the continuity of mind thesis is highly plausible. Introspecting reveals quite 
saliently (at least in my case) that one continuously receives various stimuli arising from 
different   sources   nearly   in   parallel   –   like   bottom-up   sensation,   memory, 
visual/motor/auditory imagery (e.g., inner speech), and so on. 
According to Spivey, the trajectory  of which the mind consists spans neural, bodily and 
environmental parameters. The state space that instantiates a mind comprises patterns of 
neural activation, muscular-skeletal kinematics, and objects in the environment. Just as 
sensory receptors and cortical neurons are causally related, so too qualitatively identical 
causal relationships exist between cortical neurons and muscles or between environmental 
objects and sensory receptors. 
Spivey himself holds the following view: The centralised view of mind is substituted by a 
system of dynamical interaction between brain, body, and environment that generates 
control. The processor (vehicle) and the processed (content) are not independent of another 
insofar as external information is computed or transformed serially or in parallel in order to 
provide an interpretation of the world. Rather, the processing and the processed belong to the 
same state space of non-linear interacting patterns.
All that has been said so far is compatible with the assumption that our phenomenal being-in-
the-world is internally generated by neural mechanisms. Again, this is not to say that neural 
mechanisms are not environmentally embedded. On the contrary, they are understood as 
constituting the whole mental system that is unconsciously and consciously directed to the 
non-phenomenally or phenomenally represented environment. 
Asking whether mental content is determined by factors external or internal to the mind is 
not as adequate and straightforward as it seems at first sight. Taking into account that 
conscious episodes are intrinsically  intentional,  and therefore including  the world as 
phenomenally presented, it is at least phenomenologically wrong to say that conscious 
processes are exclusively internally determined (Zahavi 2004, 2007, with Gallagher 2008). 
Conversely,   insofar   as   external   objects   are   not   intelligible   independent   from   our 
phenomenality, and insofar as they are always objects for us in order to be intelligible, it also 
seems inadequate to say that external objects are external in the sense that they are 
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is   meaningless   to   assume   that   there   is   a   mind-independent   world   that   triggers   our 
phenomenal presentations and representations. Such a thought is intelligible, but it is 
intelligible only against the background of our phenomenal representations. From the fact 
that we conceive of mind-independent objects only in terms of our phenomenality, it does not 
follow that the thought of a mind-independent reality triggering our phenomenality itself is 
not intelligible. Thinking of a mind-independent world which triggers our phenomenal world 
model does not constitutively rely on grasping those entities, as they are independent from 
our phenomenality. 
As we have seen, from the viewpoint of the phenomenality of the first-person perspective, a 
strict distinction between internal and external factors is inadequate. Obviously, there is a 
wide of range of phenomena that are experienced particularly phenomenally as internal – the 
so-called ‘opaque’ episodes. Detached offline pondering or daydreaming while walking 
through a phenomenally represented environment are good examples for this. 
What   about  the   third-person   perspective?   Imagine   that   a  neuroscientist   observes   the 
behaviour of a patient who is suffering from certain a pathology, namely, visual agnosia. 
Though the patient has no conscious visual experience of shapes and orientations of objects, 
he is nonetheless able to perform fluently motor actions directed at those objects. Thereupon 
the   neuroscientist   concludes   that   conscious   and   visuomotor   vision   are   functionally 
dissociable, or that humans process visual information unconsciously. (cf. Milner & Goodale 
1995) Most importantly for our purposes, the neuroscientist's observation of the patient's 
goal-directed behaviour functions in the frame of the neuroscientist's phenomenality – the 
objects the patient unconsciously acts on are objects only intelligible insofar as they are 
phenomenally   represented   for   the   neuroscientist.   This   can   be   called   'third-person 
phenomenality'. Moreover, taking a third-person phenomenality perspective allows us to 
speak of scientific entities not visible to the naked human eye. Although scientific ancillary 
apparatuses give access to entities otherwise not perceivable for us, the phenomenal 
representation and understanding of those entities are causally dependent on our human 
visual system. 
The next chapter attempts to articulate the consequences of embodied mind for classical 
philosophical questions relating to mental content.  
906 Implications of embodied cognition in general and PSS in particular for 
classical philosophical questions concerning mental content 
If […] we start with an empirically responsible philosophy – one that rests on the broadest 
convergent evidence – then the embodied and imaginative character of mind requires us to 
rethink the philosophy of language from the ground up. (Lakoff & Johnson 1999, p. 468)
6.1 An embodied theory of intentionality 
In what follows, I will first outline some notions of intentionality belonging to the embodied 
mind paradigm and phenomenology. Then I will criticize classical theories of intentionality. 
Let us initially consider the phenomenal model of the intentionality relation (PMIR) that goes 
back to Metzinger (2003, 2004a, & Gallese 2003). What is a PMIR? Firstly, it depicts a 
relationship between a system and an object component. The relationship is depicted as 
currently held, and the system is always transparently represented to itself. 'Transparently' 
means that the system's self-model is not represented as an internal representation, but as if 
there were a self in the outer world. Secondly, human beings can represent the object 
component both transparently and opaquely. Opaque representations are such representations 
that are phenomenally represented as internal. Thirdly, by integrating the currently active, 
transparent self-model with an opaque action simulation (e.g., pondering offline on possible 
actions) and by coupling it to the effectors, a conscious, volitional first-person perspective 
(e.g., phenomenal experience of practical intentionality) emerges, that is, a neural simulation 
of a behavioural pattern configures the object component and this simulation is consciously 
represented as currently selected, in so far as depicting the practical intentionality relation. 
This integration of the simulated behaviour into the currently active bodily self-model leads 
to its functional and phenomenal embodiment, thereby becoming causally linked to the motor 
system and the effectors. The conscious experience of steady executive control can be 
representationally analysed as follows: The content of a transparent self-model is currently 
present in a transparent model of reality and thereby presently experiences  itself as 
performing an action that it has previously simulated and selected opaquely, whereupon it 
becomes gradually assimilated to the subject component. Fourthly, a PMIR exhibits an 
experienced direction – arrows pointing from the self-model to the object component. Of 
course, in respect to complexity, this directedness is continuable, for instance, a first-order 
PMIR can take in the object component, whereby the second-order PMIR models a system-
system relationship (that is, a system has a system-object relationship as its object). Fifthly, 
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subject and object globally available: For example, consider the difference between “I am 
someone who is currently visually attending to holding a pencil in my right hand” and “I am 
someone who is currently understanding the content of the sentence I am reading”. To sum 
up, at the phenomenal level, we can approximate something similar to propositional 
structure: A content specificator (the object), a person specificator (the transparent self-
model), and an attitude specificator (the phenomenally represented relation between subject 
and object). 
I construe the PMIR as a phenomenal relation that is intrinsically meaningful. This model 
can be processed in the form of non-phenomenal and phenomenal representations or 
simulations. The PMIR should not be confused with my idea idea of internally referring 
linguistic expressions (that is, internal associations between arbitrary tokens and content 
bearing sensorimotor simulations).
76 Actually, concrete instantiations of the PMIR have to be 
taken as the referents of corresponding linguistic expressions. 
Akinetic mutism (anterior damage to cingulate gyrus or bilateral medial parietal damage) is a 
disorder which expresses itself at the behavioral level in the form of glances without any 
appearance of intention. Admittedly, patients suffering from this disorder can momentarily 
track objects or say their name, although they are not volitional subjects which are able to 
exert control. Those patients have an integrated functional self-representation that makes 
self-related information globally available for the control of action or guided attention. In 
Damasio’s terms (1999), they exhibit wakefulness, but not 'core consciousness'. According to 
Metzinger, core consciousness is the basic PMIR. Thus what those patients lack is a 
phenomenal representation of a self being autonomously related to possible action aims (in 
other words, there is no volitional subject). They fail to integrate opaque simulations of 
possible actions into the transparent self-model, for example. 
I will now consider the thesis that intentionality should be phenomenalized. What is most 
important is the way intentionality is itself represented on the level of phenomenal content. 
And in respect thereof, intentionality can be naturalized, so the claim. In other words, the 
phenomenal experience as a subject with re-presenting perceptions, thoughts or intentions 
can be naturalized. 
Firstly, the brain depicts the relation between subject and object as an asymmetric one. We 
experience ourselves as if we project visual attention outwards or inwards. The brain creates 
a self-model that causes the appearance of cognitive agents which, at will, epistemically 
76 In other words, the reference relation of the PMIR is not analogous to the reference relation of language and 
content.
92focus on the external world or on internal lives. For that reason we, as human beings, find the 
idea   of   an   objective   intentionality   relation   intuitively   plausible.   Secondly,   similarly 
hypothetical,   philosophical   debates   on   intentionality   have   been   influenced   by   our 
predominant sensory modality, namely, phenomenal vision. Just as our transparent visual 
model of reality generates distal objects, so too, the representational relationship is internally 
modelled. Subsequently, if the object component is opaquely represented (such as in offline 
simulations),   a   philosophical   interpretation   of   these   mental   contents   as   non-physical 
(“intentional inexistent”) would seem natural. 
What are the neural underpinnings of the phenomenal representation of the intentionality 
relation itself? In the case of F5 canonical grasping neurons (which respond to visual 
representations of objects' size and shape without any movement), the selectivity for an 
executed grip and the selectivity for the visual representation of objects are, to a considerable 
degree, congruent. To this extent, functionally, the F5 canonical grasping neurons are not 
responsible for either sensory input or movement, but should instead be considered as 
relational. Furthermore, physical entities are not coded in respect of their mere physical 
appearance, but in terms of interaction with an acting agent.
77 Provocatively, one could claim 
that classical philosophical  theorizing  about intentionality  (including  the problems  of 
intensional contexts and non-synonymous co-extensional expressions) is a consequence of a 
naively realistic understanding of the process of visual attention, of the phenomenal self-
focusing on a phenomenal visual object.
78 (Metzinger 2003, pp. 411-21)
What types of directedness are there? Firstly, mental and phenomenal experiences in the 
sense of the PMIR (the transparent or opaque representation of the object is that at which the 
transparent self-representation is directed). Secondly, to the extent that the brain generates 
presentations and representations by responding to external stimuli it may be considered as 
being   directed   toward   the   stimuli.   Thirdly,   an   example   of   directed   non-phenomenal 
occurrences are unexecuted motor programmes which the brain automatically provides if it 
perceives respective objects (the two functional clusters FA-VIP and F5ab-AIP) (this could 
be dubbed 'motor intentionality'). Another example of hardly consciously experienced 
directed mental occurrences are cases in which phenomenal representations are fused with 
conceptual ones, such as expecting your mobile phone to buzz and thereby actually 
experiencing its buzzing, even though it did not buzz.
79 An instance of fairly consciously 
experienced directed mental processes could be turning a phenomenal simulation of a racing 
77 Delacour (1997, p. 138) describes the notion of neural structures which model the intentionality relation itself.
78 It looks as if the indeed great epistemological problem of relating mind and world would be confined to 
explaining how language-like concepts can be adequately applied to the objects of our phenomenal world 
model.
93bicycle, for example, towards a phenomenal representation of a token of this type of racing 
bicycle – that is, a highly conscious recognition process. This is readily compatible with the 
possibility that in this case simulators are also likely to be brought into consciousness by 
automatic, subpersonal processes.
What sorts of derived intentionality there are? Linguistic symbols only have content against 
the backdrop of concretely occurring mental processes. They are only semantically processed 
if they are associated with sensorimotor simulations. How do we actually understand non-
phenomenally experienced kinds of intentionality, such as blindsight? I think we have to 
conceptualize such phenomena in terms of phenomenal structures (e.g., in the form of an 
arrow from a phenomenal model of a human body to a phenomenally familiar object), since 
intelligibility amounts to nothing more than this. This theoretical model could utterly fail, if 
one bears in mind that the stable structures of our phenomenal world model (single objects 
that we experience as identical in multimodal terms) are neurally constructed in the first 
place. In terms of theoretical intelligibility, understanding non-phenomenal intentionality is 
derived from sensorimotor structures of our phenomenal world model. Which is basically 
what Lakoff and Johnson have in mind. 
In order to provide indirect reason for our theory of intentionality, I am now going to criticize 
other theories of intentionality.
6.2 Criticizing some classical theories of intentionality
(1) At first, we have a look at Putnam's Twin Earth case and Kripke's theory of referring 
proper names. What is problematic with this view?
80 
It  seems  inconsistent   to   me  that  the  beliefs   of  two   individuals   whose  contents   are 
phenomenally processed could have different contents although they are psychophysically 
identical. Why and how should it make a difference to both non-phenomenally and 
79 Given that this fusion constitutes the phenomenal perception, it seem problematic to speak of concepts being 
directed toward phenomenal representations. One could say that the more the phenomenal representations are 
constituted by concepts, the more inappropriate is the talk of ‘directed’.
80 It is important to emphasize that my argumentation presupposes the following way of thinking: Whether this 
thought experiment shows that natural kind externalism is true or not depends on the theoretical assumptions 
being made in the background. Because I deem the concept of embodied simulation right (in light of empirical 
evidence), I will clarify the implications of the thought experiment against the backdrop of the concept of 
embodied simulation. Moreover, as we shall see later, the more or less shared intuition that the thought 
experiment speaks for natural kind externalism that is almost devoid of theory cannot be considered as an 
empirically reliable source. If thought experiments, however, are based on theoretical assumptions, then they 
have to be pitted against empirical evidence. If they are not, then one has to appeal to the theory that is best 
confirmed. This way of thinking holds true for all my reflections about thought experiments and criticism at 
proponents of classical semantics. These remarks link to my understanding of philosophy that was delineated at 
the beginning of the Introduction.
94phenomenally processed content that experientially identical objects (water) have a different 
chemical microstructure (water as H2O and as XYZ), which again cannot be reflected in 
different psychophysical activation? What makes a certain sense is to assume that different 
physical structures can bring about the mental content by interacting with two cognitive 
systems (Metzinger 2009, p. 20). Then, however, the two cognitive systems internally 
process the same content due to identical psychophysical structures triggered by different 
external entities. Is it not somewhat strange to postulate a causal difference that extends to 
the content of beliefs? Why not? Given that the brain re-presents in a way that serves as a 
basis for the organism's behaving in an environment, the question that arises is how could it 
make any difference whether Oscar thinks about washing one's hands with water while he is 
doing it with H2O, or whether Twin-Oscar thinks about washings one's hands with water 
while he is doing it with XYZ? I dare say that the assumption of a such a difference is 
motivated by feeling oneself committed to a realism and intersubjective objectivism of 
cognitive mental content. Moreover, because it is reasonable to ground conceptual thought, 
to which beliefs clearly belong, in phenomenal experiences and to regard actualised (that is, 
not merely dispositional) beliefs as being phenomenal
81, it cannot be true that Oscar and 
Twin-Oscar have different beliefs.  
Kripke's theory of the reference of proper names is also questionable. Internally, how could it 
be in any way relevant with respect to your understanding of the proper name “Gödel” that 
Gödel once was christened “Gödel”? Presumably you have seen a framed picture of him 
somewhere with some written information that you kept in mind in combination with the 
auditory and visual symbol “Gödel”, and all this allows you to go through contentful mental 
episodes about Gödel. Referring to a causal chain that began with the christening in order to 
explain the content of mental processes shows very plainly how cognitive and phenomenal 
processes were entirely neglected. 
(2) Now, I am going to criticize the classical informational semantics that is characterized by 
the following: X (an object, event) is the intentional content of C (in other words, a state C 
carries information about X) iff (i) Xs covary nomologically with tokens of C, (ii) C has the 
function of carrying information about X (Dretske 1995), (iii) if anything else causes C, its 
doing so is asymmetrically dependent on X's doing so (Fodor 1990), and (iv) an X was the 
incipient cause of C (Prinz 2002).
What is wrong with this conception? Firstly, the theory cannot explain how we learn new 
information by reading or communicating, since the mental episodes process intentional 
81 This is believed to be true not only of our understanding of embodiment, but of all theories of beliefs.
95content in the absence of co-varying environmental objects. Reacting to this by saying that 
the notion of causal co-variance also involves the co-varying of internal mental occurrences 
may solve this problem, but we still lack concrete internal mechanisms. The notion of causal 
co-variance is quite simply too wide and therefore uninformative. Secondly, causal co-
variance   cannot   explain   our   capacities   of   forming   contentful   mental   episodes   about 
scientifically impossible, fictive, future, or ideal objects. It is simply not possible, if one 
bears mind that our mental episodes cannot covary with such objects, since they do not exist. 
Both objections cry out for internal mechanisms that can generate simulations which, inter 
alia, exhibit productivity (creating non-experienced objects or events) in the offline modus – 
precisely that is what PSS provides. Thirdly, it seems natural to think that the model of causal 
co-variance is intellectually motivated by conceptually representing a co-variance between 
objects or events of our phenomenal world model and our phenomenal self-model. If this 
were the case, it would take the objects and events of our phenomenal self-model as mind-
independent objects that are actually internally generated. The supposedly co-varying stimuli 
are internally generated. Fourthly, even in phenomenal terms of the relation between these 
two internally constructed models, it is simply wrong that our opaquely represented mental 
episodes are always correlated with phenomenally transparent represented objects or events 
(e.g., pondering on a philosophical problem while sitting in the canteen). The parallel 
distributed character of the mind is plainly too complex to be able to be grasped in terms of 
simple object correlations. Fifthly, whether causal co-variance is an adequate metaphysical 
model   for   the   relation   between   mind-independent   entities   and   mental   episodes   is 
epistemically beyond reach, since we would need a grasp of inconceivable entities. That is 
not to say that we cannot develop scientific models describing how physical entities 
(invisible to the naked eye) are related to the objects of our phenomenal world model. 
Sixthly, how can the co-varying entities be causally efficient for your concept, if you had not 
focused your selective attention on that aspect of your visual field which causally co-varied 
firstly with you as cognitive system? Even if you had focused your selective attention on it, 
the thereby extracted content permanently alters within cognitive systems – both caused by 
further phenomenal external stimuli and by merely internally produced alterations (e.g., 
fading memory). Thus the notion of causal co-variance does not suffice. Seventhly, why 
should one assume something like asymmetrical dependence, if one does not bind oneself to 
a realism assumption of cognition? Could it not be that the representational content of 
classifying an object as a COW that under normal conditions is classified by humans as a 
HORSE by mapping the internal simulator of a cow to the current phenomenal visual 
96representation, is simply the simulation of the cow (that penetrates the phenomenal visual 
perception)? (Or maybe you undergo a blurry presentation on which you have no concepts, 
and this is what your mental content amounts to.) It seems appropriate to say that content 
which is cognitively available in this respective context is the COW representation, whereas 
the content not cognitively available for the respective subject is the HORSE representation. 
Eighthly, in the case of internally triggered simulations, causal co-variance between external 
entities and internal processing is simply inadequate. Even if phenomenal representations 
causally covary with mind-independent objects (in the case of ongoing online processing), 
environmentally decoupled offline simulations only make use of internally memorized 
representations. Ninthly, I think it is important and perhaps illuminating to ask for an 
explanation of why we find causal co-variance intuitively compelling, if indeed we do. In the 
first place it is a consequence of our internally modelled PMIR. This model obviously also 
functions in the context of theoretical considerations. The notion of causing external entities 
of classical informational semantics is possibly not only not intelligible independent of our 
phenomenal representations, but is itself generated by our phenomenal experience of acting 
in an external world. Of course, emphasizing the importance of intelligibility concerning 
external entities does not preclude that some manner of external entities exist. It therefore 
also does not preclude that intelligibility itself in the form of sensorimotor structures goes 
back to an inaccessible relation between cognitive systems and an objective external world. 
But how could that be tested, if not by making use of phenomenal mental models? Tenthly, 
postulating incipient causes or asymmetric dependences amounts to nothing more than 
arbitrary ad hoc assumptions which are supposed to warrant epistemic realism. Does that 
mean that if I represented my first encounter with horses as an encounter with cows, then my 
mental occurrences had no content at all? This seems to be unreasonable. Furthermore, how 
is it possible that if I did not pay selective attention to the phenomenal visual representation 
of my first encounter with a horse, that I nonetheless extract the concept of a cow? In other 
words, how can incipient causes or concepts applied under normal conditions be thought to 
be causally efficient, if the subject does not cognitively process those items? 
Besides, if one subscribes to the idea that our offline mental episodes are re-enactments of 
sensorimotor areas whose contents are to a large extent determined by previous phenomenal 
experiences, as I do, and understands the notion of causal co-variation in respect thereof, then 
the thought of causal co-variance is indeed useful. Furthermore, if one adheres to a broader 
concept   of   causal   co-variance   that   also   includes   the   co-variation   between   internal 
representations, then the co-varying between diverse modality-specific occurrences (e.g., a 
97visually represented philosophical position and a certain emotional state, such as esteem) 
may be considered as an instance of this concept.
(3) Now, consider conceptual role theories (Harman 1982; Loar 1981): The meaning of a 
term is determined by the inferential relations it is integrated into. 
As long as it is not clarified how inferential relations are internally processed in order to be 
contentful such an account leaves too many questions unanswered. And if they are defined in 
terms of a computational notion of propositions, then, as already seen, the theory is 
inadequate. 
(4) Two factor theories say the following (Field 1977; Block 1986): Causal relations and 
conceptual roles together determine the meaning of a term. 
Two factor theories are faced with the already depicted problems of causal accounts and 
conceptual role theories. 
Now let us shift attention to the debate on whether a narrow or a wide account of mental 
content is right.
6.3 Narrow mental content 
Since we have repudiated Putnam/Kripke's notion of reference that is implied by natural kind 
externalism and since we have eliminated reference to external entities (be it mind-dependent 
or mind-independent ones) in the case of environmentally detached sensorimotor simulations 
and because we have also argued for the internality of phenomenal representations and the 
grounding of conceptual structures on them, it is obvious that we hold a narrow view of 
mental content.
In the following section I am going to first discuss why PSS should be considered as a theory 
that fixes simulational content narrowly. I thereafter present Burge's thought experiments for 
social externalism about mental content. Then I will outline two vital objections to semantic 
externalism. We are concerned mainly with conceptual content.
Phenomenal presentational and representational content is narrow content to the extent that it 
necessarily depends on a virtual presence generated by the brain. The mapping of simulators 
onto a stable phenomenal world model is narrow content in that it is based on sensorimotor 
stand-ins memorized in the respective cognitive system. 
Since offline simulations are re-enactments of sensorimotor areas belonging to specific 
individuals which have different experiential material that they can re-enact (or re-combine), 
and concrete contextually embedded simulations specify mental content, mental content has 
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enacted are internal processes.
Let me briefly describe the thought experiment intended to underpin social externalism as 
conceptualized by Tyler Burge (1979, 1986): Imagine an English-speaking individual called 
Jane who utters the sentence, “I have arthritis in my thigh.” Since arthritis is a state of the 
joints only, her utterance expresses a false belief. Now imagine a counterfactual situation 
where Jane has the same internal state and personal history, yet her surrounding community 
uses “arthritis” for a different ailment that is called “tharthritis”. This disease comprises 
rheumatoid afflictions of both thighs and joints. In this context, her above-mentioned 
utterance would be true. I am referring to this because it is supposed to show that the contents 
of her beliefs differ in the two contexts, though she is psychophysically identical. Since the 
only thing that differs in the two contexts are the linguistic usage and the content of her 
belief, it is inferred that mental content is partly dependent on shared linguistic practices. 
This, again, is to demonstrate that semantic externalism is right. 
What pivotal strategies do the two objections respectively pursue? The first one disagrees 
with the intuition that the contents of the beliefs differ in both worlds – it is argued that they 
are actually identical. The non-phenomenal and more or less phenomenal processing 
accompanying Jane's utterance, “I have arthritis in my thigh”, is identical in both contexts. 
Individuating her phenomenal process could look as follows: Imagine that her context-
specific sensorimotor simulation consists of an auditory and visual simulation of the word 
“arthritis” that is associated with a feeling of pain, a proprioceptive localization of this pain 
in her thigh, and a dynamically processed body image. If one takes for granted that this 
highly context-specific phenomenal processing is identical in both contexts, and that what 
one calls 'belief' equates to this processing, then it is simply wrong that her psychological 
content differs in these two contexts. It is irrelevant whether “arthritis” is conventionally used 
for joints only or for both thighs and joints. 
The second objection concedes that it is right anyhow that her statements, which make use of 
linguistic forms whose sensorimotor meanings are determined socially, have different truth 
values in both contexts – the former is wrong, the latter right. Thus if the sensorimotor truth-
condition of “arthritis” is socially determined in terms of joints only, then Jane’s statement, 
“I have arthritis in my thigh”, is wrong in this social context. To put it clearly, which 
linguistic forms are correctly associated with which sensorimotor simulations is the result of 
99social processes. However, that in no way implies that the mental contents which precede her 
statements are wide.
82 
I think that this place is suited for carrying out the announcement from the last section of 
Chapter one – that is, arguing against extended functionalism – because this position is also a 
strong form of externalism. The line of argument is as follows: Because both Inga and Otto
83 
have to make use of inner sensorimotor simulations in order to make the respective 
information (stored in memory or contained in a notebook) intelligible, and in view of the 
fact that one could specify neural processes at a certain level so that they uniquely realise 
phenomenal experiences (e.g., in terms of modality-specific feature maps), then we have no 
different realisers of the same functional state. Hence, if cognitive processing presupposes 
intelligibility,   and   intelligibility   is   tied   to   sensorimotor   simulation   in   the   case   of 
environmentally detached mental processing, then it is neither the case that the respective 
information is multiple realizable nor that cognitive processing extends into the environment. 
I my view this example only shows that a kind of embedded interactionism seems to be true 
– that is to say that phenomenally transparent representations of linguistic symbols control 
cognitive processing (see 4.5). 
6.4 Nonconceptual mental content
The following section is supposed to provide a theory of nonconceptual mental content. For 
that we refer to some distinctions introduced in the second Chapter and in the context of the 
reconstruction of PSS. 
Determining which mental contents are nonconceptual depends on the notion of concepts one 
adheres to. Thus the notion of nonconceptual content is an essentially 'contrastive' (Bermúdez 
2008) one.
Remember that according to PSS, in high-level functional terms a concept is a simulator – 
that is, a frame which integrates perceptual symbols across category instances and the 
dispositional property of generating an infinite set of concrete simulations. A necessary and 
sufficient condition for being perceptual symbols is their being extracted by means of 
selective attention and their permanent storage in long-term memory. 
82 Burge's utilization of the thought experiment relies on the adequacy of a usage theory of meaning (e.g., 
Sellars 1954). He has no concept of a belief apart from an empirically highly questionable folk psychology.
We will see later that it is quite meaningful to speak of non-linguistic mental occurrences having truth values.
83 This example is completely reconstructed in Clark and Chalmers’ essay “The Extended Mind” (1998). 
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nonconceptual   content.   Of   course  this   includes   phenomenally   processed   content   that 
admittedly is attentionally available, but that is not actually being paid selective attention to. 
All  internally   processed   content   that   is   not   available   for   cognitive   processing   is 
nonconceptual content. As already mentioned, only phenomenally processed content is 
cognitively   available   ('principle   of   phenomenal   reference').   Hence,   unsurprisingly, 
exclusively non-phenomenally processed content constitutes a part of nonconceptual content. 
Moreover, to a certain degree, the internal dynamics of the brain is attentionally unavailable 
('autoepistemic closure' (cf. Metzinger 2003 & Northoff 2004)). 
In summary: Nonconceptual contents are all those contents that are attentionally unavailable, 
attentionally available but not actually being introspected, and actually being introspected but 
in which case we are unable to store them in long-term memory. Phenomenally experienced 
emotions that do not rely on the involvement of the neocortex (LeDoux 1996) may be 
considered as an instance of the second kind of nonconceptual contents. 
Certainly the most interesting question is to grasp phenomenally processed nonconceptual 
content. What are examples of those contents? Phenomenal tokens like green24 or green26 of 
which we do not posses concepts (in the sense of temporarily stable psychological types that 
provide transtemporal identification). Although we probably can discriminate between those 
phenomenal tokens, we do not have concepts of them. Such contents satisfy two of the three 
functional properties of consciousness – they are attentionally available and available for 
motor behaviour (e.g., speech production or pointing movements) in discrimination tasks, but 
not available for cognitive processing. Such contents are not available for long-term memory 
and hence nor for cognition in general ('memory constraint').
84 
Let me now present a special case of nonconceptual content for the sake of completeness: 
There is evidence that individuals with blindsight react emotionally to faces presented in 
their blind field even though they have no phenomenal visual perception of the faces (de 
Gelder et al. 1999).
85 If those individuals have phenomenal experiences of their emotions and 
if those emotions were extracted by means of selective attention, then only the stimuli (to be 
84 This is more or less in alignment with the classical argument that the content of perception is more fine-
grained than the content of propositional attitudes (e.g., Peacocke 1992, Tye 1995, Heck 2000). McDowell's 
proposal (1994) that demonstrative concepts (such as that shade) allow us to conceptually represent colours 
with the same fineness of grain with which they are perceptually represented does not work. The reason is that 
internalizing the linguistic behaviour of saying that shape is not sufficient for the storage of concepts of the 
respective phenomenal contents. Since concepts have to satisfy the 're-identification condition' (Kelly 2001), 
that is, they must be applicable in thought in the absence of the respective phenomenal sample in order to count 
as concepts, demonstratively captured presentational shades are nonconceptual. 
85  Clearly, it is assumed that the those individuals have no non-visual phenomenal experiences (e.g., 
somatosensory) of the faces.
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which the individuals have no phenomenal experience are nonconceptual contents. If those 
individuals have no or little phenomenal experience of their emotions, then both the stimuli 
and the emotions may be considered as nonconceptual contents. (Prinz 2007, p. 57)
There remain two further functionally individuated kinds of nonconceptual contents – on the 
one hand, those that are only available for motor control, and on the other, those that are only 
attentionally available. A good example of the former are the flexible and selective 
behavioral reactions a table-tennis player has to have in order to return a ball successfully. 
Examples of nonconceptual contents which are only available for attention are very subtle 
alterations in proprioceptive experiences or in cases of meditation (states of almost maximum 
focusing on phenomenal experiencing). 
We can now state more precisely what it means to speak of being more or less conscious. 
The more functional constraints are satisfied, the more conscious those contents. The lower 
the degree of satisfaction of the functional constraints, the simpler the contents. Clearly, these 
are not the only constraints on which the degree of consciousness depends – even if only one 
constraint is satisfied, this phenomenal experience may prove to be strongly conscious if it is 
experienced as present to a high degree. (Metzinger 2003; pp. 30-43, 62-83) 
The following remarks are limited to phenomenal nonconceptual content. Heck (2000) 
distinguishes between states
86 that are (i) state-nonconceptual and those that are (ii) content-
nonconceptual. (i) Undergoing state-nonconceptual states does not require the possession of 
the concepts involved in a correct determination of the contents of those states. Conversely, 
state-conceptual states are those states the organism cannot undergo without possessing the 
concepts required for the specification of the state's contents (e.g., environmentally detached 
offline thought). (ii) Undergoing content-nonconceptual states means that the experienced 
content is nonconceptual. For a state to be content-conceptual means that its content is 
constituted by concepts. Are the previous remarks on nonconceptual contents cases of state- 
or content-nonconceptualism? Or is it a useful distinction at all? Bermúdez (2007) argues 
that the problem with the state-content distinction is that concept-dependent and concept-
independent states can only be distinguished in terms of different types of contents. I don’t 
think   so.   Concept-dependent   and   concept-independent   states   can   be   functionally 
distinguished – that is, if one has the capacity (the function) to undergo mental episodes 
whose contents do not come from environmentally embedded inputs, then these mental 
86 Because it is a reconstruction of Heck’s position, I also speak of ‘states’ instead of ‘processes’ or ‘episodes’, 
whereas I think that the meanings of the latter expressions are neurophenomenologically more adequate in order 
to grasp the mind.   
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of contents. Examples of state-nonconceptual states are non-phenomenal proprioception or 
vision-for-action. In terms of our terminology, the distinction between (i) states and (ii) 
contents is analogous to the distinction between the following two questions: (i) Is the 
globally (un)available content constituted by concepts? (ii) Is the this content cognitively 
available or cognitively unavailable? As mentioned previously, environmentally detached 
offline simulations are state-conceptual. The same is true of phenomenal representations that 
are cognitively penetrated. State-nonconceptual are all low-level online processes. Content-
conceptual processes are those whose that are cognitively available. Content-nonconceptual 
processes   are   those   whose   contents   are   cognitively   unavailable   (e.g.,   phenomenal 
presentations).   
How can content-nonconceptual contents be individuated? With reference to the example of 
the colour shades green24 and green26, one needs neurophenomenological correlates.
87 In the 
case of contents viewed phenomenally as internal (e.g., fleeting proprioception), one needs 
neurophenomenological explanations. What seems to be problematic is that repeating 
phenomenological   reports   can   transform   once   cognitively   unavailable   content   into 
cognitively available content. 
Can state-nonconceptual content be completely autonomous of conceptual content? I should 
think so. If a creature lacks any memory capacities necessary for undergoing offline 
simulations, but nevertheless processes contents which are relevant for the coordination of its 
behaviour, its state-nonconceptual content is autonomous of conceptual content. Even if 
creatures can only aptly be assigned spatial contents if they are able to re-identify particular 
locations of the represented environment, and even if this requires that they can represent the 
changing of their positions within that environment, both representations can function at the 
nonconceptual level. What might be interesting is to elucidate modality-specific notions of 
state- and content-nonconceptual content and to explain how and why different modality-
specific contents are comparatively more or less cognitively unavailable.
88 
In the next section we are concerned with the question whether perception is cognitively 
penetrable.
87 Of course, the specification of the phenomenal side has to be made by somebody who is experienced in 
individuating phenomenal experiences. Moreover, one could consult a colour scale in order to specify fine-
grained phenomenal colour gradations. 
88 It seems to be the case that the content provided by phenomenal visual perception makes up the largest part of 
our cognitively available content.
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Evidence  for strong interactions between lower-level and higher-level neural areas (cf. 
Churchland et al. 1994, pp. 39-47) suggest that phenomenal visual perception is cognitively 
penetrable. If it is indeed the case that phenomenal visual perception is cognitively 
penetrable, then our central assumption of a single
89 representational format of perception 
and conception would be quite plausible, if only because the substantial additional cost of 
permanently transducing one representational format into the other were not required. 
First of all, a simulation is a top-down activation of feature maps to re-enact perceptual 
experience. Besides top-down initiation, cognition affects the content of vision: Neuroscience 
investigations of visual and motor imagery demonstrate that in the absence of physical input 
cognition builds content in sensory-motor areas. According to Barsalou, the Müller-Lyer 
illusion only shows that bottom-up dominates top-down information when they conflict 
(aside from hallucinations), the illusion does not indicate the impenetrability of perception. In 
the absence of bottom-up influence, top-down information dominates (in the case of 
imagery); if bottom-up and top-down information is reconcilable, top-information penetrates, 
but rather complementary to bottom-up influence. Located between pure bottom-up and pure 
top-down efficacy, consider a cognitive process that relies on mixtures of bottom-up and top-
down information to construct perception: filling-ins. In filling-ins, gaps of bottom-up 
information are filled by information from perceptual memory, typically an instance of 
cognition. For example, phoneme restoration adjusts low-level feature detectors – thus, 
filling in missing phonemes in word recognition, based on memory representations, not only 
penetrates conscious experience, but also sensory processing itself. Such findings indicate 
that cognition and perception are part of a common representational system and that they 
become merged in order to construct perceptual representations. (Barsalou 1999, pp. 588-9)
On a related note, perception's penetrability might be underpinned by considering the tilt 
aftereffect. It was shown that the illusion was significantly greater on the side to which 
participants paid attention than on the unattended side. Though the voluntary control of 
spatially endogenous attention is not equatable to higher-level knowledge, it begins within 
the association cortex. Critically, since the aftereffect illusion occurs in the visual cortical 
area, it is obviously influenced by feedback signals from the association cortex (e.g., Lamme 
and Roelfsema 2000). That is not to say that the feedback signals have the capability of fully 
89 With respect to the assumption that both representational formats are spatial in nature, one could speak of a 
single representational format. It would be doubtful to say that phenomenal visual perception and higher-level 
cognition apply the  same spatial  representational format, because the brain has different spatial formats 
available (cf. Paillard 1991).
104replacing the local informational pattern in the visual cortex, but that they are able to subtly 
alter it. 
In the next section we are concerned with the question whether the indeterminateness of 
conception is a conclusive objection to PSS.
6.6 Indeterminateness of conceptual processing
For   we   are   opposing   a   language-like   view   of   the   mental   vigorously,   and   the 
indeterminateness of conceptual processing was often cited as evidence against a visual and 
for   a   language-like   character   of   conception,   we   have   good   reason   to   show   that   a 
sensorimotor, non-linguistic notion of conceptual processing permits indeterminateness. 
It is often argued that since perceptual representations are picture-like, they are determinate. 
However,   because   human   conceptualization   is   indeterminate,   it   cannot   be   based   on 
perceptual representations. Human conceptualization is as indeterminate as our perceptual 
experiences are phenomenally richer than our conceptual capacities. 
At first, let me introduce some important distinctions. It is one thing to question whether 
phenomenal episodes themselves are determinate, it is quite another to question whether 
phenomenally processed content is cognitively available in a determinate way, such as 
countability. In other words, the concern is whether phenomenal contents involve cognitively 
recognizable contents (see 2.2). Additionally, it appears to make a difference whether one 
attends to phenomenal presentations and representations or whether one attends to, if it 
makes sense at all (because one could also say that a certain kind of attention brings 
phenomenal simulations forth), more or less phenomenal simulations. 
Perceptual symbols as constituents of concepts can of course be indeterminate for a variety of 
reasons: Schematically extracting stripes from a perception of a tiger may result in patches, 
as distinct from a representation of the exact number of stripes. Representing the tiger later, 
the free-floating symbol may depict the striped-ness of the tiger, without representing a 
particular number of stripes. If this symbol of being striped is attached to a surface of a 
simulated   tiger,   it   would   have   a   determinate   number   of   stripes,   however,   probably 
inaccurately in respect to the original perception. 
Now, consider an even more convincing solution, not assuming conscious representation: 
High-level neurons in perceptual systems can code information qualitatively – using the 
example, perceiving the tiger causes the firing of detectors which respond solely to it being 
striped,   without   capturing   any   specific   number   of   stripes.   Equally   important   is   that 
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representation of a rectangle, whereby specific neurons code the representation of the lines 
independently of their length, position, and orientation. Furthermore, imagine that other 
specific neurons represent the vertices that join the lines, independently of the angles that 
link them. Hence, qualitative coding enables both indeterminacy and generality. (Barsalou 
1999, pp. 584-5) To summarize: These points show the indeterminacy of sensorimotorily 
embodied concepts. From this one can also conclude that, as the notion of selectively 
attending to phenomenal simulations makes sense, the content of phenomenal simulations 
does not have to be cognitively available in a determinate manner. 
In addition, consider the following three points: (i) Phenomena like change blindness (for 
example, Rensink et al. 2000) and inattentional blindness (Mack & Rock 1998) make plain 
that people do not attentively experience or monitor presented details. What is remarkable in 
the case of change blindness is that we often fail to notice changes even when we are looking 
at the changes (tested by eye trackers) as they appear. (ii) Consider also the virtual character 
of phenomenal perceptual contents. Strictly speaking, it is not part of your conscious 
experience of a portemonnaie laying on table, for example, that is has a back side. The virtual 
presence of its back is a function of our implicit sensorimotor knowledge that consists in the 
ongoing activity of simulations, at least in terms of embodied cognition. (iii) If you reflect on 
the fixed content of your conscious episode which is currently occurring, then do you 
encounter nothing but determinate detailedness? I don’t think so. Aspects of the background 
or of the periphery of your visual field are indeterminately present. Do you have a 
phenomenally clear grasp of the colour of the object that is shimmering on the outermost 
right side of your periphery? Do you have a sharp image of the whole passage of a book page 
if you reflect on what is determinately present as you attend to a sentence? I believe not. 
Clearly, even blurred phenomenal visual episodes are always determinate. I think that all that 
change and inattentional blindness, the virtual character and blurring on the periphery show 
is that phenomenal visual episodes are not attentionally and cognitively available in a 
determinate   manner.   They   do   not   show   that   phenomenal   episodes   themselves   are 
indeterminate. 
If the notion of attending to more or less phenomenal offline simulations makes sense, and to 
the degree that some aspects are blurred while others are schematically represented, the latter 
would be cognitively available. If such a notion does not make sense, and one's attention is 
not particularly concentrated on the simulations, but the simulation itself is the cognitive 
processing, then, though the simulation is definitely determinate, only schematic information 
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case that every offline simulation (e.g., while reading a sentence or while quasi-seeing the 
back of the portemonnaie) produced a perceptual episode fully rich in phenomenal visual 
detailedness (non-schematical), you would permanently undergo hallucinations; and that 
would not be at al useful to you as an acting being.
As we have broached the objectivist cognitivist semantics in the first section of chapter one, 
we are now going to criticize the explanations of a possible world semantics.
6.7  Criticizing the explanations a possible world semantics provides for non-
synonymous co-extensional expressions and intensional contexts of beliefs 
(i) Calling to mind one of the standard examples of co-extensional but non-synonymous 
expressions: Although “renate” and “cordate” apply to exactly the same range of referents, 
the former means “creature with kidneys” and the latter “creature with a heart” (it is at least 
taken for granted that these two expressions are co-extensional). 
A possible world semantic explains the different meanings in terms of diverging extensions 
in possible worlds – that is, though “renate” and “cordate” apply to the same things in the 
actual world, their referents differ in at least one possible world. (cf. Lycan 1999) 
(ii) Reconsidering the philosophical classic of how belief states generate intensional contexts: 
(1) The sentence, “John believes that the football player Kaka changed from AC to Real 
Madrid in 2009”, is true. (2) The sentence, “John believes that the Brazilian football player 
who scored seventy Serie A goals and twenty-three Champions League goals for AC Milan, 
changed from AC Milan to Real Madrid”, is false. Either because John does not have this 
belief or because he thinks something that contradicts the propositional content. Although the 
propositional contents of both sentences refer to the same individual (co-extensional), namely 
Kaka, only the first is true.
A possible world semantics explains the fact that co-referential sentences have different 
truth-values by saying that the linguistic expressions “Kaka” and “the Brazilian football 
player who scored seventy Serie A goals and twenty-three Champions League goals for AC 
Milan” indeed co-refer in the actual world, but not in at least one possible world – which is to 
say that their intensions differ. Since believing is a relation between a believer and a 
sentence’s intension/proposition, then it is quite possible that somebody believes the one, but 
not the other proposition. 
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objections that are also true of possible world semantics: Appealing to actual or possible 
external referents in the case of offline simulations makes no sense; objectivist motivations 
for assuming possible world semantics; neglecting the requirement of internal processes 
constitutive of all kinds of mental content. Secondly, endowing quasi-linguistic mental 
processes with content exclusively by relating them to sets of referents signifies the static and 
context-insensitive character of classical accounts of mental content. Thirdly, explaining the 
two puzzles in terms of internal simulations seems to be easy. Even if “renate” and “cordate” 
refer to the same phenomenally accessible individuals, different subjects as well as the same 
subjects associate different simulations with kidneys and hearts on several occasions. In 
phenomenal terms alone, it is quite evident that different subjects have different information 
which they make use of on certain occasions in order to understand linguistic tokens. The 
fact that co-referential expressions cannot be substituted salva veritate seems to be rather 
trivial from the viewpoint of embodied cognition. It is a quite superficial point that a subject 
does not have to know that Kaka is a Brazilian football player who scored seventy Serie A 
goals and twenty-three Champions League goals for AC Milan in order to know that Kaka 
changed from AC Milan to Real Madrid. He simply does not undergo an embodied 
simulation in which Kaka as identical individual is simultaneously associated with the one 
who changed club and the one who scored so-and-so many goals. What is made clear by the 
hypothetical scenario of the subject simulating the information about the number of goals so 
that not Kaka but someone else scored them is that the referents themselves are embedded in 
the context of perceptual simulation. Neither a description beyond the perceptual simulation 
is required, nor does it make sense to extract the individuals. Since the individuals are always 
embedded in concrete simulations (at least in the case of offline cognition), there are two 
different phenomenally simulated referents in (1) and (2). The only claim that is right about 
the possible worlds explanation is that the subject probably does not believe the content of 
sentence (2). Fourthly, even if one defines possible worlds (including associated descriptions 
that have other referents compared to those in the actual world) in terms of scenarios which 
individual subjects can conceive, which seems reasonable, the fact that “Kaka” and the 
description in (2) have different meanings has nothing to do with the fact that they have 
different referents in at least one possible world, but is the result of differing perceptual 
simulations that were associated with the different linguistic tokens. 
As previously announced, the following section aims at eliminating or reformulating classical 
semantic notions.
1086.8  Eliminating   or   reformulating   classical   semantic   notions:   truth,   reference, 
compositionality, inferential relations, and normativity
To flesh out the introductory quotation of Lakoff and Johnson, I would like to make a 
contribution towards rethinking “the philosophy of language from the ground up”. This 
includes an elimination of reference in the case of environmentally detached  offline 
simulation, a reformulation of truth conditions most widely independent of language, and an 
elimination of a computational notion of compositionality and of normativity in the sense of 
being constitutive of mental content.
(a) What does a truth-conditional semantics purport? Basically, a theory of meaning can 
generate for every sentence of the object-language a T-sentence that specifies the meaning of 
each sentence in terms of the conditions under which it is true. For example, the German 
object-language sentence, “Schnee ist weiß” is true iff snow is white. The meaning of the 
object-language sentence is analysed in terms of a meta-language sentence. 
In what way does this theory fall short? First and foremost, it does not make sense to specify 
the meaning of sentences without considering the context (both environmental and in the 
sense of prior experiences that are manifest in a state space) in which cognitive systems are 
embedded. Second, the fact that we understand linguistic tokens (e.g., questions, commands, 
metaphors) that do not have truth-values or truth-conditions as well as fact-stating sentences 
(cf. Lycan 2000, p. 140), should give us cause to ask for explanations of how cognitive 
systems understand in principle. Thirdly, the right-hand side of the T-sentence is falsely 
handled, as if it were an extensional description of a world that is independent of our specific 
human conceptual system in the way it is described. To put it pointedly: Since T-sentences 
unintentionally presuppose that their right side is already meaningful, they are circular.
What concept of truth condition can be formulated within the frame of embodied cognition? 
For a naturalistic and an anti-realistic view of the mind, it is not difficult to grant truth-
conditions. Truth-conditions are specified in terms of transparent and opaque (e.g., emotions) 
phenomenal representations that are neurally constructed and so part of phenomenal world 
models. Of course, this concerns only the everyday sense of truth-conditions. Remember that 
we already defined truth in terms of understanding the relation between phenomenal 
simulations and phenomenal representations. 
In what sense does it make sense to speak of understanding sentences in terms of knowing 
their truth conditions? In order to be able to know the meaning of a sentence one has to know 
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environmentally embedded usage of language, such as deixis) with which the sentence’s 
arbitrary shapes are associated. Knowing the sensorimotor simulations with which the 
arbitrary shapes are associated means that your mental system almost automatically links the 
arbitrary shapes (to be understood as external stimuli) to corresponding sensorimotor 
simulations. If one assumes that social practices determine which arbitrary shapes are 
associated with which sensorimotor simulations, that is to say that social practices determine 
the truth conditions of sentences, then the associated sensorimotor simulations are true iff 
they fairly correspond to those that are socially stipulated. 
There are at least three cases of misrepresentations
90 which are easily integrable into our 
sense   of   embodiment.
91  Firstly   concepts   can   be   wrongly   applied   to   phenomenal 
representations. If context-specific top-down influences make phenomenal representations 
appear in a way which suggests classifying them in terms concepts people would not take 
into account under normal conditions, then one can say that this subject conceptually 
misrepresents the objects of the phenomenal representations. Thus the applied simulators do 
not correspond to phenomenal representations. Secondly, non-phenomenally cognitively 
processed contents can also be cases of mispresentations – expectations of subjects can bring 
forth phenomenal presentations or representations (e.g., hallucinations) that would not be 
triggered by the environment in the case of subjects who are not affected by hallucinations. 
They may be considered as cognitive, since memorized representations become merged with 
bottom-up information to generate a phenomenal perception. Thirdly, there are even cases of 
non-cognitive mispresentations, namely, illusions. For instance, representing the Kanisza 
figure as consisting of two triangles and three fully filled disks is a misrepresentation, if one 
determines the self-generated stimulus in terms of physical structures being specified from 
the viewpoint of third-person phenomenality.
Summarizing,  mappings   of   simulators   onto   phenomenal   representations,   anomalous 
phenomenal presentations or representations (e.g., hallucinations), and presentations and 
representations triggered by bottom-up stimuli (e.g., including illusions) can be cases of 
misrepresentations. (cf. also Siewert 2002) 
(b) Now we are going to deal with the idea of reference.
As already shown, all that remains of reference is concrete reference, that is, the mapping of 
simulations onto phenomenal representations. It has been mentioned several times already 
90 The understanding of representation in ‘misrepresentation’ is theoretically unspecified.  
91 The following considerations may be considered as a reply to the classical objection that naturalistic theories 
per se cannot account for misrepresentations. 
110that environmentally decoupled offline simulation does not refer to external entities at all. If 
you will, linguistic forms refer to sensorimotor simulations, but this happens also entirely 
within the cognitive  systems. Well,  what are the objections  we have to a classical 
understanding of reference?
Now let us consider an argument by Putnam (1981) aimed at showing that one objectively 
correct account of classical reference is impossible: (P1) In a model of objectivist semantics 
the reference relation R consists of a set of ordered pairs which are made up of formal 
linguistic elements that are interpreted by one or more entities of the model. (P2) What does 
the expression 'refer' refer to? (P3) If one determined 'refer' theoretically, as in Kripke's 
causal theory of reference, one would again get formal sentences of a theory which would 
have to be endowed with meaning by one objective model. (P4) Yet, such an objective model 
cannot be possible, given that one adheres to truth-conditional semantics and to the condition 
that changing the meaning of the sentence's parts is sufficient for changing the meaning of 
the whole sentence sentence (see the reconstruction of Putnam's argument in my subsequent 
remarks on compositionality).
92 (P5) The game can be infinitely continued – one can ask for 
a theory of theory, of which we again need one correct interpretation, and so forth. (P6) 
Hence, an infinite regress threatens. 
Furthermore, I think that the argument indirectly calls attention to a point that is of 
paramount importance for our purposes: In the context of those phenomenal entities, it is 
only reasonable to relate to reference if the reference relation itself is processed within the 
cognitive system. The infinite regress can only be stopped if the relata are internally 
processed – that is, if subjects perceptually simulate word tokens that are statistically 
correlated with certain content bearing sensorimotor simulations or if they map words or 
simulators onto phenomenal representations. Thus both the referents and the reference 
relations is internally processed. 
(c) Now, we are concerned with the classical view of compositionality: For every complex 
expression e in L, the meaning of e in L is determined by the structure of e in L and the 
meanings of the constituents of e in L.
93
92 The point is that the truth value of sentences underdetermines the referents of their components. 
93 It might be that compositionality and intersubjective sharing are two dogmas which date back to Frege (Clark 
& Prinz 2004, p. 62). Moreover, it is not unimportant to bear in mind that classical semantics also speaks of a 
context principle, according to which the meanings of the sentence’s parts are determined by its whole meaning. 
An embodied concept of semantics has the advantage that it can explain the context-specific nature of the 
meaning of linguistic expressions, be it particular or complex expressions. Clearly, this context specificity is a 
consequence of the context-specific nature of embodied mental content. Linguistic tokens devoid of bodily and 
social context simply underdetermine the underlying mental content.
111In what way is this notion of compositionality problematic? Firstly, a compositional syntax 
and semantics in the context of classical symbolism is very problematic, as already shown. 
Hence, if the notion of compositionality is bound to symbolism, it has to be eliminated. I 
think   that   the   empirical   evidence   (especially   the   occlusion   effects)   suggests   the 
neurophenomenological implausibility of a computational notion of compositionality. The 
combination of context-insensitive amodal symbols cannot account for the complexity of 
multimodal perceptual contents.
94 In respect thereof Lakoff’s idea that syntactic and semantic 
compositionality cannot be fully productive (see 1.2) is intelligible. Secondly, from the fact 
that meaningful linguistic expressions superficially exhibit compositionality one cannot 
conclude that compositional syntax and semantics are causally efficient structures. One of the 
crucial insights of connectionism is to distinguish high-level phenomena from underlying 
mechanisms (cf. Bechtel 2008, pp. 166-9).
95  Thirdly, if one regards concepts as action-
oriented capabilities, then those context-specific situated conceptualizations are reliant on 
emergent features. Imagine that someone cautions you with these words: “Be careful, there is 
a WRONG-WAY DRIVER in a TRUCK on the motorway!” Thereupon certain features 
might come to your mind – for example, that cars could get caught underneath the truck, that 
vehicles could overturn, or that the truck could lose its shipment, etc. So if concepts are 
supposed to facilitate action, it is favourable that they create emergent features, most likely in 
by means of situated conceptualizations of dynamical perceptual simulations. Moreover, it 
seems   uncontroversial   that   under   certain   circumstances   our   concepts   can   exhibit 
compositionality  and   systematicity,   for  example,  if  we try   to  understand  a  complex 
expression that we do not understand in its composition (Prinz 2002).
96 Or imagine that you 
read an example of systematicity (“Mary loves John” - “John loves Mary”) for the first time, 
then your phenomenal mental episode (including the attempt to memorize this arbitrary 
construct) exhibits systematicity at the phenomenal level during this concrete period of time. 
Fourthly, Putnam (1981) gives the following argument for the inadequacy of compositional-
referential and truth-functional semantics: (P1) Any adequate theory of meaning must satisfy 
the following condition: Changing the meaning of the sentence's parts is sufficient to change 
the meaning of the whole sentence. (P2) The standard model-theoretic semantics defines 
meaning in the following way: (i) A sentence's meaning is a function that allocates a truth 
94 This claim does not presuppose the truth of concept empiricism in terms PSS, because proponents of theories 
of amodal symbol systems likely assume that amodal symbols are about multimodal perceptual contents.
95 Clearly, that is not to say that the comprehension of high-level phenomena is not constrained by knowledge of 
lower-level processes.
96 Hereby we perceptually simulate the contents of the particular words in order to grasp the meaning of the 
whole expression.
112value to that sentence in each possible world. (ii) The meaning of a term (noun or noun 
phrase) is a function that allocates a referent (individual or kind) to that term in each possible 
world. (iii) The meaning of an n-place predicate is a function that allocates a referent (a set of 
n-tuples of entities) to that predicate in each possible world. (P3) It is possible in principle to 
have two different models, A and B, for a collection of sentences, so that model A makes all 
sentences true and model B makes all sentences true. (P4) Hence, though the parts of the 
sentences of both models refer to different things, their sentences have the same truth value 
and consequently the same meaning. (P5) Thus, within a standard model-theoretic definition 
of meaning, it is possible to change the meaning of the sentence's parts without changing the 
meaning of the whole sentence. (C) Consequently, the standard model-theoretic definition of 
meaning is not an adequate theory of meaning. 
The argument indirectly shows that a formal model-theoretic account of entities and relations 
cannot endow meaningless linguistic symbols with content, since they are themselves 
without meaning. 
(d) Consider the following view of normativity of mental content and inferential relations: A 
mental state M has a propositional content p only if there is a rule, or system of rules, R in 
force for M. (Boghossian 2003, Millar 2004) 
To what extent is this claim problematic?  Or, in what way does an embodied cognitive 
system exhibit normativity? Firstly, our question is not whether certain inferences that can be 
written down are justified and why, but how such inferences are internally processed and 
what endows them with content. The point is not whether inferential relations can be 
considered as normative insofar as not every inference is allowed, but how these articulated 
relations are mentally represented to be meaningful. Secondly, it might well be that 
normative relations in terms of logical syntax are grounded in preconceptual image-
schematic structures. Decisively, they are only intelligible against the backdrop of neurally 
embodied sensorimotor structures. Hence, as already shown, a meaningless logical structure 
that is only sensitive to word shapes and a non-spatial scaffold exists nowhere. Moreover, to 
facilitate logical processing we can also make use of symbolized logical structures by means 
of imagery (e.g., A  → B). Thirdly, I think it is none too daring to claim that grounding 
mental content in sensorimotor processing is sufficient, therefore that normativity cannot be 
constitutive of mental content, given that truth, application, and assertion conditions are the 
113only ones that are qualified for normativity. Fourthly, much more often than not, we do not 
experience ourselves as drawing inferences (Metzinger 2004b).
97 
6.9 Methodological consequences of embodied cognition
As   we  have   presented   and   justified   a  theory   of   offline   cognition   and   clarified   the 
epistemological status of simulations (see the third section of chapter two), we can now 
consider the implications of this theory for classical philosophical methodologies, precisely 
because they are often limited to 'intuition pump' (Dennett 1988) and a notion of logical 
possibility that is tied to conceivability.
(a) Explaining the unreliability of philosophical intuitions
I am now going to repudiate the epistemic or methodological reliability of applications of 
philosophical intuitions. On the one hand, philosophers use intuitions to decide whether 
defining conditions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient (e.g., true, justified 
belief), or only jointly sufficient for a definiendum (knowledge). The defining conditions are 
adequate if the subjects asked subsume the person/situation/individual in all logically or 
metaphysically possible worlds in which the person/situation/individual satisfies the defining 
conditions, under the definiendum. Importantly, this manner of applying intuitions aims to 
determine what phenomena such as knowledge, mind, or rationality are, not what concept 
people have of them. In the following, this application of intuitions (I) as epistemic (E) 
source (S) is abbreviated as IES. Philosophers such as Gettier (1963), Putnam (1975b), 
Kripke (1980, p. 83-5) and Lehrer (2000, p. 187) have made use of IES. 
On the other hand, philosophers consider intuitions as evidence in need of explanation. For 
example, that the more or less shared intuition that mental states are multiply realizable is 
explained abductively, for all those who share it, in terms of their functionalist concept of the 
mental (Ramsey's example, 2006). This usage of intuitions (I) as evidence (E) in need of 
explanation (E) is abbreviated as IEE. 
Clearly, the IES can only be reliable if one assumes an objectivistic view of cognition. Its 
reliability requires that the defining conditions (in the form of concepts) are psychologically 
represented – namely, contextinsensitive and intersubjectively identical. Otherwise how 
could it make sense or be justified to apply a layman's or philosopher’s intuitions in order to 
determine what scientifically and philosophically relevant phenomena are? Such a usage of 
intuitions could only be reliable if the background assumptions about cognition are right. As 
97 Even less do we have the phenomenal experience that we are interpreting information which perception has 
supplied us with. 
114we have seen, an intrasubjectively and epistemically (mirroring the world) objective view of 
cognition is untenable, both with respect to a mind-independent world and in the context of 
our phenomenal world model. Hence, the IES is unreliable. By the way, it was shown that 
intuitions vary culturally (Jackman 2005) and are unstable or context-sensitive (Swain et al. 
2008). 
What about the reliability of IEE? It depends on whether one views concepts – be 
exceptionally   understood   as   linguistic   behaviour,   hereby   –   as   coarse-grained, 
macroscopically unified skills (Evans 1982) which causally rely on mental mechanisms (e.g., 
verbalization,   perceptual   simulation,   linking   conceptual   simulation   with  simulation   of 
linguistic tokens) that are not in like manner specified as it macroscopically appears, or 
whether one treats concepts as microfunctional
98 constituents causally explaining cognition 
or linguistic behaviour. I have no objections to the former. It attempts to provide at best an 
adequate description of a pragmatically individuated process of ascription of skills. The 
latter, however, is committed to a meanwhile highly questionable view that goes back to 
Fodor and Pylyshyn (e.g., 1988), namely, 'conceptual and propositional modularity'. One 
might remember at least one of the already mentioned objections: If one takes the thought of 
interlevel   constraint   seriously   (that   is,   sensorimotor   processing   constitutes   conceptual 
processing), then explanations in terms of propositions are inadequate.
To sum up: IES and the causally explanatory orientation of IEE are unreliable, not least 
because they make untenable assumptions about the mental. The fact that philosophical 
intuitions are unreliable can be explained by the context-specific nature of embodied 
simulations  and the binding of intuitions to phenomenal simulations, as mentioned above. 
(b) The other methodological consequence of embodied cognition with  which we are 
concerned has to do with three different concepts of possibility: mental, phenomenal, and 
theoretical possibility.
All those worlds that can be mentally simulated are mentally possible. What especially 
matters is that the mechanisms the respective system makes use of in order to generate and 
assess representational coherence are brought into line with biological or social functionality. 
Possessing the property of mental possibility has nothing to do with epistemic justification. 
Phenomenally possible are all those worlds we can consciously simulate. This includes states 
of affairs conceived of in explicit planning, cognitive operations, or hallucinations. Again, 
what is phenomenally possible is a consequence of the specific functional profile of the 
98 This corresponds to Clark’s idea of a functional organisation that is much more fine-grained in comparison to 
a functional organisation being provided by symbolism (1989, 1999). I think that if one fleshes out the concept 
of  microfunctions   in   terms   of   neural   subsystems   (e.g.,   modality-specific   feature   maps)   that   constrain 
phenomenal experiences, then microfunctionalism is an attractive position.   
115respective representational architecture. If our epistemic access to possibilities consists in 
conceiving scenarios, then the possibilities accessed in this way are epistemically irrelevant. 
They are epistemically irrelevant because the conceived content is a function of sensorimotor 
simulations, which is bound to affordances, for example. All that is not incompatible with 
situations human beings can conceive of by virtue of their bodies and brains can be mentally 
and phenomenally simulated.
99 
Theoretical possibility is a property of worlds that can be coherently described in an external 
linguistic medium. What I also regard as crucial is that the notion of theoretical possibility is 
no longer only bound to phenomenal simulations that are conceivable without contradiction 
(whatever is meant by). By contrast, that which is theoretically possible/necessary is confined 
to certain empirical assumptions – such as, is it necessary for behaving goal-directed that 
humans are phenomenally conscious of the object they oriented their behaviour to? This 
notion of logical possibility/necessity is therefore a posteriori. Since a priori thought 
experiments   that   block   out   empirical   evidence   are   phenomenally   grounded,   and   the 
theoretical positions accessed in that way are frequently wrong (such as, that goal-oriented 
behaviour requires consciousness), theory-free a priori thought experiments are epistemically 
unreliable. Because such a notion of possibility explicates conceptual relations of empirically 
(e.g., neurophenomenological) specified concepts, it corresponds to the understanding of 
philosophy being introduced at the beginning of the Introduction. 
There are two reasons why the difference between phenomenal and theoretical possibility is 
especially relevant: Firstly, it seems to make sense to think that precisely those phenomenal 
simulations that are internally evaluated as coherent appear intuitively plausible to us. 
Imagining Swamp man en route to inverted earth (Tye 1998) appears intuitively plausible to 
us because we can it more or less coherently simulate. As already insinuated, phenomenal 
possibility does not entail theoretical possibility. The fact that we are able to have a coherent 
phenomenal simulation of a zombie (Chalmers 1996, p. 94) is philosophically rather 
insignificant, because it is a function of our evolved biological endowment. That we can 
phenomenally simulate a seemingly possible world does not entail that this world is 
coherently or empirically plausible describable. Secondly, conceivability is often viewed as a 
property of statements. Decisively, yet, linguistically expressed propositional statements are 
not implied by non-propositional mental or phenomenal contents. Taking the representational 
or simulational dynamics unfolding in the human brain seriously, including phenomenal 
99  There   are   three   different   phenomenal   simulations   with   three   different   proper   functions:   producing 
representations of the actual world that are nomologically possible; generating general models of the world that 
are  nomologically   possible and   biologically  relevant  (in  planning  goal-directed   actions  pure  cognitive 
processes, for example); generating quasi-linguistic representations of logically possible worlds.
116processes,   is   at   odds   with   assuming   'propositional   modularity'.   Holistically,   context-
sensitively and non-propositionally processed phenomenal contents (e.g., imagine a zombie) 
do not entail statements expressed in a linguistic medium. 
To avoid misunderstandings, this is not to say that quasi-symbolic representations in the form 
of propositions of theoretically possible worlds cannot be phenomenally simulated. Clearly, 
language as an external medium can be introduced and processed at the phenomenal level – 
what is most important, however, is that the processed linguistic tokens are themselves modal 
symbols, since they are dynamically and context-specifically processed in auditory or visual 
form. (cf. Metzinger 2003, pp. 54-60)  
I think it could be quite informative to explain and determine once what is the mental content 
of individual subjects undergo when they are conceiving Swamp Man or a zombie. It seems 
more than questionable to conclude from that the fact that people linguistically confirm that 
they can conceive of Swamp Man that it is theoretically possible that there are beings without 
consciousness which are behaviourally indistinguishable from us. It is probable that the 
respectively processed mental contents are far from being part of a network of theoretical 
assumptions which could be epistemically relevant.
7 Summary
The central difference between objectivist cognitivist semantics and embodied cognition 
consists in the fact that the latter is, in contrast to the former, mindful of binding meaning to 
context-sensitive mental systems. According to Lakoff/Johnson's experientialism, conceptual 
structures arise from preconceptual kinesthetic image-schematic and basic-level structures. 
Gallese and Lakoff introduced the notion of exploiting sensorimotor structures for higher-
level cognition. Three different types of X-schemas realise three types of environmentally 
embedded simulation: Areas that control movements in peri-personal space; canonical 
neurons of the ventral premotor cortex that fire when a graspable object is represented; the 
firing of mirror neurons while perceiving certain movements of conspecifics. 
Sensorimotor coupling and the dual visual systems thesis are readily compatible. 
The body schema and the body image are functionally double dissociated phenomena: The 
former enables the non-phenomenal control of motor behaviour, the latter corresponds to 
visual phenomenal presentations and representations of the body. 
117The central function of the forward model is to reliably predict the consequences of 
behavioral output on input. It therefore makes a considerable contribution towards ensuring 
successful online processing. 
Phenomenal contents possess the property of being available for at least one of the following 
three processes: guided attention, cognitive processing, and behavioral control. 
Mental representations re-present a virtual external world and can become globally available. 
Phenomenal representations are globally available representations of a virtual external world.
Mental simulations process more or less (e.g., predicting consequences of behavioural output 
on   input)   counterfactual   contents   which   can   become   globally   available.   Phenomenal 
simulations are experienced as belonging to a subject who is transparently represented. 
In consequence of processing mental presentations, blindsight patients exhibit selective 
motor behaviour. Phenomenal presentations are not available for concept formation.
Multilevel considerations typify mechanistic explanations in cognitive neuroscience. The 
notion of mechanistically mediated effects as hybrids of causal and constitutive relations and 
the local nature of levels of mechanisms make it possible to resist Kim's argument against 
higher-level causes and the problem of overdetermination. 
The mechanistic framework provides an adequate concept of explanation because it does 
justice to the norms being implicit in cognitive neuroscience. It was shown that constitutive 
explanatory relevance (that is, mutual manipulability) is sufficient for causal relevance and 
that causal relevance (analysed in terms of the manipulationist view) accounts for the implicit 
norms of cognitive neuroscience. 
Whether   mental   occurrences   are   multiple  realisable   depends   on   the   granulation   of 
individuation, which lower-level is chosen, and the concept of function one is trying to 
explain. Mental occurrences are multiple realisable at many levels. Inter-theoretic constraint 
does not imply unique realisation, nor is it implied by it. Hence, the argument for strong 
psychological autonomy and the methodological argument are inconclusive. 
To the extent that the specification of neural processes depends on higher-level phenomena 
and the whole mechanism exhibits properties that the non-organised parts do not have, 
higher-level phenomena are not reducible to its non-organised realisers. That is not to say 
that the organised neural processing being specified in relation to macroscopically observable 
stimuli cannot be identical with the mechanism’s whole behaviour.
Furthermore, with a view to the practice of cognitive neuroscience Bechtel and McCauley’s 
heuristic notion of type identity is justified. This understanding of type identity is compatible 
with the multiple realisability of mental episodes at many levels. 
118Succinctly,   one   could   say   that   higher-level   phenomena   are   epistemically   irreducible, 
ontologically reducible (regardless of whether one has a concept of ontology that depends on 
downward looking explanations or not), and the intelligibility of identity claims is bound to 
multilevel explanations.  
Moreover, the conclusiveness of four classical arguments against identity claims was 
challenged: Neurophenomenology shows that bridging the explanatory gap is within sight; 
Metzinger’s analysis provides a functional determination of consciousness; Jackson’s Mary 
argument does not show that phenomenal experiences are not explanatorily reducible to 
neural processes; the apparent contingency of brain-mind identity may be explained by the 
insufficiency of our current epistemic situation; Davidson’s notion of token identity is hardly 
intelligible against the backdrop of the practice of cognitive neuroscience.
I presented an argument against extended functionalism. The basic thought was that the 
intelligibility of cognitive processes is uniquely realised by neural processes – given that they 
are specified at an appropriate level. Thus, in respect thereof, there are no two realisers 
(internal and external) of the same meaningful cognitive process.  
Perceptual symbols as multimodal, schematic records of the neural activation underpinning 
online sensorimotor processing are analogously and non-arbitrarily related to perceptual 
processes. PSS defines concepts in terms of simulators – that is, frames which integrate 
perceptual symbols across a variety of category instances into a spatial organisation and 
enable the potentially endless generation of specific simulations. Furthermore, productivity, 
the implementation of propositional structure, variable embodiment, and the processing of 
abstract concepts are derived features of the theory.
Because the mechanistic framework provides a justified concept of explanation and PSS was 
identified as a mechanistic explanation, Barsalou’s theory can be considered as a justified 
explanation.
According to Pulvermüller's theory, language consists of networks between perisylvian areas 
that process word forms visually and auditorily and content-bearing sensorimotor stand-ins. 
The example of somatotopic activation shows that motor representations are immediate, 
automatic, and functionally relevant and therefore not epiphenomenal. 
The fact that variables affecting perceptual processes (occlusion, size, shape, modality 
switching, orientation) also affect conceptual processing suggests that conception makes use 
of   modality-specific   mechanisms.   Even   more   compelling   is   that   lesions   in   specific 
sensorimotor areas are sufficient for knowledge deficits of categories involving contents 
which correspond to the lesioned areas. That the representation of categories varies both 
119inter- and intrasubjectively has also been corroborated. In addition to that, the situated nature 
of conceptualizations has been experimentally confirmed. 
Almost every objection to concept empiricism has been thoroughly rejected. Among the 
serious ones are the possibility that phenomenal simulations are mere epiphenomena, the 
prima facie problem of abstract concepts for perceptual symbol systems, and the objection 
that modal theories also still need to explain context-sensitivity.
Symbolism, as the older computational model, inter alia, suffers from the insubstantiality of 
conceptual and propositional modularity. Propositional attitudes can at best be captured by 
internal speaking at the phenomenal level. Exclusively syntax-sensitive computing of amodal 
linguistic forms occurs nowhere. Although connectionist models do justice to the statistical 
and parallel distributed character of mental processes, their disembodiment and non-
explanatory nature make them appear unsatisfactory. According to the dynamical systems 
theory, the mind consists of an ongoing, continuous trajectory through state space that works 
in real-time. Actually, neither single perceptual stimuli nor discrete mental representations 
occur. Online cognition has to be considered as continuous non-linear inseparable sensation-
cognition-action loops. That is true of environmentally detached offline cognition only 
insofar as it makes use of sensorimotor structures. With regard to its input, environmentally 
decoupled offline cognition does not rely on visual and behavioral input. 
Types of referring or directed mental occurrences are non-phenomenal motor simulations, the 
PMIR, and non-phenomenally or phenomenally experienced mappings of simulators onto 
transparent or opaque (e.g., emotions) phenomenal representations. 
Environmentally decoupled offline simulations do not refer to external entities (be it mind-
dependent or mind-independent ones). The internally controlled re-enactment of feature 
maps is all we have. The processed word forms refer to sensorimotor simulations within the 
cognitive systems, if you will. 
The crucial problem of Putnam's natural kind externalism is the point that the idea of 
psychophysical identical individuals with different mental contents is inconsistent within the 
frame of embodied cognition.
100 This idea is amiss if one bears in mind that mental systems 
have evolved internal structures in order to coordinate their behaviour in a more complex 
way and not represent mind-independent entities veridically. The principal problem in 
Kripke's reference theory of proper names is the disregard of internal processes that are 
required to make thoughts about individuals intelligible. 
100  Asserting this inconsistency does not beg the question, if one assumes that only those theories are 
epistemically relevant that are compatible with causally efficient processes. Explaining the content of all types 
of mental episodes in terms of reference to external entities does not meet this necessary condition.
120The pivotal reasons to repudiate informational semantics in terms of causal co-variance are 
as follows: This model cannot account for internally processed contents that are not features 
of our phenomenal world model.  The contents of environmentally  decoupled  offline 
simulations cannot be determined by causally co-varying environmental entities. Moreover, 
the potentially co-varying stimuli are self-generated by the brain. It also suffers from a strong 
content-vehicle distinction. The assumption of incipient causes and asymmetric dependence 
is arbitrary and ad hoc – which is no surprise in the face of a neglect of internal processes – 
and only anxious to preserve epistemic realism. 
Because I think that linguistic expressions are only contentful against the backdrop of 
phenomenal representations or simulations and that these could not differ from each other 
provided that Jane is psychophysically identical in both contexts, I challenge the claim that 
Jane’s mental contents differ. 
Insofar as our phenomenal presentations and representations are transparent, mental episodes 
are wide in phenomenal terms. Insofar as our phenomenal presentations and representations 
are neurally constructed in order to make some contents globally available, each processed 
content working against the backdrop of our phenomenal world model is specified narrowly. 
Content-nonconceptual content is that content which is cognitively unavailable – that is, not 
storable in long-term memory. State-nonconceptual processes are those processes whose 
occurrences   do   not   presuppose   concepts   (e.g.,   non-phenomenal   or   phenomenal 
proprioception). State-conceptual processes are those processes which only occur, if the 
respective mental system has concepts available (e.g., cognitively penetrated phenomenal 
perceptions or environmentally detached offline simulations). 
If bottom-up and top-down contents are not irreconcilable, as a rule cognitive simulations 
and sensory presentations and representations merge to generate phenomenal perceptual 
representations. 
Conceptual processing in terms of PSS is indeterminate for the following reasons: Re-
enacting schematically extracted symbols and the qualitative coding of high-level neurons 
are responsible for indeterminateness. Moreover, since phenomenal visual perceptions have a 
virtual character and are in this respect themselves indeterminate, conceptual processing is 
also indeterminate. Even the evolutionarily advantageous weakly expressed phenomenality 
(to avoid hallucinations) of offline simulations suggests phenomenal indeterminateness.
Non-synonymous co-referential expressions and intensional contexts are better explained in 
terms   of   context-specific   associations   between   linguistic   symbols   and   sensorimotor 
simulations than in terms of diverging referents in possible worlds. 
121We presented three different types of misrepresentations within the frame of our notion of 
embodiment. Furthermore, knowing the truth-conditions of sentences was analysed in terms 
of undergoing those sensorimotor simulations that are socially stipulated as being linked with 
the corresponding sentences (to be understood as arbitrary forms).
We   presented   two   arguments   of   Putnam:   The   one   was   believed   to   show   that   a 
compositional-referential and truth-functionalist semantics is inadequate, because it does not 
fulfil the condition that changing the meaning of the sentence’s parts is sufficient for 
changing the meaning of the whole sentence. The other was supposed to demonstrate that 
there is no way to speak of one objectively correct account of a classical notion of reference. 
If one proceeds on the assumption that non-phenomenal neural and phenomenal processes 
are interdependently specified, then arguing that the processing of inferential relations is 
constitutive of phenomenal mental content is more than questionable. If the mind equates to 
the ongoing processing of sensation-cognition-action loops, then the classical computational 
content-operation (to be understood as compositional logical syntax) distinction has to be 
abandoned.  
Moreover, it might well be that  the understanding of logical relations is ontogenetically 
grounded in pre-conceptual sensorimotor structures.  
Embodied cognition has the following methodological implications: IES and the causally 
oriented version of IEE are unreliable and this can be explained in terms of context-sensitive 
sensorimotor simulations. The epistemically solely relevant concept of mental, phenomenal, 
and theoretical possibility is theoretical possibility. 
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139Appendix
(Barsalou 1999, p. 593)
It is important to emphasize that the pictures in figure A are not pictures or conscious images 
in a literal sense, but they visualize and in so far stand for configurations of neurons. These 
configurations of neurons become active in representing the information that is depicted in 
the illustrations. As important as, the particular drawings stand for simulators that can 
generate endless simulations of the shown instance. 
The illustrations in figure B depict simulators of spatial relations. A notion closely related to 
the idea of image schemata (see second section of chapter one). If you perceive a plane above 
a cloud, you focus on the occupied spatial regions and extract the occupying phenomenal 
entities. Thereupon you have a schematic representation of  above  that comprises two 
schematic spatial positions. Given that you filter out this information on further phenomenal 
perceptions, you achieve an  above  simulator that yields a variety of different  above 
simulations (e.g., the two regions are vertically closer or broader apart). The thicker 
140boundary for a given spatial region indicates that it is that part which one's selective attention 
is focusing on. 
In C it is depicted how simulators in figure A and B combinatorially produce complex 
perceptual simulations. In the rightmost example, the simulators for above, cloud, and jet 
produce a complex simulation in which a cloud is simulated above a jet. 
In figure D a simulation is constructed recursively by specializing specialized schematic 
regions. The lower region of above is specialized with a left-of simulator's simulation, whose 
two regions are next specialized with simulations for jet and cloud. 
Boxes with thin solid lines stand for simulators, boxes with thick dashed lines stand for 
simulations.
(Barsalou 1999, p. 595)
In figure A the simulator of balloon (type) generates a simulation of balloon (token) which is 
mapped onto or fused with the phenomenally  perceived entity (token). This can be 
understood as the way in which PSS represents a proposition. 
In figure B the simulators of above, balloon, and cloud produce the hierarchical simulation of 
a balloon above a cloud. This simulation then is fused with the phenomenal perceptual scene. 
141In figure C the same perceived scene like in B is alternatively interpreted. Hereby the 
simulator of below substitutes the one of above whereupon selective attention focuses on the 
cloud instead of the balloon. 
Boxes with thin solid lines represent simulators, boxes with thick dashed lines stand for 
simulations, and boxes with thick solid lines represent perceived situations. 
142Zusammenfassung
Zentraler   Erklärungsgegenstand   dieser   Magisterarbeit   ist   der   Inhalt   unserer   mentalen 
Episoden. Die dafür in Anspruch genommenen explanatorischen Ressourcen stammen aus 
einem relativ jungen Paradigma namens embodied mind. Dieses betrachtet mentale Episoden 
als verkörperte bzw. neuronal verkörperte Zustände.
Das erste Kapitel beschäftigt sich mit grundlegenden Gedanken verkörperter Kognition. 
Darunter fällt unter anderem Lakoff/Johnsons Gedanke, dass die Inhalte höherer Formen von 
Kognition (wie z.B. Sprachverstehen oder Denken) anhand sensomotorischer Strukturen 
verstanden werden (beispielsweise verwendet man das Sprichwort „auf dem Schlauch 
stehen“, um eine momentane psychologische Situation einer Person intelligible zu machen). 
Dieser intuitiv eingängige Gedanke wird dadurch untermauert, dass bildgebende Verfahren 
der Hirnforschung zeigen, dass sensomotorische Gehirnareale aktiviert werden, wenn wir 
Sprache prozessieren bzw. über Dinge nachdenken, die nicht in der jeweils gegenwärtigen 
Umwelt präsent sind. Insofern spricht man auch davon, dass sensomotorische Areale von 
Umweltinputs entkoppelt werden können. Ihren Input erhalten sie dann aus raum-zeitlich 
repräsentierten Informationen, die im Langzeitgedächtnis abgespeichert sind. 
Dieser naturalistische Zugang zu Kognition steht dem der kognitivistisch objektivistischen 
Semantik diametral entgegen. Dem letzteren zufolge haben unsere mentalen Episoden 
deswegen Inhalt, weil sie auf denkunabhängige Entitäten referieren. Zudem verlangt der 
generelle und objektive Charakter unserer quasi-sprachlichen Begriffe, dass sie unabhängig 
von kontextuell verkörperten Subjekten intelligible sind.    
Das zweite Kapitel dient dazu, bestimmte begriffliche Unterscheidungen einzuführen, die 
hilfreich sind, um die Inhalte unserer mentalen Episoden umfassend beschreiben zu können. 
Zu   Beginn   dieses   Kapitels   wird   jedoch   zunächst   dafür   argumentiert,   dass   unsere 
phänomenalen (also bewusst erlebten bzw. erlebbaren) Wahrnehmungen (z.B. visuelle oder 
auditive) keinen direkten Zugang zu einer denkunabhängigen Welt verschaffen, sondern 
neuronal konstruierte Modelle sind, die bestenfalls einen Ausschnitt der externen Welt 
repräsentieren bzw. präsentieren. 
Die oben erwähnten begrifflichen Unterscheidungen sehen so aus, dass Repräsentationen, 
Simulationen und Präsentationen von einander abgegrenzt werden. Diese werden wiederum 
jeweils in nicht-phänomenal und phänomenal unterteilt. Der grundlegende Unterschied 
zwischen Repräsentation und Simulation besteht darin, dass der Inhalt von Simulationen vom 
jeweiligen Erfahrungssubjekt als intern (wenn z.B. eine Person daran denkt, was sie am 
143nächsten Tag zu tun hat), der von Repräsentationen jedoch als extern erlebt wird (wenn man 
z.B. ein Auto auf der Straße sieht) (abgesehen von Halluzinationen, die als solche erlebt 
werden). Präsentationen zeichnen sich unter anderem dadurch aus, dass sie Informationen 
bereitstellen, die nicht im Langzeitgedächtnis abgespeichert werden können und daher nicht 
zugänglich sind für kognitives Prozessieren (wie z.B. subtile Farbnuancen). Diese drei 
Begriffe werden unter anderem auch dadurch charakterisiert, inwieweit sie zugänglich sind 
für die folgenden drei Formen mentalen Prozessierens: auf etwas seine Aufmerksamkeit 
richten, Kontrolle von Verhalten und kognitives Prozessieren. Diese drei Formen liefern 
zugleich eine funktionale Charakterisierung von Bewusstsein. 
Am Ende dieses Kapitels wird dafür argumentiert, dass neuronale Vehikel und die Inhalte 
unserer mentalen Episoden co-konstitutiv füreinander sind.
Das dritte Kapitel zielt vor allem darauf ab, die wissenschaftliche Praxis von  cognitive 
neuroscience adäquat zu beschreiben und auf dieser Grundlage klassische philosophische 
Themen wie das Verhältnis von Körper und Geist, Reduktionismus, mentale Verursachung 
oder die Frage, ob Gehirn und Geist identisch sind, zu thematisieren bzw. zu reformulieren. 
Einem für dieses Kapitel zentralen Gedanken zufolge integrieren neurowissenschaftliche 
Erklärungen verschiedene Ebenen, darunter auch die wahrnehmbaren Verhaltens. Da ich 
mich einer bestimmten Form von Identitätsbehauptung verschreibe, werden auch klassische 
Argumente gegen Identitätsbehauptungen diskutiert, allen voran Multirealisierbarkeit. Ich 
argumentiere unter anderem dafür, dass selbst wenn mentale Episoden multiple realisiert sind 
durch   neuronale   Prozesse,   folgt   daraus   weder,   dass   Kenntnisse   von   Gehirnprozessen 
explanatorisch irrelevant sind, um mentale bzw. phänomenale Episoden zu verstehen, noch 
dass es keine inter-theoretischen Abhängigkeiten zwischen der Individuierung mentaler bzw. 
phänomenaler Episoden und neuronaler Prozesses gibt.  
Das vierte Kapitel dient dazu, Barsalous Theorie perzeptueller Symbolsysteme (PSS) zu 
rekonstruieren. Der Erklärungsgegenstand dieser Theorie sind höhere Formen von Kognition 
(wie z.B. Denken oder Sprachverstehen). Ihr grundlegender Gedanke ist, dass offline 
Kognition sensomotorische Areale so aktiviert, dass bestimmte raum-zeitliche Inhalte nicht-
phänomenal   oder   phänomenal   prozessiert   werden.   Diese   Theorie   wendet   sich   vom 
Symbolismus   ab,   da   amodale   Symbole   und   ein   computationales   Verständnis   von 
Propositionen (also solche, die nicht in sensomotorischen Arealen prozessiert werden) keine 
Rolle mehr spielen. Barsalou zeigt außerdem, dass abstrakte Begriff, wie z.B. Wahrheit, in 
sensomotorischen Strukturen gegründet sein können. In diesem Kapitel werden zudem 
empirische Evidenzen für PSS präsentiert sowie Einwände gegen PSS im Besonderen bzw. 
144begriffsempiristische   Theorien   im   Allgemeinen   diskutiert.   Außerdem   wird   eine 
Sprachtheorie neuronaler Verkörperung dargestellt, der zufolge arbiträre sprachliche Formen 
nur deshalb über etwas sind bzw. Inhalt haben, weil sie mit sensomotorischen Simulationen 
assoziiert werden. Insofern ist das, was Sprachverstehen kausal gründet, rein intern zu fassen.
Ganz im Sinne des Gedankens, dass Theorien über mentale Prozesse in dem, was neuronal 
passiert, gegründet sein müssen, werden im fünften Kapitel zwei computationale Modelle 
von   Kognition   (Symbolismus   und   Konnektionismus)   kritisiert,   da   diese   eine   solche 
Gründung missachten. Der zentrale Einwand gegen Symbolismus ist, dass Verhalten nicht 
durch   propositionale   Einstellungen,   die   im   Verhältnis   zu   quasi-linguistischen 
Repräsentationen stehen, erklärt werden kann. Ganz wesentlich dabei ist der Mangel an 
bedeutungstragenden   Strukturen   innerhalb   der   jeweiligen   Subjekte.   Konnektionistische 
Modelle stehen unter anderem vor dem Problem, dass die Modelle von inhibition-exhibition 
und point-to-point signalling all zu stark vereinfachen. Dieses Kapitel ist jedoch nicht rein 
negativ,   da   ein   nicht-computationales   Modell   vorgestellt   wird,   namens  dynamischer 
Systemtheorie. Diesem zufolge zeichnen sich mentale Prozesse durch kontinuierliche bzw. 
andauernde   sensomotorische   Aktivität   aus,   bei   der   es   keine   einzelnen   Input-Output 
Computationen  gibt, die nacheinander  bzw. linear  prozessiert werden. Dieses Modell 
unterscheidet sich auch dahingehend von computationalen Modellen, als es mentale Prozesse 
als real-zeitliche Phänomene betrachtet.   
Das sechste Kapitel setzt sich zum Ziel, die philosophischen Konsequenzen von verkörperter 
Kognition   im   Generellen   und   Barsalous   Theorie   perzeptueller   Symbolssysteme   im 
Besonderen   zu   explizieren.   Dabei   wird   für   folgende   Thesen   argumentiert:   (1)   Die 
intentionale Gerichtetheit (directedness) mentaler Episoden besteht darin, dass Simulatoren 
auf phänomenale Repräsentationen projiziert werden (wenn man z.B. eine Person, die man 
schon einmal gesehen hat, wieder erkennt). Diese Gerichtetheit wird als konkrete Referenz 
verstanden. (2) In Fällen von offline Kognition gibt es keine Referenz mehr, die relevant für 
die Inhalte unserer mentalen Episoden ist. (3) Eine informationale Semantik (die auf der Idee 
kausaler Co-Varianz zwischen externer Entität und interner Episode beruht) ist vielen 
Problemen ausgesetzt, die mit PSS gelöst werden können. Sie kann beispielsweise nicht 
erklären, wie es möglich ist, dass wir über Dinge nachdenken können, die nicht in der jeweils 
gegenwärtigen Umwelt präsent sind. (4) Phänomenale visuelle Wahrnehmung ist kognitiv 
penetrierbar. (5) Das Phänomen begrifflicher Unbestimmtheit ist gut vereinbar mit PSS.  (6) 
Zudem fassen wir den Inhalt mentaler Episoden als intern individuiert auf (narrow content) 
und wenden uns damit gegen einen sozialen oder natural kind Externalismus. (7) Normative 
145Relationen im Sinne inferentieller Beziehungen verstehen wir in Form von sensomotorischen 
Strukturen   (image   schemata).   (8)   Wenn   man   die   traditionelle   semantische   Idee   von 
Kompositionalität an ein klassisch computationales Modell von Kognition bindet, dann wird 
hierbei eine Elimination dieser Idee befürwortet. Wahrheit ist insofern nicht konstitutiv für 
den Inhalt unserer mentalen Episoden, als der Inhalt derselben in abstrakter Form bereits 
innerhalb der jeweiligen Subjekte vorhanden ist (das heißt, dass die Simulatoren hinreichend 
bedeutungstragend sind). (9) Letztlich wird die Unreliabilität philosophischer Intuitionen 
gezeigt und in Begriffen von embodied cognition erklärt.
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